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PREFACE
KIERAN A. KENNEDY
Director. The Economic and Social Research lnsitute
Following the publication of the paper Attitudes in the
Republic of Ireland Relevant to the Northern Ireland
Problem (ESRI Paper No. 97), by E. E. Davis and R. Sinnott,
the Executive Committee of the Institute proposed that a
paper be devoted to the subject which would enable the
authors to respond fully to criticisms of Paper No. 97, and
would allow the methodological and scholarly ~ssues that
arise to be discussed in an appropriate academic forum. The
present paper is the outcome.
Part I contains a general review of the issues by the authors
of Paper No. 97, and their response to published criticisms;
Part II is a critique of Paper No. 97 by four other members of
the Institute’s research staff; and Part III is a rejoinder by the
authors of Paper No. 97to the critique in Part II. In Appen-
dix I, the Head of the Survey Unit deals with issues raised
about the sampling method used in Paper No. 97. For some
years past, it has been the practice of the Insitute, on grounds
of economy, not to publish questionnaires in full. This prac-
tice was followed in the case of ESKI Paper No. 97, though
all of the questions involved in the analysis were published
in the text of the paper. As there has been considerable
interest in the questionnaire, however, it is reproduced in
full in Appendix H.
In the present ~aper, as’ in the case of all ESKI papers, only
the authors are necessarily committed to methods, analysis,
interpretation, and findings. Papers in each of the Institute’s
series are subject to the relevant refereeing procedures
described in my Preface to Policy Research Series Paper No. 1.
’The final responsibility for deciding whether, and in what
vii
form, the papers are published rests solely with the Director.
The established practice of the Institute, conforming to
normal academic practice, is that no direct supervisory
function is exercised by the Council, or by its Executive
Committee, in relation to a project once it is admitted to the
research programme. Accordingly, every Institute paper
contains the following notice: "The paper has been accepted
for..-g’ublication by the Institute which is not responsible for
~either the content or the views expressed therein." This
approach has been adopted as the best way of securing the
academic freedom and integrity of research workers, with, it
is hoped, a consequent growth of creative and rigorous
research.
Will
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INTRODUCTION
There are two ways in which one can evaluate research
results such as those presented in Attitudes in the Republic
of Ireland Relevant to the Northern Ireland Problem: Vol. 1
Descriptive Analysis and Some Comparisons toith Attitudes
in Northern Ireland and Great Britain (ES1ZI Paper No. 97).
The first is to examine the methodology and its application
in the particular case. The second is to examine the results
and their interpretation. The methodological issues are dealt
with in Section I. The underlying concept of attitude and the
criteria of attitude research are set forth and the extent to
which the research meets these criteria is examined. Section
I1 deals with the results and their interpretation. Two issues
arise. Are the results described and interpreted in appropriate
terms without exaggeration or distortion? How do the results
, as interpreted compare with other relevant evidence?
Criticisms of findings in ESRI Pape~ No. 97 which deal
with attitudes to the IRA and attitude towards Northern
Ireland Protestants fall into the foregoing broad categories.
Methodological criticisms related firstly to the questions or
items which were used. Critics argued that they were merely
factual statements; that they used emotive language; that
either singly or in combination they lacked balance; that they
were vague and ambiguous; that interviewees were not asked
directly about the attitudes reported; that graded response
categories were used which were meaningless in the context
of the items concerned; and that there was no provision for
"don’t know" responses. Secondly, there were methodologi-
cal criticisms of the statistical analysis of the data relating to
attitudes to the IRA and towards Northern Ireland Protestants.
These criticisms relate mainly to the procedure of factor
analysing only five variables, and to the interpretation of
.factor loadings. Both sets of methodological criticisms are
1
dealt with in Section I. In regard to the interpretation of the
findings, critics suggested that the results were described in
an extreme and unwarranted manner, and that the results
conflict with other evidence. These criticisms are dealt with
in Section II.
I METHOD
A The Concept of Attitude
In ESRI Paper No. 97 we distinguished between what we
described .as choice of solution, policy preferences and
attitudes. This distinction is basic to the structure of the
report) The first element of this tripartite distinction -
choice of solution -- is defined as an outcome (a set of
political institutions)which is regarded as both desirable and
possible. This concept is discussed at length in Paper No. 97
(pp. 29-32 and Figure 1). Turning to the second element,
policies are defined as "various steps (which) have been
suggested which the British and Irish Governments might
take in order to assist in bringing about a solution" (p. 63.)
and policy preferences are what people think should be done
in the case of each proposed step or action.
In regard to the third element, the meaning of the concept
of "attitude" seemed to us to be sufficiently clear in the con-
text of the treatment of the attitudes in question (towards
partition, the IRA and Northern Ireland Protestants) in
Section IV. Since many of the criticisms of Section IV of
Paper No. 97 would seem to be due to the fact that we did
not spell out the meaning of this widely accepted and widely
used concept, an elaboration of its meaning is necessary at
this stage.
The word attitude, as used in social psychological theory
and research, has two meanings: a broad meaning and a more
precise and restricted meaning. We shall deal here with the
1. The distinction is outlined in the General Summa~ which precedes the Report,
is re-stated in the IntToduction IP. 211 and is further elaborated on in the Report
in discussing preferences regarding government policy towards the IRA (p. 77I.
For a full account of the background to the re~:a.rch as a whole, ~ Davis and
.$innott 1976, 1978a, 1978b, 1978c, and Sinnott and Davis 1979.
$ .B,
term in the second sense2 since this is the meaning of attitude
as the term is used in the distinction between choices, prefer-
ences and attitudes, and since this meaning underpins the
discussion in Section IV. Probably the most frequently quoted
definition of attitude in this second sense is that of AUport:
"An attitude is a mental and neural state of readiness, organ-
ised through experience, exerting a directive and dynamic
influence upon the individual’s response to all objects and
situations with which it is related" (Allport, 1935). Examina-
tion of more recent definitions shows that Allport’s approach
continues to be influential. For example, the following
definitions have been put forward: "A personal disposition
common to individuals, but possessed to different degrees,
which impels them to react to objects, situations or proposi-
tions in ways that can be called favourable, or Ufifavourable"
(Guilford 1954, pp. 456-457); "state of readiness, a tendency
to act or react in a certain manner when confronted with
certain stimuli" (Oppenheim 1966, p. 105); "the specific
organization of feeling and beliefs according to which a
person evaluates an object positively or negatively" (Katz,
1966, p. 150); "an organised predisposition to think, feel and
behave toward a referrent or cognitive object" (Kerlinger
1973, p. 495); "positive or negative dispositions which
dispose a person to behave favourably (positively) or
unfavourably (negatively) toward particular foci" (MacGr6il
1977, p. 11); "a relative!y enduring system of beliefs about,
and associated feelings towards, an object or situation, which
predisposes one to respond to it in some preferential manner"
(Committee on Irish Language Attitudes Research, 1975,
p. 21) and finally, and rather simply, "feelings about parti-
cular social objects" (Nunnaily 1967, p. 515).
We do not propose to examine in detail these various
2. An example of the broad meaning of the term can be found in SdJtiz e: aL,
where attitude is defined as including: "various aspects -- for example, beliefs
about the r~ature of ~n object, person, Or gcoup; evaluations of it; tendenc/es to
behave tow’~rds it in a certain way; views about appropriate policy with respect to
it. One may ah~o include in his definition such other characteristics of an attitude
as the salience of the object for the in~vidual, the extent of differentiation in his
view of the object, his time perspective with respect to it, etc. Having thus ~--cified
his definition of attitude, the investigator is in a po:fition to formulate his research
problem more clearly by deciding which aspca he wishes to focus on" ($elltiz,
ct a/., 1959, p. 14"6).
definitions nor to review the many other available definitions
of attitude. The above definitions are presented in order to
illustrate two central features of attitude in this second or
restricted sense of the term. The first feature is that an
attitude is essentially evaluative in that it ascribes positive or
negative attributes to an object or involves an orientation
towards an object which is positive or negative. Secondly, an
attitude is not necessarily a reasoned response arrived at as a
result of comprehensive reflection and consideration but
may be primarily an affective response which is a matter of
disposition or habit. In summary, when analysing attitudes in
this sense, we are seeking to identify psychological states, dis-
positions, evaluative orientations, or feelings towards the
object in question. This c9ncept has important implications
concerning the techniques used to study attitudes.
B Choice of Technique
Though many techniques are available to the survey
researcher, two of the major alternatives for use with large
samples are forced choice questions and agree-disagree attitude
items. In the first of these two techniques there is one
question per issue and the respondent is asked to choose one
of a series of specified responses. In the case of the second
technique, the attitude in question is usually measured by a
combination of the responses to a number of individual
attitude statements.3 Each of these two methods has its own
validity, its own function and, most importantly, its own
rules.
For the purpose of identifying choices between mutually
exclusive categories, the forced choice question is the most
appropriate method. The principal rules governing this
method are that the questions should be unambiguous, that
$. Such combinations may b presented and analysed as summa~ons or avera~:s
of response scores (the procedure which we have employed) or as sets of response~
to individual items. Liken items have the advantage that they can be used in both
ways. As Moser and Kalton point out *’As the items composing a Likert scale are
themselves rating scales they ~ often usefuUy be analysed individually" (Moser
mad Kalton 1976, p. $62I.
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they should not lead the response in one direction or another,
that they avoid loaded or emoti(,e terminology and that they
should not presuppose information that the respondent does
not have.
When the task is to identify and measure attitudes, forced
choice questions have major limitations. Attitudes do not
fit easily into either/or categories, they are essentially matters
of degree and techniques for measuring attitudes should be
capable of taking account of this characteristic. As Edwards
(1957) in his text on Techniques of Attitude Scale Con-
struction states:
It may be noted that in the definition of attitude given
earlier we stressed the notion of degree of positive or
negative affect associated with a psychological object. It
!s a disadvantage of both the method of direct question-
mg and the observation of behaviour that they do not
conveniently lend themselves to an assessment of the
degree of affect individuals may associate with a
psychological object (p. 8).
The very precision of language required of a forced choice
question is a disadvantage when one is seeking to measure
something in which feelings and habit generally play a large
. role. Formal precision in language may fail to touch on or
evoke the response (positive or negative) that more colloquial
language could. A related problem is that the directness
which is required of a forced choice question may inhibit a
frank response on sensitive issues. We believe that attitude to
the IRA in particular is a sensitive issue and that individuals
may not be entirely frank in response to direct and explicit
questions. Accordingly, an indirect approach to the issue is
required. The authors of the classical attitude study The
Authoritarian Personality addressed a similar problem in
these words:
One might inquire why, if we wish to know the intensity
of some ideological pattern -- such as anti-Semitism --
within the individual, we do not ask him directly after
defining what we mean. The answer, in part is that the
phenomenon to be measured is so complex that a single
response would not go very far toward revealing the
important differences among individuals. Moreover, anti-
Semitism, ethnocentrism and political-economic reaction-
G
ism or radicalism are topics about which many people are
not prepared to speak with complete [rankness. Thus
even at this surface ideological level it was necessary to
employ a certain amount of indirectness (Adorno,
Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford, 1950, p. 14f).
In the foregoing quotation Adorno et al. also make the argu-
ment for the assessment of complex attitudes by means of
more than a single response. The problem with forced choice
questions is that, in exercising choice, the respondent reacts
specifically to’only one of the options or statements offered
to him. This precludes the possibility of combining responses
to the whole range of options. This is not a limitation in
studying choice from among known possibilities -- as in the
case of choice of solution or voting intention.4 But it would
seriously inhibit the measurement of attitudes involving
complex mental or emotional states.
Thus difficulties involved in the use of forced choice
questions to study attitudes can be overcome to a significant
extent by employing the alternative approach mentioned --
using agree-disagree attitude items and combining the
responses to a number of items in order to measure each
attitude. We are not arguing that this method is the on]y
valid approach to questionnaire construction nor that it suits
all circumstances. We do claim, however, and the claim is
widely accepted in the literature on survey research, that for
the purpose of investigating attitudes in the sense defined,
the use of attitude items and attitude scales is the most
appropriate approach. This is particularly so when the objects
of the attitudes include highly sensitive matters.
The crucial point in the present context is that the criteria
of attitude measurement and, specifically, the criteria for the
construction of attitude items or statements and attitude
scales are quite different from those which apply to the
design and wording of forced choice questions. We now out-
4. In that context, we used forced choice questions in ESRI Paper No. 97.
Exaxnplcs arc the series of questions on choice of solution (pp. 29ff.) and the
qucstlon on voting intention in a hypothedca[ referendum on the rcmovaJ of
Articles 2 and 3 from the Constitution (pp. 67-68). In the former case, respondents
were shown a List of potcntizl solutions. In the latter case, a card containing both
.zlzic.le$ was tho’,~a to the respondent as part of the question.
line these criteria and then discuss their application in the
research reported in ESRI Paper No. 97.
C Criteria of Attitude Measurement
(i) Items should employ language and phrasing which is
familiar and colloquial. One of the purposes of this criterion
is to ensure that the terms used are understood by respon-
dents. A further reason is that formality in language would be
likely to inhibit rather than facilitate the expression of habit-
ual responses. It might seem that this particular guideline
would lead to some vagueness, and indeed it has been suggest-
ed that vagueness to the point of ambiguity is a fault of the
items we have used. It should be emphasised that there must
be no vagueness in the mind of the researcher as to the nature
of the attitude he is studying. In this project, as in all attitude
research, much preparatory work was devoted to clarifying
the attitudinal concepts employed (see discussion under
criterion (vi) and (vii) below). Equally we do not want state-
ments which obviously contain more than one meaning,s
On the other hand, any attempt to excise all generalities
from attitude items and to specify each term used would lead
to a degree of formality and complexity in the items which
would’totally defeat their purpose. Oppenheim deals with the
issue in the following terms:
Paradoxically, however, it does not always pay to make
the statements too clear and unambiguous, or to ask the
respondent to think very hard. Often, a statement that is,
strictly speaking, almost meaningless, works very well
because pilot work has shown that respondents cloak it,
in their own way, with the meaning that our context
requires . . . As to careful thought, of course we want
respondents to be attentive, but we want them to think
and express themselves as they do habitually; we don’t
want them to think out a new philosophy of life on the
5. If crldcs approach the interpretation of attitude items in a highly inteIlectual-
ised way, seeking total exactitude, then of cour~ ambiguities will be detected.
Such ~ritlc~tms are irrelevartt jn that, as the above quote from Oppenheim makes
dear, the technique is specifically designed to avoid rumination in ar~werln8 the
survey q uc~rdo P..~
spot or to start ruminative doubts with every item. This
is one more reason for clothing the attitude statements in
language that will be familiar to them. (Oppenheim 1966,
pp. 115-116).
(iJ) Items shoulcl be evaluative and should include contentious
and emotive words and phrases. While a rule of forced choice
questions is that they should aim at neutrality, just the
opposite rule applies to attitude items -- they should ascribe
positive or negative attributes to the object in question.
Nunnally expresses the point succinctly: "There is no place
for truly neutral statements in summative scales" (Nunnally
1967, p. 5B2). On this aspect of the construction of attitude
items Oppenheim is even more specific:
Remembering that attitudes are emotional, we should try
to avoid the stilted, rational approach in writing attitude
statements and select from the tapes the more conten-
tiously worded statements of opinion; we must not be
afraid to use phrases relating to feelings and emotions,
hopes and wishes, hates, fears, and happiness.
(Oppenheim, 1966, p. 114).
(iii) Items, while contentious, should not be extreme.’This
and the following criterion are mentioned by Nunnally in the
passage from which the above quotation is taken and both
are really subsidiary aspects of the criterion of non-neutrality.
Any attitude may be expressed in statements of varying
degrees of extremity. Extreme expressions of an attitude will
be endorsed only by those who hold the attitude concerned
very strongly. Thus, very extreme statements of an attitude
should be avoided as the responses to them are likely to
misrepresent the varying degrees in which the attitude is held.
An underlying postulate here, deriving from the overwhelming
weight of experience in attitudinal research, is that attitudes
are essentially a matter of degree.
(iv) There should be an even division between positive and
negative items. Moser and Kalton (1976) suggest two reasons
for variation between positive and negative items -- it assists in
maintaining respondents’ attention and it minimises the
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effect of response set (the tendency for individuals to assume
a patterned or set way of responding) (Moser and Kalton, op.
clt., p. 362).
(v) Response categories for attitude items should allow for
expression of the intensity of attitude. One way of achieving
this is that respondents should be allowed to agree slightly,
moderately, or strongly with each item, and so also with
levels of disagreement.
(vi) Items must be relevant to the psychological object con-
cemed. This entails that the researcher has a clear concept
both of the attitude he wishes to measure and of the object
towards which it is directed. This conceptual clarification is
arrived at by means of a combination of a priori reasoning
and extensive exploratory research. The exploratory research
consists of open-ended interviews which should, where pos-
sible, be tape-recorded. Free-ranging in’terviews of this sort
play a vital part, not only in clarifying the nature of the
attitudes in which the researcher is interested, but also in
providing raw material for construction of attitude statements.
This source material insures against the use of excessively
intellectual and unfamiliar words and phrases. In emphasising
the importance of pilot interviewing, Oppenheim describes
its essential purposes as:
(1) to explore the origins, complexities, and ramifications
of the attitude areas in question in order to decide more
precisely what it is we wish to measure; (2) to get vivid
expressions of such attitudes from the respondent in a
form that might make them suitable for use as statements
in an attitude scale (Oppemheim 1966, p. 112).
(vii) In developing the measures of attitude for the final
survey (i.e., appropriate combinations of items), an analysis
of responses to a large number of potential attitude items
should be taken into account. This pretest entails further
interviewing, with a larger number of respondents, using a
structured questionnaire similar in form to the one that will
be used for the main survey. A sample of 200 to 300 respon-
dents is appropriate for this pretest. Its purpose is twofold:
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to assess potential items and groupings of items by the
analysis of actual responses to them and to improve and
refine the attitudinal concepts which guide the research. A
convenient and standard statistical procedure which allows
for this interplay between empirical analysis and conceptual
development is factor analysis. On the basis of the relationship
between items (as measured by their correlation coefficients)
factor analysis attempts to identify groups of items which
"go together". This facilitates the interpretation of particular
items and enables the researcher to discard unsatisfactory
items and select a sub-group of items to represent a particular
concept. At the same time, since the clusters do not necessar-
ily correspond to the expected grouping of items, factor
analysis may suggest modifications of the original concepts.
Use of factor analysis is not limited to the pre-test data. It
can also be applied to the results of the main survey and it
may, even at that stage, suggest significant modification of
the concepts and measures. In recommending that factor
analysis be used for the purpose outlined, Nunally says:
Since it usually is necessary to combine scores on a
number of variables to obtain valid measures of con-
structs, some method is required for determining the
legitimacy of particular methods of combining variables.
Important in determining this legitimacy are the patterns
of correlations among variables. Factor analysis is nothing
more than a set of mathematical aids to the examination
of patterns of correlations, and for that purpose, it is
indispensable (Nunnally 1967, p. 371).
Factor analysis does not provide definitive proof of the
adequacy of measures of attitude. On the other hand, the
fact that the relationship between attitudinal concepts and
items has been empirically examined, and that in the course
of this analysis both concepts and items have been modified,
increases confidence in the measures. The issue of the
~.dequacy of measures can be thought of in terms of validity.
A measure is said to be valid if it measures what it purports
to measure (see, for example, Kerlinger 1973, p. 457).
Homogeneity, or the internal consistency of a group of items,
is put forward by Nunnally as a necessary but not sufficient
11
condition for validity6 (Nunnally 1967, p. 92). Factor
analysis, by identifying relatively homogeneous clusters of
items, enables one to apply this condition to the selection of
items.
An important outcome of this preparatory research and
analysis is that each attitude can be represented in the final
questionnaire by relatively few items. This is important
because questionnaire space and interview time are scarce,
many issues compete for attention and much social and
demographic data have to be collected from respondents. It
is always desirable to have as many items as possible but,
as Oppenheim points out, the number of items is of secondary
importance:
However, more important than the number of attitude
statements used is the fact that they have been scaled:
They have been selected and put together from a much
larger number of attitude statements according to certain
statistical procedures. Because of this, we must not judge
the relatively small number, of attitude statements in a
finished scale at their face value: they are the outcome of
a process of complicated sifting and, in addition, represent
all the preliminary work and thought described in
Chapter 5 (Oppenheim 1966, p. 120).
D Application of the Criteria
The foregoing criteria are widely accepted for the measure-
ment of attitudes. The attitude items used in the reseaxch
must be judged by these criteria. Thus, criticisms which
centre on the use of contentious statements, emotive
5. Spedfically, Ntmnally is referring to "construct validity" v, fii~h is the concept
most relevant to attitude research. His sufficient condition is that "the supposed
measures of a cortsm~t . . . behave as expected" (Nunnally 1967, p. 92). This
statement is preceded by the caution that "A discussion of bow one can, if ever,
obtain sufficient evidence that a domain of observables relates to a consta’uct
requires an analyfi$ of some of the deepest innards of scienfit~c explanation."
(ibid. p. 92). This accords with Ntmnally’s earlier statement that "Validity is a
matter of degree rather than am all or none property and validation is an unending
i~ooe$$" (ibid. p. 75). A fimilar p~nt is made by Ke~ing~ who, having dis-
cussed an ideal approach to analysing validity concludes: "Though efforts to
study validity must always be made, reseasch should not be abandoned just
because the full method is not feasible" (Kerllnger 197~, p. 466).
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language, and indirect rather than direct questions are really
beside the point in that such criticisms arise from the appli-
cation of criteria which pertain to a different methodology,
which is not appropriate for attitudinal measurement. The
question then is whether we applied the above criteria
correctly. We consider this in relation to each of the criteria.
(i) Items should employ language and phrasing which is
familiar and colloquial
Examination of the items will show that the language is
colloquial and familiar and therefore tends to be general
rather than precise and specific. These characteristics are in
accord with the criteria of attitude research outlined. That
the statements are among those ordinarily made about the
objects or groups in question is borne out by our prepara-
tory and exploratory work prior to the main survey. As
briefly outlined in Paper No. 97 (ESRI Paper No. 97, p. 22),
approximately 60 wide-ranging interviews dealing with the
problem in Northern Ireland were conducted by the authors
and several rese~ch assistants in the Spring and Summer of
1976. The interviews were conducted with people living in
very diverse areas including a Border village and urban areas
in the East, IVlidlands and South of the country. Interviewees
were encouraged to express their views at length and in their
own terms. With few exceptions, the interviews were tape-
recorded so that the detail of phrases and words used could
be subsequently examined. Potential attitude items were
dra~rn from this source material and also from 70 taped inter-
views carried out by RTE journalists (see ESRI Paper No. 97,
p. 22) and from material collected from newspapers ar, d
political periodicals. The end product was a collection of
some 500 potential attitude items. These items were then
sifted and edited in the light of the criteria of attitude item
construction and in the light of concepts of the attitudes we
wished to measure.
(ii) Items should be evaluative and should include contentious
and emotive words and phrases.
Some of the criticisms of the individual items used to
measure these two attitudes have been that they refer to
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matters of fact, indeed to matters of fact which are beyond
dispute and which compel agreement. Although, as Moser
madKalton note, factual items are sometimes used as indirect
measures of attitude (Moser and Kalton 1976, p. 357), if
many of the items were factual, it would indeed lead one to
question whether this criterion of attitude measurement -
the measurement of evaluative orientation - was being met.
In evaluating this issue, it is helpful to examine the
responses to the individual items which are presented in
Appendix A Table Alfl Examination of these responses
indicates that, whatever about being factual statements, the
items are not statements which are obvious or which compel
a particular response. In each case significant proportions of
people take positions contrary to what our critics claim to be
facts. For instance, in the case of the item "The vast majority
of Protestants in Northem Ireland are w~lling to reach an
agreement acceptable to the Catholic communityt~’k~2 per
cent agree. One could interpret this and other divergences in
response as disagreement about facts, and conclude that one
set of responses represents a wrong perception of facts. The
alternative and, to our mind, more plausible interpretation
takes into consideration that the items either state basic
evaluations ("I support, etc., ...... " ". ..... it is only’right that,
etc., ...... ") or they ascribe or deny positive or negative char-
acteristics to the .object or group in question ("bunch of
criminals and murderers"~ "patriots and idealists", "willing
to reach an agTeement acceptable to the .Catholic com-
munity"). On this interpretation the responses indicate not
that some respondents misjudge the facts and are wrong but
that res~)ondents differ in their attitudes, i.e., they have
different evaluative orientations towards the object or group
in question.
It has. been argued that the IRA items used are factual
statements because they can be seen as referring to the defen-
sive role of the IRA at the beginning of the 1970s. However,
7. These data were not included in the original paper as we felt we had adequately
summarised them. We recognise that in not presenting these data in ESRI Paper
No. 97 we did not adequately take account of the needs of those readtas who
prefer to tee the indivld~ frequencies rather thaLn average score*, or who would
wish to compazx our summary measures to the distributions on the original items..
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the items themselves are general rather than specific, and the
insertion of a specific historical reference is arbitrary. This
is not to deny that respondents may be influenced in their
response by their perception of the role of the IRA in the
past. This does not affect the point that the items are overall
evaluations of the IRA.
Thus the items relating to attitudes to the IRA and
towards Northern Ireland Protestants are eval/lative not
factual. What is more, these evaluations are frequently stated
in a contentious way using emotive words and phrases (e.g.,
"bunch of criminals and murderers"; "basically patriots and
idealists"; "prepared to defend privileges at all costs"). Use
of such expressions is entirely consistent with the require-
ments of attitude measurement.
(iii) Items while contentious should not be extreme.
This criterion is subordinate to the more basic criterion
that items should be contentious. The underlying principle
is that the degree of moderation-extremism of an attitude
item is relative to the attitude concerned. Just as, in general,
measuring instruments must be in proper proportion to what
is being measured, so also with attitudinal measures. Using an
item which is very extreme relative to a particular attitude
would be analogous to using an oven thermometer to measure
body temperature. Thus the issue of whether our items are
too extreme must be judged in the context of the nature of
the attitude in question and of the range of statements com-
monly made about the object of that attitude. Seen in this
light," the IRA items which critics have suggested are extreme
are, we believe, contentious but not unduly extreme. In our
exploratory interviews we encountered other statements
which we judged to be more extreme than those which we
finally used.
(iv) There should be an even division between positive and
negative items.
As indicated, the first reason for this rule is that it assists
in maintaining respondents’ attention. This argues for a
balance of items in the questionnaire itself. Examination of
Section V of the questionnaire used in the present study (see
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Appendix II) will show that a reasonable variation between
positive and negative items is maintained in that section, and
that further variation is derived from the inclusion of items
dealing with perceptions rather than evaluations,s
The second reason for the rule (that it minimises response
set) is related more to the balance of items in each single
measure of attitude. This criterion was borne in mind in the
selection of items for the original four measures of attitude
which axe listed on p. 94 of ESILI Paper No. 97. The four
attitudinal measures, together with the positive-negative
balance of the related items (in brackets) were as follows:
attitude to partition (3, 2), attitude to the IRA (3, 2), attitude
to British involvement in Northern Ireland (1, 2) and attitude
toward Northern Ireland Protestants (2, 2). As indicated in
Section IV of Paper No. 97, analysis of the results of the
main survey suggested a different grouping of the items from
that originally expected. In our judgement, the revised clL".. ~’:
of items produced more satisfactory measures of att;tude. A
price was paid in the process of revision in that the original
even balance of positive and negative items was to some
extent lost. Thus, attitude to partition is measured by five
anti-partition items and one pro-partition item, and attitude
to IRA motives is measured by two positively phrased items.
We feel, however, that the gain involved in revising the expect-
ed clustering of items outweighs the partial loss of an even
division between negative and positive items (the distinction
between two components of attitude to the IRA is fully dis-
cussed below). The Committee on Irish Language Attitudes
8. The issue of the sequence of items or questions is not ~edfic to the attitude-
sczJh~ approach. We have been cnllcised for our decision to place questions on
~[~n"cnzes rcgardlns Brifi.th withdrawal before questions concerning expec~
of the consequences of such withdrawal. The reverse of this ordel~ng (see pp. 18-
19 of the Qu[stlonnalxe in Appendix II) would, in our view, be likely to bias
downwaxd~ the preference [or Br~tish withdrawal because to endorse something
which has been stated to have violent consequences is likely to be seen as a
socially undesirable response. It is much less Ukel? that the question concerning
preferences would affect responses to the question concerning expected con-
sequences. It was for this reason that we asked for preferences Ftrst ~nd expecta-
lions of consequencel scconcL Since there are strong a priori grounds for believing
that our question ordering was the most appropriate one, the strategy of rotating
the ordering of the ques~on~ would have rlskcd w~l~ng half the data on this
Research encountered the same problem:
Ideally one should include an equal number of positive
and negative items in any attitudinal scale~ Unfortunately,
although we had included a roughly equal number of
positive and negative items in the interview schedule,
these did not "yield" .an equal number of positive and
negative items on each factor (Report of the Committee
on Irish Language Attitudes Research, 1975, p. 27).
Besides, in assessing the question of balance of items, it
should be noted that response set is not now generally
thought to be as big a problem as has sometimes been suggest-
ed. After a lengthy discussion of the issue, Nunnally summar-
ises the position as follows:
The overwhelming weight of the evidence now points to
the fact that the agreement tendency is of very little
importance either as a measure of personality or as a
source of systematic invalidity in measures of personality
and sentiments. What little stylistic variance there is
because of that tendency, if any, can be mostly eliminated
by ensuring that an instrument is constructed so that
there is a balance of items keyed "agree" and "disagree"
with respect to the trait in question (NunnaUy 1967, pp.
611-612).
While Nunnally endorses the criterion’ of even balance within
each scale, it is evident that he accords it a low priority.
(v) Response categories for attitude items should allow for
expression of the intensity of attitude.
As indicated in Paper No. 97 (p. 23), the format for
response was as follows:
DISAGREE AGREE
strong moderate flight flight :L moderate strong
(Attitude [ I I [ I I I [
The origin and nature of the attitude statements and the pro-
.cedure for responding to them was fully explained to respon-
dents (see page 6 of the Questionnaire ’in Appendix II).
Registration of intensity of attitude was described to respon-
¯ dents as follows:
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As it is likely that you will have stronger views about
some of these statements than about others, we have
provided three degrees of agreement and three degrees of
disagreement for each statement. Please place an "X" in
the box which best described your opinion (Appendix II,
p. 6).
The use of this procedure was then illustrated by means of a
hypothetical example. We have seen that it is desirable that
provision be made for expression of intensity of attitude. Our
procedure meets this criterion. Given the full explanation
provided for respondents, we have no reason to believe that
the use of degrees of agreement or disagreement with any of
the items caused problems for the respondents.
Use of the above response format also raises the issue of
the non-provlsion of an explicit "donCt-know"-category. The
"don’t know" problem was handled in the following way. If
a respondent refused to respond to a particular item, that
item was marked "R" in the margin and these refusals were
treated as missing data and omitted from the analysis. The
highest overall refusal rate for any of the combinations of
items was 3.5 per cent (see Table 43, ESILI Paper No. 97, p.
99). Respondents who said "don’t know" were first of all
prompted to see if a negative or positive response could be
elicited. In the absence of such a response, that item was
marked with "X" in the space between the Agree and Disagree
sets of boxes. The responses to each item were assigned a
score from 1 to 7, with 1 indicating strong disagreement and
7 indicating strong agreement and with "don’t know"
responses being assigned a score of 4. This procedure involves
a definite interpretation of "don’t know" responses as
neutral. Now, the largest percentage of "don’t know"
responses on any of the items included in the summated
scales was 3.7 per cent (see Appendix A Table A1). This
means that including or excluding the "don’t know" responses
as scores of 4 in the scales has htfle effect on the results.
Furthermore, there is ample precedent in the literature for
the use of the procedure employed in the present research.
After a lengthy discussion of the issue, Nunnally recommends
that a "don’t know" c~ttegory should not be lm-ovided in the
scale, giving as an example a six-step scale virtually identical
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to the one employed in the present reseaxch. He summarises
the position thus:
Although the issue is not highly important, in most cases
there is a slight advantage in having an even number of
steps rather than an odd number, as was illustrated
previously in the six-step scale ranging from "completely
disagree" to "completely agree" (Nunnally 1967, p. 522).
(vi) Items must be relevant to the psychological object con-
ceTned.
Two issues arise in this regard -- the designation of the
object of the attitude and the concept of the attitude itself.
On the first issue, it has been suggested that our items do not
meet this criterion because (a) the term IRA could be under-
stood as referring to what is now commonly called the
"Old IRA" and that on this basis the term "Provisional IRA"
should have been used, and (b) the term "Unionist" would be
preferable to "Northern Ireland Protestant" as a designation
of the object of our "attitude of political opposition".
(a) While it is true that the Provisional IRA has been the
largest and most active paramilitary organisation on the
republican or nationalist side, at no point has it been the only
active organisation of this kind. The term IRA has the
advantage of being general enough to include all republican
paramilitary organisations while at the same time being
colloquially used as a designation of the Provisional IRA. We
do not believe that there is any significant probability that, in
1978, in the context of a series of questions and statements
dealing with the contemporary situation in Northern Ireland,
respondents would understand the term IRA to refer to the
mifitary wing of the independence movement in the period
1919-1921 or to the anti-treaty forces in the period 1922-
1923.
(b) The term Northern Ireland Protestants was used in
preference to such terms as unionist or loyalist because all of
the exclusively political labels have shifted considerably in
meaning in recent years and no longer have a clear referent.
The aim of the research was not to ascertain attitudes to
those who happen to support the present constitutional
status of Northern Ireland (the data in Paper No. 97 relating
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to Northern Ireland indicates that this includes a significant
proportion of Northern Ireland Catholics). We were interest-
ed rather in ascertaining attitudes towards Northern Ireland
Protestants, not as a religious group, but as what we saw as a
recognisable group or community involved in a political con-
flict. The items refer to this group or community and proceed
to make political statements about it. The point is clearly
stated in Paper No. 97 in introducing the items and the
measure -- "What is involved here is not a measure of social
prejudice in general but of political attitude (ESILI Paper No.
97, p. 100).
For these reasons we believe that the terms "IRA" and
"Northern Ireland Protestants" are the most appropriate
designations of the objects of the attitudes concerned and,
accordingly, that our attitude items meet this aspect of the
criterion.
Relevance to the psychological object also requires that
the researcher have a clear concept of what it is he is seeking
to measure. As indicated in outlining this criterion the open-
ended exploratory interviewing conducted at the outset of
the research (described in (i) above) is a vital stage in develop-
hag appropriate concepts and in ensuring a match between
concepts and items. Conceptual development and ref’mement
obviously occur after this stage, however, and the issue of the
development of our concepts of attitudes to the IRA and
towards Northern Ireland Protestants and of appropriate
measures of them is taken up at length in Section E, below.
(vii) in developing the measures of attitude for the final
survey, an analysis of responses to a large number of potential
attitude items should be taken into account.
Just over one hundred potential attitude items were
included in a pre-test study on a stratified sample of 256
respondents in December ]~976 -January 1977.9 At this
stage of the research, the concepts, the attitude items and the
relationship between them inevitably required considerable
clarification and refinement. Factor analysis was used as an
g. For a decailecl discussion of the pre-cest and of some of the factor-ana/yd¢
re~tltw see Davis ~nd Sinnort 1978a and 1978b.
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aid in exploring and interpreting responses to this large
number of attitude items. The results of this analysis were
used in selecting items to measure particular attitudes in the
main survey. The responses in the main survey itself were
then taken into account in finalising the measures of attitude
and this process suggested further significant modifications
(see ESKI Paper No. 97, pp. 94-101). The process of develop-
ment of the measures of attitudes to the IRA and of attitude
tow~ds Northern Ireland Protestant~ will now be discussed
in greater detail.
E The Development of the Measures of Attitudes to the IRA
and of Attitude towards Northern lreland Protestants
(i) Attitudes to the IRA.
Throughout the preparatory stages of the research a single
concept of attitude to the IRA was employed, i.e., pro versus
anti IRA. From an initial set of fifteen items, seven were
selected as representative of this attitude. The other items
were excluded from the measure because they were factual,
historical, included more than one distinct concept, or
because they related to specific policy preferences in the area
of security. Five of these seven items were used with some
minor modification in the final study, the other two being
included in a nationally representative survey dealing mainly
with subjective social indicators in June 1977.1°
With the benefit of hindsight we readily acknowledge that
it would have been better had we included more items
relating to attitude to the IRA. This is particularly so in view
of our decision, t~tken during the analysis of the survey
results, to split attitude to the IRA into two components:
attitude to activities and attitude to motives. It should be
borne in mind, however, that in addition to the five IRA
attitude items reported on in Section IV, the survey included
seven items measuring policy preferences relating to the IRA.
10.The distributions of responses to these two items ("The IRA are engaged in a
just war against the British" and "The IRA ~rc an obstacle to a just and l~ting
solutloq to the problem in Northern h’el,and") accord with the disuibudons on
the items used in the main sttrvey in 1978.
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(The responses to each of these seven policy preference items
were fully described in ’Section III of Paper No. 97 (EStLI
Paper No. 97, pp. 77-83)). While one could have devoted a
whole research project to exploring attitudes to the IRA, our
research project was concerned also with many other aspects
of the Northern Ireland problem such as choice of solution,
policy preferences, and attitudes to Irish identity.
Given the limited number of items measuring attitude to
the IRA, the question may well be asked: would it not have
been better to have adhered to the original intention of
measuring overall attitude to the IRA with five items? Had
we done so the distribution of respondents on "attitude to
the IRA: pro versus anti" would have been as shown in Table
1. Focusing on the summary figures in Table 1, we would
have concluded that 98 per cent of respondents were in some
degree pro.IRA in their attitudes, 50 per cent in some degree
anti IRA and 26 per cent neutral We felt that this conclusion
would not have been incorrect, but that it could be, and in
our view should be, further ref’med. The possibility of such
refinement is suggested in the first place by the range of the
responses to each of the individual items (see Table 2). These
range from a low overall pro IRA response of 20 per cent to
the "methods" item ("the methods of the IRA are totally
unacceptable") to a high overall pro IRA response of 52 per
cent to the "patriots and idealists" item ("the IRA are
basically .patriots and idealists"). One interpretation of this
range of responses is that the items are all expressing the
same attitude with varying degrees of intensity. An alterna-
tive interpretation is that two different things are being
meas{ared. When one re-examines the five items in the light of
this possibility, a plausible case can be made that Items 1 and
2 in Table 2 are measuring attitude to IRA activity, and
Items 4 and 5 are measuring attitude to IRA motives. Place-
ment of Item 3 is more problematic but it seems to us that
the balance of argument is in favour of treating it as a measure
of attitude to activities. Although this interpretation is not
conclusively established by inspection of responses to the
individual items and relies on the researcher’s judgement, it
is given support by a separate factor analysis of the five IRA
items.
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While factor analysis of five variables is uncommon, this
does not in any way invalidate the procedure, though the
results will be more tentative than would be the case with a
larger number of items. The first question in this factor
analysis is whether or not it is legitimate to extract more than
one factor. Barlett provides.a test of significance for assessing
the legitimacy of extracting additional factors from a corre-
lation matrix (see Lawley and Maxwell 1963, pp. 51-54).
Application of the test indicates that it was quite in order to
extract a second factor.H
Table h Attitude to the IRA: pro (vers~) anti (based on five items taken
together)
percentage Attitude to lRA : " percentage
Attitude to IRA: of pro (versus) anti of
pro (veTs~) anti respondents (reduced categories) respondents
1 Strongly anti 9.0 Anti 50.3
2 Moderately anti 17.0
3 Slighdy anti 24.3
4 Neutral 26.6 Neutral 26.6
5 Slighdy pro 15,1
6 Moderately pro 5.6
7 Strongly pro 2.4 Pro 23.1
Total 100,0 Total 100.0
Number ( 1697) Number ( 1697)
11. In this case the issue is whether~he malrix contains more thma one factor, so
that one must test the null hypothes~s that the remaining four latent roots are
equaL Application of the test yhelds a value for the criterion of 126.52 which isdlstaJbuted approximately as X with, in this case, 9 degrees of freedom.
a level of significance of .001. Application of the test to the three remaining
latent roots indicates that one could exta-act a further factor. However, given the
ratio of factors to variables which this would involve, a three-factor solution
would not be satisfactory. One should note that the above test relates to the
random sample (N = 17581 and the two extra samples (N -- 217, N -- 236) taken
together. This is because in the original factor analysis we employed all the avail
able cases. Our reason for doing so was that, since the structure of attitudes could
be expected to be relatively stable a~oss all subgroups of the population, the
opportunity to work with the larger number of cases could and should be availed
oL Because tests of significance requh-e the ~tsumption of random sampling, we
earl’led out the Bartlett test on the v:sults of the same fak’tor analysis of the
random larnple data only. The rcsul~ were as followsX"t      119.25, df ~ 9,
p~- 001.
23
Table u: Frequencies on five individual items relating to the IRA
p~ Rrff~ttd p~
.1 .,P*~y "1
"Deviation from total of :oo per cent is due Io rounding ~’ror.
; Having ascertained that a second factor would be statisti-
cally significant, the next issue is whether the two factors can
be rotated to yield interpretable results. The loadings on two
varimax rotated factors were presented in Appendix Table
B.2 of Paper No. 97. These loadings suggest a clustering of
the items into two groups corresponding to the groups
suggested by the a pHoH reasoning outlined above (the load-
ings are reproduced here in Table 3).
Table 3 : Factor analysis of five items relating to the IRA (orthogonal and
oblique rotations)
(i) £nad/ngs on two vat/max (orthogona//y) rotatedfaqors
Factor I Fatt~r 2
I Were it not for the IRA the Northern problem
would be even further from a solution -0.60 0.37
2 The methods of the IRA are totally u rmceeptable. 0.88 0.01
3 The 1RA are basically a bunch of criminals and
murderers. 0.65 -0.4 I
4 Leaving aside the question of their methods,
I basically support the aims of the fgA. , -0.32 0.71
5 The 1RA are basically patriots and idealists. -0.0"/ 0.86
(ii) LaadingJ on two obliouely rotated fagtors, (direct oblim wi~ Kaiser normalisation.)
FacLor I Factor 2
I Were it not for the IRA [he Northern problem
would be even further from a solution. 0.56 0.2.5
2 The methods of the IRA are totally unacceptable. -0.94 0.20
3 The IRA are basically a bunch o f criminals and
murderers. -0.62 -0.29
4 Leaving aside the question ff their methods,
I basically support the aims of the IRA. 0.20"~" 0.68
5 The IRA are basically patriots and idealisus. -0.10 0.89
% Vat 47.6 .16.7
Cumuladve percentage of variance-64.3
¯ Thus, Items 1, 2, and 3 are the items which are most
¯ importfint on Factor 1. This group of items was interpreted
.in Paper No. 97 as referring "to aspects of IRA activities:
2~
without their activities the problem would be worse (Item 1)i
the methods underlying their activities are totally unaccept-
able (Item 2) and their activities make them a bunch of crimi-
nals and murderers :(Item 3)" (ESRI paper No. 97, p. 97).
Similarly Items 4 and 5 ("aims" and "patriots and idealists’!)
are the most important items on Factor 2, and these were
interpreted in Paper No. 97 as representing an attitude to
IRA motives. This grouping of the items involves a decision
to assign Item 3 to Factor 1 above despite the fact that it also
has a loading on Factor 2.just above the higher of the two
conventional cut-off points in factor analysis (.40). The
decision is justified in our view by the substantially higher
loading of the item on Factor 1 and by size of the gap
between .41 and the next highest loading on Factor 2, i.e.,
.71. This interpretation of factor loadings is consistent with
our use of factor analysis as an exploratory technique. The
decision receives further support from the fact that the
ahemative factor analytic procedure of oblique rotation
(which some might argue would be more appropriate in the
circumstances) produces a more clearcut result with no over-
lap of loading between the items as we have grouped them
(see part (ii) of Table 3).
As already emphasised (see pp. 11-12), factor analys’is does,
not prove that our measures are valid; it provides a degree of
evidence to back up a particular interpretation or judgement.
In the case of the five IRA items, as with all attitudinal items,
judgement plays a considerable role but we would argue that
the judgement to use the evidence to discuss two dimensions
o¢ attitude to the IRA rather than one.!s j,astified on inter-
pretative grounds, assists in clarifying the attitude concerned,
and receives sufficient support from analysis of the data to
sanction its use.
(ii) Attitude towards Northern lreland Proiestants
In the early stages of the research we considered two
distinct attitudes in this area, the first being political con-
frontation versus compromise in general and the second being
an attitude of acceptance or rejection of Northern Ireland
Protestants. As the research proceeded, we adopted a concept
which combined elements of both of these, viz:, an attitude
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of political compromise or opposition, conciliation or con-
frontation vis-a-vis Northern Ireland Protestants. Ultimately,
we rejected the label confrontation versus conciliation as too
extreme and chose instead the more general term anti versus
pro.
As the text of ESRI Paper No. 97 indicates, t~o of the
items relate to the perception of the political stance of
Northern Ireland Protestants. The first of these ("The vast
majority of Northern Ireland Protestants are willing to reach
an agreement acceptable to the Catholic community") was
discussed above (p. 14). We argue that the chatacteristic
being attributed or denied is a desirable one ("willing to
reach an agreement") and accordingly, that responses are
indicative of an attitude. The second item is "The basic prob-
lem in Northern Ireland is that Protestants ate prepared to
defend their privileges at all costs". Central to this statement
is the phrase "the basic problem in Northern Ireland is ..."
and agreement with the item indicates a.perception of a high
degree of Northern Ireland Protestant intransigence which in
turn indicates an attitude of opposition. This interpretation
of the responses as an attitude of political opposition is re-
inforced when one considers the other two items in the
measure. Disagreement with the statement "Since they are
the majority, it is only right that Protestants should have the
last say in how Northern Ireland is to be governed" is a denial
of what the majority community in Northern Ireland would
regard as their basic political rights. Finally, the item "North-
ern Ireland Protestants have an outlook and approach to life
that is not Irish" must be seen in the context of the prevailing
rejection of partition. In this context agreement with the
item seems to us to indicate quite fundamental political
opposition.
These four items clustered together as the third factor of
the three-factor solution (see Appendix A, Table A2 which
presents both a three-factor and a four-factor solution) and
this clustering was in accordance with our expectations in
selecting these items for the final questionnaire. However, the
cluster is not as homogeneous as the other clusters or com-
binations of items used, i.e., the items ate not as closely
related (the average correlation between the items is .19,_see
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Appendix A Table A3). While there is no consensus as to the
minimum degree of homogeneity required of an attitudinal
measure, it is arguable that our summary reference to the
homogeneity of subsets of items being "empirically establish-
ed by means of the factor analysis" (ESRI Paper No. 97, p.
96) oversimplifies the matter by not adverting to this variation
in the degree of homogeneity attained. The point remains,
however, that the four items relating to Northern Ireland
Protestants clustered together as expected in the factor
analysis. While it would be preferable if the average inter-
item correlation were higher, all that the relatively low corre-
lation suggests is that there is room for improvement of the
attitudinal measure concerned and therefore a need for
further research in this area. However, we are confident that
we have succeeded in measuring this attitude adequately
though not as well as we would have wished and our view is
strengthened by the fact that MacGr~il, using a different
method and the stimulus "Unionist", arriving at findings’
quite similar to our own (MacGr~il 1977, p. 248).12
12. MacGr~l’s findin~ are fur~er d£scu.s~d below (p. 37).
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II INTERPRETATION
The issue of interpretation will be dealt with under two
headings - interpretation of attitudes to the IRA and inter-
pretation of attitudes towards Northern Ireland Protestants.
A Attitudes to the IRA
One could have summarised the results of this part of the
research by reporting the distribution on the five IRA items
individually. The outer limits of the distribution of attitudes
to the IRA are established by the 20 per cent disagreement
and 77 per cent agreement (each more or less strongly) with
the item "the methods of the IRA are totally unacceptable"
(Table 2). (The fact that overall favourable response to the
IRA does not go below this 20 per cent figure on any of the
five items is particularly important inview of the controversy
concerning our conclusion, which we drew on the basis of
responses to three items taken together, that 21 per cent are
in some degree supportive in their attitude to IRA activities.)
Responses favourable to the IRA range upwards from this
20 per cent to the 52 per cent agreeing (again more or less
strongly) to the item "The IRA are basically patriots and
idealists". As to the items in between, overall, 35 per cent
agree with the statement that "were it not for the IRA the
problem would be even further from a solution", while 59
per cent disagree; 43 per cent disagree with the statement
that "the IRA are basically a bunch of criminals and murder-
ers", while 50 per cent agree; and 49 per cent agree with the
statement "Leaving aside the question of their methods, I
basically support the aims of the IRA", while 4:6 per cent
disagree with this statement.
Focusing on the issue of attitudes favourable to the IRA,
one could have presented the above range of favourable
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responses to these IRA attitude items (20 to 50 per cent) as
indicating the proportion of people in some degree favourable
in their attitudes to the IRA or one could have taken the
further step of suggesting the possible interpretation that the
lower end of the range represented an attitude to IRA
activities and the upper end an attitude to IRA motives. In
either event the conclusions would not, we believe, differ
significantly from the conclusions which we drew from the
average scores on the items. We now turn to those conclu-
sions and their interpretation.
The nub of the distinction which we made regarding
attitudes to the IRA is the difference between attitude to
activities and attitude to motives. Both attitudes can be
favourable or unfavourable. In order to describe the favour-
able-unfavourable continuum in regard to IRA activities, we
used the term "support" versus "opposition" The frrst point to
be emphasised in relation to this term is that the support we
are discussing (and indeed the opposition) is graded or is a
matter of degree. This is quite clear in both tables and text.
Thus Table 43 of Paper No. 97 lists three degree of support
¯ and three degrees of opposition, plus a neutral category, and
indicates that only 2.8 per cent have a "strongly supportive"
attitude (ES1LI Paper No. 97, p. 99). In the text it is emphas-
ised that "13 per cent are slightly supportive as against eight
per cent moderately to strongly supportive". The strongest
statement in the text (the "stark fact" statement) is itself
highly qualified - "the stark fact remains that 21 per cent
of the population emerge as in some degree supportive in
their attitude to IRA activities" (ibid., p. 98).
The second point to note about the term support is that it
does not imply any concrete activity. This usage is clearly
included in the relevant dictionary det-mition of support
which is "to strengthen the position of (a person or commun-
ity) by one’s assistance, countenance, or adherence; to uphold
the rights, claims, authority or status of; to stand by, back
up" (Oxford English Dictionary). More important is the fact
that the text explicitly disavows any claim to be making
inferences about activity:
It should also be emphasised that we have" no evidence
that an attitude of support for IRA activities, as we have
measured it, leads to any concrete actions, by way of
monetary contributions or whatever, in support of the
campaign of the IRA (ESRI Paper No. 97, p. 98).
Others might perhaps have preferred to have portrayed
these shades of attitude to the IRA in a different way,
referring perhaps to acquiescence, tolerance or sympathy
vis-d-vis IRA activity where we speak of slightly supportive
attitude and moderately supportive attitude. We would
accept these terms as rough equivalents of our own. At the
same time we believe that the terms we used are better
because they read less into the data while at the same time
expressing quite adequately the gradations of the attitudes
concerned. It may be, however, that the term "attitude to
IRA activities: support versus opposition" is so open to mis-
understanding and misinterpretation that it channels attention
away from what we would regard as the fundamental issue
arising from our study of attitudes to the IRA, namely, the
need for debate and disctission and for even greater efforts
on the part of all who can influence public opinion, with a
view to reversing the degree of favourable attitude to IRA
activity that prevails among a significant minority of the
population. If in fact the terms support and opposition,
which we used, have diverted attention from that issue, we
would willingly abandon them and replace them with some
alternative set of terms to express the findings about favour-
able versus unfavourable attitude to IRA activity which, in
the words of Paper No. 97 is the real issue:
....... it must be acknowledged that, on this evidence,
opposition to IRA activities is not overwhelming and
certainly does not match the strong opposition so often
articulated by public figures (ESRI Paper No. 97, pp.
98-100).
The term used to describe the favourable-unfavourable
continuum in relation to IRA motives was sympathy versus
rejection. As ESRI Paper No. 97 explicitly states, this is a
much less "hardline" attitude than the attitude of support
for IRA activity (ESR.I Paper No. 97, p. 100). One can,
without contradiction or equivocation, sympathise with the
motives of the IRA, while condemning their activities. In
identifying and analysing an attitude ’of sympathy for IRA
motives, we made this point dear:
Though the two may often be positively related they can
also run in contrary directions. Evidently some respond-
ents condemn the activities of the IRA while sympathising
with their aims and motives. Failure to bear this in mind
in reflecting on the data would involve a serious mis-
interpretation of the figure of 42 per cent sympathy for
IRA motives as support or sympathy for the IRA as such
(ESRI Paper" No. 97, p. 100).
The fact that a genera] desire for Irish unity is common to
the major political parties in the Republic and the political
and military wings of the IRA raises the question whether
our measure of sympathy for the motives of the IRA is not
the same as simple endorsement of thc goal of reunification.
We would agree that sympathy with the motives of the IRA
certainly includes endorsement of the goal of reunification.
There is, a vital difference, however, between expressing a
favourable attitude towards reunification on its own and
expressing that attitude by endorsing IRA aims and attribu-
ting patriotism and idealism to the IRA. The significance of
our finding is, we believe, that a substantial proportion of "
people are prepared to express their approval in the latter
form, despite the fact that political and opinion leaders
aspiring to reunification have been at pains to point out
the differences between their aspirations in relation t,~ Irish
unity and-the objectives of the paramilitary organisations.
This measure raises the further issue of the degree of
accuracy of the underlying perceptions of IRA motives and
the implications of this accuracy for the interpretation of the
attitude. It is quite possible that different perceptions of IRA
motives underlie the attitude we are discussing. This, however,
does not either invalidate or make irrelevant the findings. It
is a consequence of the nature of attitudes that they are
important whether based on accurate perception or not. In
fact, attitudes may often determine perception. In the present
case whether sympathy for or rejection of IRA motives is
based on partial perception, selective perception, or misper-
ception, in no way diminishes the fact that people hold such
attitudes.
A general interpretative issue which arises in relation to
these and the other two scales presented in Section IV of
ESRI Paper No. 97 is the location and interpretation of the
mid-point in the summated scale, i.e., that point at which
scores change from being positive to negative. It is obvious
what this point is for each of the individual items in that they
are clearly presented as agree-disagree items with gradations
on each side of the divide (see the response format above,
p. 17), and any particular response can be readily categorised
as positive or negative. In averaging these responses, however,
a particular score may result from different combinations
of responses. Thus, for example, a "neutral" score may
arise from a series of neutral responses to each item (i.e.,
"don’t knows") or from certain combinations of positive and
negative responses. In the case of self-cancelling responses, it
is, in our view, preferable to categorise such a respondent as
neutral than to categorise him or her as pro or anti on the
basis of their response to a single item. If, on the other hand,
an individual’s combination of responses moves him towards
one or other end of the 1 to 7 continuum, then it is reason-
able to interpret that score as slightly positive or slightly
negative. It is, of course, evident that the interpretations of
summated scores as neutral, slight, moderate, etc., are approxi-
mations and this point was clearly signalled when the matter
of labelling the intermediate values on a Likert scale was
introduced in Paper No. 97. The relevant quotation is as
follows:
This composite score ranges from i (strongly pro-parti-
tionist) to 7 (strongly anti-partitionist) and we can attach
the following approximate labels to the intermediate
values on the scale:
PRO: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7    : ANTI
strong moderate slight neutral slight moderate s~’ong
*(ESRI Paper No. 97, p. 96).
The approximate nature of the procedure was again adverted
to in the discussion of the distribution of the first of the four
attitudes concerned.
The resuhs of a survey carried out in March 1978 have
been adduced as evidence which disproves the fmdings relating
to attitude to IRA activity presented in ESRI Paper No. 97.
The survey was conducted for the BBCPanorama programme.
The question on attitude to the IRA and the percentage
responses eficited by the question were as foUows:
People have different views about the aims and
activities of the Provisional IRA. I would like
you to look at this card, on which axe listed
some of the opinions which people have
expressed to us. I would like you to read
through the list and tell me which statement
comes closest to your own opinion?
Percentage of
Respondents
(a) I have no time whatsoever for the
Provisional IRA. 51
(b) I admire the idealism of the Provisional
IRA but I think their use of violence is
totally wrong. 32
(c) I approve of the Provisional IRA because
the problems of Northern Ireland cannot
be solved without violence. 2
(d) Don’t know/no opinion. 15
For the following reasons we do not accept that the
Panorama survey cluestion is an adequate measure of attitude
to the IRA.
(1) The question is two-dimensional - it deals with admira-
tion of idealism and general approval, including presum-
ably approval of activities and methods -- yet, being a
forced choice question, it allows for only one response.
In our study, we distinguished clearly, and measured
separately, attitude to activities and attitude to motives.
(2) The third statement in the Panorama survey question is
two-tiered in the sense that, in agreeing to it, one is
expressing two things - approval of the Provisional IRA
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and acceptance of the statement that "the problems of
Northern Ireland cannot be solved without violence" as
the reason for approving. While two-tiered statements
may sometimes be permissible in an attitude item, they
are unacceptable in a forced choice question. This is par-
ticularly so when, as in this case, the second half of the
two-tiered statement is very strongly worded --"because
the problems of Northern Ireland cannot be solved without
violence". The effect is to create a very considerable gap
between the second statement ("I admire the idealism of
the Provisional IRA but I think their use of violence is
totally wrong") and the third statement ("I approve of the
Provisional IRA because the problems of Northern Ireland
cannot be solved without violence"). These two state-
ments (in fact three or possibly four statements) could
have been used as independent items in an agree-disagree
attitude item format. Then the gaps between the state-
ments might not have mattered. They were not so used.
Instead, respondents were forced to choose one and only
one. Given the extremity and two-tiered nature of the
final statement, there is a considerable probability that a
social desirability effect "would have operated against
choice of this statement and in favour of the more
moderate second statement.
(3) The response to this question in the Panorama survey
contains an inordinately large number of "don’t knows"
-- 15 per cent. While this 15 per cent includes those who
genuinely do not have an attitude .to the IRA, it undoubt-
edly also includes people who have an at:itude which.,
because of the formulation of the question, they were
unable or unwilling to express. One simply does not
know how large this proportion is or what attitude they
hold. Indeed, Kyle, in an article describing the results of
the Panorama survey adverts to this problem of inter-
preting the large "don’t know" figure (Kyle, 1979, p. 35).
It is significant that not only our approach, which was
specifically designed to keep the "Don’t knows" to a
minimum, but also MacGr~il’s question on attitude to the
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use of violence in Northern Ireland (see below, p. 37),
produced a far smaller unknown factor.
(4) In the Panorama survey question there is no ordering
within each dimension, thus there is no opportunity for
a qualified response -- degree of admiration of idealism
or a degree of approval of activities or methods. Because
there was no possibility of degrees of agreement or dis-
agreement with the statements offered to respondents
and because the third statement was very strongly worded,
what the Panorama survey question has identified is
2 per cent unequivocal and unreserved approval of the
Provisional IRA. This would appear to correspond to our
2.8 per cent attitude of strong support for IRA activities.
The advantage of our method is that it enables one to
identify and describe grades of attitude to the IRA which
lie between unqualified choice of the statement "I admire
the idealism of the Provisional IRA but I think their use
of violence is totally wrong" and unqualified choice of
the quite extreme statement "I approve of the Provisional
IRA because the problems of Northern Ireland cannot be
solved without violence".
We conclude that our approach to the identification and
measurement of attitudes to the IRA in our 1978 survey pro-
duces a more comprehensive and accurate result than that
produced by the Panorama survey of the same yeaar.
Recent local government election results showing electoral
support for Provisional Sinn Fein have also been adduced as
evidence which contradicts our findings. Since electoral
choice, on the one hand, and attitude to terrorist activity, on
the other, are governed by the distinct and non-competing
¯ criteria, there is simply no conflict between the two sets of
figures. The two are entirely separate realms, a fact which
emerges from the survey - the figure from our survey for
potential electoral support for both Provisional Sinn Fein and
the Irish Republican Socialist Party taken together is 0.7 per
cent. The fact is that we were not discussing either local or
national electoral support and we made no claim to be
attempting to predict electoral support from evidence of
degree of attitudinal support for IRA activities.
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Our findings are corroborated by MacGr~il’s study of
attitudes of the population of the greater Dublin area iia 1973.
This wide-ranglng study included a series of attitude items
relating to Northern Ireland. The items were introduced as
follows -- "Northern Ireland is a topic of interest and
concern for many people. I would like to get your views on
some aspects relating to the Northern Ireland problem" and
one of the items was "Would you agree or disagree that
violence, while regrettable, has been necessary for the
achievement of non-Unionist rights in Northern’Ireland". The
responses to this item are presented in Table 4. While 62 per
cent disagreed with the statement, 35 per cent agreed.
MacGr~il interprets the latter figure as follows:
The considerable minority (35.5%), however, who agreed
with Item No. 10, is most significant in the light of the
explicitly non-violent stand of major political, religious
and labour leaders, and at the very time when serious
death and destruction had been a daily occurrence in
Northern Ireland. Such a minority position can be
interpreted as a vote of no confidence in the efficacy of
non.violence (on the part of the 35.3% who agreed with
the statement) (MacGr~il 1977, p. 379).
Table 4 : Attitude to use of vialence for the achievement of non-Uniouist rights
in Northern Ireland. (Sample of populatiou of greater Dublin area
1973, 2278 respondents)
Item Response Percentage
of respoudents
Would you agree or disagree
that the use of violence, while
regrettable, has been necessary
for the achievement of non-
Unionist rights in Northern
Ireland ?
Source: MacGr~i11977, p. 377.
Agree 35.3
Don’t know 3.1
Disagree 61.6
100
Total
Number 2278
$7
Finally, while we have emphasised the difference between
a policy preference and an attitude and that one cannot infer
the latter from the former, it is worth noting that our findings
in /elation to attitude to the IRA are consistent with the
findings i-egarding preferences for and against policies dealing
with the IRA. These are presented in Section III of ESR1
Paper No. 97 and can be summarised briefly as follows: A
tougher line against the IRA (39 per cent opposed), direct
British Government negotiations with the IRA (44 per
cent in favour), extradition to Northern Ireland or Britain
of people a~:cused of politically motivated crimes (48 per
cent opposed), post settlement amnesty for Provisional
IRA (55 per cent in favour), political status for those
convicted of politically motivated crimes (60 per cent in
favour).
One final issue arises in relation to our interpretation of
attitudes to the IRA. Some critics have suggested that the
findings were already out of date when published. The critic-
ism centres on the time lapse of thirteen months between
completion of data collection and publication. We agree that
attitudes may change over time though comparison of our
findings with MacGr~il’s findings relating to 1973 suggest
that mere passage of time is not a sufficient condition for
extensive attitude change in regard to the IRA. Fluctuation
in attitude is perhaps more likely under the impact of major
events, and the public impact of certain events in August and
September 1979Is would probably have led us to enter a
caveat in this regard in Paper No. 97 but for the fact that it
was already in press by then. However, the likely extent and,
particularly, the durability of such attitude changes is a matter
of debate. A conclusive answer to the question of whether
lasting changes in attitude have occurred.since our data were
collected can only come from further research.
B Attitude towards Northern Ireland Protestants
The interpretation of the four individual items which con-
stitute the measure of this attitude has been discussed above
.13. The murd~al of Lord MotmtbattFn and rnembc~ of his party At M~or¢
and of 18 Blltish soldiers at Warrenpolnt on 27 August 1979 =-n~ t~.e axlda-ess by
JPope John Paul 11 at Drogheda on 29 Sept~mbcz 1979.
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(p. 27). One can summarise the distribution of responses of
these items as follows: 64 per cent disagree that "the vast
majority of Protestants in Northern Ireland are willing to
reach an agreement acceptable to the Catholic community",
78 per cent agree that "the basic problem in Northern Ireland
is that the Protestants are prepared to defend their privileges
at all costs"; 75 per cent disagree with the view that "since
they are the majority, it is only righi that Protestants in
Northern Ireland should have the last say in how Northern
Ireland is to be governed"; and 68 per cent agree that
"Northern Ireland Protestants have an outlook and approach
to life that is not Irish". (See Appendix A, Table A.1.) The
attitudinal measure based on this data was introduced as
follows: "’What is involved here is not a measure of social
prejudice in general but of political attitude . . ." and the
measure was summarised with .the statement:
Taken together, the items add up to a political orientation
which is either pro or anti Northern Ireland Protestants.
(ESRI Paper No. 97, p. 100).
In comments on Paper No. 97 the emphasis we placed on
the political aspect of this attitude has been frequently ignor-
ed and the term "attitude to Northem Ireland Protestants:
anti versus pro" has been invested by some critics with con-
notations of religious prejudice and hostility. Paper No. 97
neither states nor implies such meaning, in fact we explicitly
ruled out such meaning in favour of a political interpretation
of the attitude. This essential political aspect is evident in the
label which is not "anti versus pro Protestant", as some of
our critics mislabelled it, but "anti versus pro Northern lreland
Protestant". The former term is a religious designation, the
latter is ethnic or political. The literal meaning of "anti" is
"opposed to" and, as is evident in the quotation above, this
term was given an explicit and unambiguous political inter-
pretation when the concept was being introduced. The
political nature of the attitude’ is abundantly clear in the
discussion of the significance of the attitude. Having pointed
out that the prevailing attitude towards Northern Ireland
Protestants is one of opposition, we emphasised that the
significance of this attitude lies in its political context, i.e.,
the widespread endorsement of a united Ireland solution. To
further emphasise the political nature of the attitude, we
went on to say:
It is, of course, arguable that attitudes towards Northern
Ireland Protestants would be fundamentally different in a
united Ireland or in the situation of significant moves
towards a united Ireland. The assumption underlying this
argument is that ar~ti-Northern Ireland Protestant attitudes
are a product of the existing political situation and that
if that situation were fundamentally different, i.e., if
there were significant moves towards a united Ireland,
then attitudes would be different and much more favour- ’
able to Northern Ireland Protestants. Running counter to
this optimistic view is the argument that an attitude of
opposition, while it may be a product of prevailing
political structures, is an obstacle to significant political
overtures towards Northern Ireland Protestants on the
part of the Republic of Ireland, thus decreasing the pros-
pect of reunification by consent. (ESRI Paper No. 97,
p. 100).
The study by MacGr~il already referred to provides the
only comparable data on this particular attitude. MacGr~il
used the terms "Unionists" and "Nationalists (N.I.)" as
designations of the majority and minority communities in
Northern Ireland and included these terms among seventy
stimuli employed in administering the classical technique of
the Bogardus Social Distance Scale. We have indicated above
our reasons for preferring the term "Northern Ireland
’Protestant" to "Unionist" to designate the majority com-
munity in Northern Ireland. The events which make such a
change necessary occurred after MacGr~il’s research. We
would therefore regard MacGrdil’s term "Unionist" and our
term "Northern Ireland Protestant" as approximately
equivalent.
MacGrdil found that in terms of social distance, "Unionists"
ranked eighth from the bottom of the list of seventy social
groups presented to respondents (MacGrdil 1977, p. 248). He
points out that this ranking, makes "Unionists" one of
"Dublin’s outgroups" and presents the data and his inter-
pretation as follows:
"Unionists" have fared badly with a 3.063 M.S.D. (Mean
Social Distance) score; 62.8% of the sample would not
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welcome them into their family and 20.3% would deny
citizenship to them or debar them from the Republic.
The overall ranking (8th from the bottom of a sample
of seventy) would classify them among Dublin’s out-
~aOUpS. When this is contrasted with the relatively
vourable position of Protestants]Presbyterians (see
Table No. 64 above), it shows that the unfavourable
attitude is mainly political. (MacGrril 1977, p. 248, our
emphasis).
It is to be expected that the majority of Dubliners would
have different aims and objectives to Unionists, but this does
not account for Unionists being categorised as an "outgroup",
or for the fact that 63 per cent would not welcome them
into their family and that 20 per cent would deny citizenship
to them or debar them from the Republic. Our findings were
that 28 per cent were slightly opposed, 29 per cent moderately
opposed, and 18 per cent strongly opposed to Northern
Ireland Protestants. We interpreted our data as indicating
political opposition, while MacGrril commented that his data
showed that the unfavourable attitude was "mainly political".
In discussion of the development of this measure of attitude
to Northern Ireland Protestants (p. 27 above), the need for
further research in this area was referred to. It is particularly
interesting to note, therefore, that the only other research
which has been done produced results in line with ou÷ own
findings.
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CONCLUSION
The following conclusions emerge from this consideration
of the Findings relating to attitudes to the IRA and towards
"Northern Ireland Protestants presented in ESILI Paper No. 97.
The findings were based on a methodology of attitude
measurement which is widely accepted in the disciplines of
social psychology and political science and which is appro-
priate for the subject matter of the research. This methodo-
logy was, in all essentials, correctly applied. It is perhaps
unnecessary to point out that any methodology must be
applied sensitively and that no methodology allows one to
dispense with the judgement of the individual researcher. We
believe that in all cases the judgements which we made are
reasonable and receive sufficient support from the data to
warrant their use.
The fundamental interpretative issue is, do the terms used
to describe the findings regarding these attitudes convey the
relevant meaning without overstatement or exaggeration? We
acknowledge that other researchers might have seen fit to use
terms different from the ones which we used. We believe,
however, that the terms we tised, in the qualified way in
which we used them, are suitable for the purpose and that
the use of different terms would not have materially altered
the conclusions reached. As to the suggestion that our con-
clusions regarding attitudes to the .IRA are contradicted by
the results o( .the 1978 Panorama survey, we have shown why
the Panorama question is quite inadequate and the results
misleading. In fact, when one looks at previous published
research in this area (MacGr6il’~ 1977), our findings are sub-
stantiated.
It is our belief that a solution to the problem in Northern
Ireland can only be approached through debate and discus-
sion, which must take place both within and between the
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communities concerned. In concluding Paper No. 97 we
expressed the hope that it would "make some small contri-
bution to the essential process of debate and discussion, not
only within the Republic of Ireland, but also within each of
the other three communities concerned and, ultimately,
between all four" (ESRI Paper No. 97, p. 152). Now that we
have dealt with the questions that axose in relation to the
findings, we trust that this hope will be realised.
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Table A ! : Frequer~es on seventeen individual attitude items dealing with attitudes
¯to tile Northern Ireland problem. Items grouped according to fb~tor
analysis presented in Section IV of ESRl Paper No. 97.
¯ Dcv~don from to tal of l oo po" cent is ClUC to rou ndlng error.
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Table AI: (Continued)
p~t~ Rtduttd ~¢r~qr
"Deviation From tota] of ~ oo per cent is due to rounding error.
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Table Ah (Continued)
Table A~ : Attitudes to fhe Northern lreiand problem: Factor analysis of 17
attitude iterm. Principal factoring without inleration (N = 2206)
(i) Loading~ on three varimax rotated factors
I Reu nific~ion is an essential coodltion for awt’ solutlo n
of the problem in Northern I reland.
2 The ,~sl rr~joriry of ProtestanEs in Northern J round are
willthg Eo reach an agreemenE acceptable to the
Catholic ¢ommun~.
3 Were it nol for the IRA. the Northern problem would he
even furor from a solulio n.
4 This is an island and it cannol be perrrtancnl}y
partitioned.
5 The basic prob~c’m in Northern Ireland is that Prole~lants
a rc prepared to defend their priv[tcgcs al all costs.
6 The pr¢~cc of Brillsh Troops in I~orthcrn Ill’and .imou nt5
t~ for ¢ign occupallon of pare of Ireland.
7 There *.’i[ I ne~’cr he pcace iJi Northrrn hcland ul~lil
parllcion is ended.
8 The methods of the 1KA are Iotal[y u ~accep~ble.
9 $1ncc the-/are the rnajoriEy, [E is only righl Iha~ the
Prol~tant~. thou[d have tht" last say in how Northern
Ireland i~ to be go’¢¢rncd.
10 The ~oo nor we gel thr idea Ihal the North befongs to us
#lttt ~ pl’l~lt r II{.;id, tht. b{-K t er.
~pplc>~ch Io lil~’ dial b, t~ot hish.
12 Thc t RA are bltslc~lty a bunch ui’cr~min~l~ and murderers.
3 The major cause of the problem in Nonber~ J rcb~d i~
Erilish inter ferenc¢ in Irish all, its.
14 Lcaving aside the quesl~on o f their methods+ I basicalty
s~ppor~ thca~rn~ of the ~RA.
I $ V/ere it nol for the British. the shuat ion in Non hem
I re]and would be worse than it is.
16 The t RA are basically pa~rlots and idealists.
17 The Northern Ireland problem "~.’ill not be ~olved by
cnding partilion.
Fart~ l
.~agl~¢ 2
.l:atloy 3
0,75 ~.18 -0.01
O,O6 0.06 0.72
0,29 -0.60 0.03
0.74 -0.06 -0.0~
0.39 0.13 -0.46
0.61 .-0.t ~ -0.36
0.77 -0,Z$ -0.05
0.09 0.72 0.03
-0,01 03Z 0.59
-0,43 0.25 0,31
0.26 O.Oa -0.50
-0,0~ 0.77 0.12
0.$0 -0.24 -0.31
0.29 -0,$9 -0.27
-0.13 02’7 0,37
0.2a -0,51 0.02
-0.3~ 0.35 -O.Ot
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Table A~t: (Continued)
(ii) Loadings on four varimax rotated factors
Faztor I F~tor 2 Facto~ 3 Fact~¢ 4
I RCu nilication is Jn c~scntial ¢ondh[on for any solut ion
of the problem in Northern Ireland. .74
.17 .14 ~1
¯ The ,’~st rn~cci~ of proltstants in Nor thrrn lrrlar.d are
willing to reach an agreement acceptable to the
Catholic cOmmunil’t. .I I -.04 -.45 .$5
3 Were it not for the IRA, the Northc-rn problem would be
even further from a solution. .2.5 .66 .12 .08
4 This is an bland and it cannot be pcrrnantmd).
panilioned. .75 .02 .09 -.07
5 The basic problem in Northern I roland is that Protes~ts
are precared ~o defend their privileges at all costs. .23 -.02 .69 -.o.~
6 The p r t.~,cnce o f Bri’.i~h T~oops in Northern I r¢land amou ms
to foreign o¢¢up,tion of parl of I reiand. .J5 .111 J$ -.23
~nhion is ~dccL 34 .16 .20 .01
8 The methods of d~e I RA itre totally uaa¢¢eplable. .07 -.73 .05 .10
9 Since they are the m-fJo riW, it is only fight that the
pl’Ot~"3 ~rlt~ should hi’¢e thtr last ~ly in how N o Cth erl’l
Ireland is to be governed. -.07 .03 -.07 .73
10 The sooncr wc get the idca that the North belong: t o us
out o f our heads the bcxtcr. -.51 -.11 .01 .47
I 1 Norzhcrn Ireland Prot~lanu have an oudook ~md an
approach to life that is no~ I rlsh.                             .08.09 .91 -.06
12 ThelgAarebaslcallyabunchofcriminalsandmurderers.-.05 .73 .05 .25
13 The m£3or cau~ of th. ~¢oh|em in Na,’th~ I ~La~l it
British thterfermce in I rlsh affairs. .43 .27 .S8 -.16
14 Lea~’ing aslde tht. qucsdon of thelr methods. I basically
supporl the alms o[ the 1RA. .29 .57 A6 -.2"/
15 Were it not for the British. the situation in Nor~hecn
I r elasld would b¢ wov~ than it is. -.I 8 -.26 -.02 .5 I
16 The I RA are has/tally pat fiou and idcalisu. .24 .57 .ll .07
17 The Nor~crn I roland problem will nol be sol’.~d by
ending p,artition, -.47 -.23 .24 .24
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Table A2: IContinued)
(iii) The eigenvalues and their corresponding percentages of variance for 17
attitude items in the factor oa~lyJis.
Cumulative
Component Percentage of perce~age of
number EigenvoJ~ze variance variance
I 4.61 27.1 27.1
2 L65 9.7 36.8
3 1.33 7.8 44.6
4 1.08 6.3 50.9
5 .94 5.5 56.4
6 .83 4.9 61.3
7 .78 4.6 65.9
8 .74 4.4 70.3
9 .68 4.0 74.3
10 .66 3.9 78.2
11 .61 3.6 81.8
12 .59 3.5 85.3
13 .54 3.2 88.5
14 .52 3.1 91.6
15 .50 2.9 94.5
16 .49 2.9 97.4
17 .44 2.6 100
17 100
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1 h\q’RODUCTION
In Part I of this publication, Davis and Sinnott answer
criticisms of the methodology and results of their Paper,
Attitudes in the Republic o/Ireland Relevant to the Northern
Ireland Problem (ESR.I Paper No. 97). Our principal aim in
Part I] is to offer a reasoned critique of Paper No. 97 as it
was published, although we also take account of the additional
information and explanation provided by the authors in
Part I. We thUS hope that our critique provides irl itself an
independent and balanced assessment of Paper No. 97.
Our appraisal runs parallel for some way with the authors’
exposition in Part I. To a large extent we share a common
view of the aims of Paper 97 and of the appropriate method-
ology for realising these aims. Like the authors, we believe
that a careful examination of this methodology and the
manner in which it was applied can go a long way t6wards
answering the key question of whether there is sufficient
evidence to justify the more contentious findings of Paper
No. 97. It is in our assessment of the extent to which they
correctly followed the prescribed nlles of attitudinal research .
that we part company with the authors, and are led to
dispute the findings of Section IV of Paper No. 97.
2 GENERAL OVERVIEW OF PAPER NO. 97
The foundation of any social research which seeks to
establish the opinions or attitudes of the population as a
whole is the sample which is chosen to represent that popula-
tion. If the sample is inadequate or biased then the results
obtained cannot be accurately grossed up to obtain a valid
indication of the views of the population. Suggestions have
been made that the sample used in Paper No. 97 was deficient.
As mentioned in the Preface, the issues concerning sampling
axe dealt with in Appendix I by the Head of the ESRI Survey
Unit. We are confident that the sample was as good as could
have been obtained, and that information derived from it can
be taken, within the normal statistical confidence limits, as
reflecting national responses.
Similarly, we have no criticisms to make of the actual
achTdnistration of the survey questionnaire which was carried
out by a professional and experienced field force. There is no
reason to suppose that there is any significant bias in the
responses due to interviewer effects.
Given that the sample and interviewing techniques were
satisfactory, it follows that the data collected in the survey
reflect with reasonable accuracy the answers of the national
population in the summer of 1978. How valuable these data
axe therefore depends solely on the nature of the questions
asked. The questionnaire was long, with over 200 questions,
although the answers to many of these axe due to be analysed
in a subsequent study. The questions relevant’to Paper No.
97 fall into three distinct groups.
The first group of questions need not detain us. Its purpose
was simply to establish the basic demographic characteristics
of each respondent, such as sex, age group, marital status and
educatiorfal level. Such information is obviously necessary for
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analytical purposes as well as to monitor the validity of the
sample as a whole.
The second group of questions concerned opinions on
alternative possible solutions to the Northern Ireland problem
and preferences in relation to policy issues facing the Irish or
British governments. The answers to these questions form the
basis to Section LII of Paper No. 97, in which the authors
analyse the responses in considerable detail. Most of the
questions concerning solutions were of a "forced choice"
variety, in which the respondents had to make first, second
and last choices between clearly defined alternatives pre-
sented to them. With regard to policy proposals most of the
questions involved agreeing or disagreeing with well defined
statements concerning possible policy initiatives.
On the whole, this group of questions appears to be well
thought out and clearly presented. The analysis, in terms of
’relating answers to different questions to each other and to
demographic factors, is comprehensive and illuminating. We
may have drawn one or two slightly different inferences from
the data, but this could be said of practically any research.
The third group of questions was designed to elicit under-
lying attitudes towards aspects of the Northern Ireland
problem. These questions, and the analysis of the answers,
occupy Section IV of Paper No. 97. Most of the criticism of
Paper No. 97 has been focused on this Section
, 
and particul-
amy on its first eight pages (94-101). These pages form the
core of the authoTs’ attempt to measure attitudes concerning
Northern Ireland, and we have grave misgivings about the
validity of these measurements. The remainder of this critique
is accordingly devoted to a detailed examination of the
methodology applied to this short but vital portion of Paper
No. 97.
3 THE AIMS AND PROCEDURES OF ATTITUDE
RESEARCH
In Section IV the aim is to identify and analyse attitudes
relevant to the Northern Ireland problem. Because some
critics appear to have misunderstood what is meant by the
¯ word "attitude" in this context
, 
it is necessary to be very
clear as to the nature of attitude research before assessing
how well the authors succeeded in their aims.
Attitude research is a well established branch of social
psychology, sharing many techniques with the better-known
field of personality measurement and possessing an extensive
literature of its own. By no means all other social scientists
are convinced of its practical utility in extending our under-
standing of society, but few would deny that it is a legitimate
field of study.
In a broad psychological sense, attitudes are commonly
described as containing three elements: the "cognitive", or
rational awareness and understanding; the "affective", or
emotional disposition or feeling; and the "behavioural", or
manifest response in terms of observable actions. However
the authorities in the field~ are in general agreement that
what attitude research attempts to measure are sets of
basically emotional dispositions towards given target objects,
issues, or groups of people. Many of the definitions quoted.
imply that attitude will influence behaviour, but none the
less they make it clear that the term "attitude" refers to the
underlying feeling towards the object and not to any pattern
of behaviour in respect of it. Similarly, attitudes are clearly
distinguished from beliefs, although again one can influence
the other.2 Finally attitudes are evaluative, in the sense that
1 See Davis ~.nd Sirmotu" dlscuzsion in P~t I (pp. 8-5) and in partloalar t~eir
quotations from Allport (193§) Guilford (1954) Oppenheim (1966) Katz (1966),
Kerllnger (1973} and NunnaU¥ (1970).
2 Edwards (1957, pp. 10-12).
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feelings towards the object can be positive or negative, but
the evaluation is essentially on an’ emotional, rather than a
rational, plane. In technical terms, attitude rese~ch looks for
"affective" rather than "cognitive" responses.
This fundamental characteristic of attitude ~:esearch is not
set out clearly in the course of Paper No. 97. It is left to the
reader to be sufficiently acquainted with the field to recognise
that attitudes are related to feelings rather than to thought
out positions. Nevertheless, Part I of this document shows
that the authors do in fact accept the standard interpretation
of the term. As they say, (p. 5), "In summary, when analysing
attitudes in this sense we are seeking to identify psychological
states, dispositions, evaluative orientations or feelings toward
the object in question".
The main purpose of attitude research is to examine the
association between particular attitudes and a number of
other variables. These may be other attitudes, opinions on
specific issues, or the socio-demographic characteristics of the
respondent, such as age, sex, education, occupation and
location. In order to make such comparisons, it is necessary
to construct some sort of measure for the attitude concerned.
Because attitudes are on an emotional rather than a rational
level, they cannot usually be ascertained through the posing
of single, clear-cut questions. Rather they may be "tapped"
by an array of questions, generally referred to as "attitudinal
items". These may be presented in various ways, but one
method frequently used, and that chosen for use in Section
IV, is the "Likert" item. This consists of presenting a state-
ment relevant to the attitude being studied, with which a
respondent may express differing degrees of agreement or dis-
agreement. Because the answers may be graded in intensity,
the responses to an individual Likcrt item can be converted
into a crude numerical scale. By adding a respondent’s score
on a number of these items together, a "summated scale" or
index is obtained which, it is hoped, will represent a complex
attitude more accurately than could the answer to any of the
. individual items on its own.
The success of any piece of attitude research depends
almost entirely on the ’~validity" of the summated scales con-
structed. Validity simply means that the researcher has
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indeed measured what he set out to measure. To be valid, a
scale must be reliable, in the sense that it measures consist-
ently, and it must also correspond closely to the concept that
the researcher wishes to measure. By its nature, absolute
validity can never be fuUy established, because confidence in
the concepts used can never be complete, and perfect corre-
spondence between an abstract concept and a concrete
measure cannot be demonstrated. Nevertheless, the researcher
can hope to produce scales possessing a high degree of valid.
ity. Procedures have been evolved, rules established and tests
¯ constructed which, if applied correctly, can greatly increase
confidence that the scales are reasonably accurate measures
of the attitude defined by the researcher.
Concepts can be developed and refined through a structured
process of reading, pilot interviews, pretest and analysis
before the main study is undertaken,s By this stage the major
concepts should be clear and unambiguous. No formal rules
or tests can be applied to the conceptual frml~ework of a
research paper, but commonsense and loglc can usually
detect whether it avoids confusion and known fallacy.
The first step towards producing scales is the selection of
attitudinal items for inclusion in the survey questionnaire.
The stages of pilot interviews and pretest are valuable in
suggesting and checking possible sets of questions in relation
to each expected attitude. Fairly clear-cut rules have been
laid down concerning the characteristics which should be
possessed by attitudinal items. While these rules should be
followed, the ultimate test of how well the items were selected
lies in how good the scales derived from them are.
Although items are generally selected in the hope that each
one will help tap a particular attitude, it is necessary to con-
firm that they do group together as expected. This is usually
done through the application, at both pretest stage and in
the main study, of factor analysis. This is a statistical tech.
nJque for examining the correlations among a group of
variables, in order to abstract a number of clusters of those
variables which are dosely related, and which can therefore
$ We follow, here mad throughout," the authors" ~ology for these stages,
although it is more usaJal to refer to the initial unstructured intervicvet u pt~etesting,
and the application of it draft questionnairt to a tmali sample u a pilot sxuvey.
be interpreted as possessing some common meaning. As with
any statistical technique there are established rules governing
the use of factor analysis, and there are commonly accepted
criteria for determining the number of clusters to extract and
which items to include in each cluster.
When the responses to individual items are added together
to provide summated scales for each cluster as a whole, it is
possible to test the reliability of these scales. While a scale
of low reliability is of little value for any purpose, the degree
of reliability’ required depends very largely on the use to be
made of the scales. If an attempt is to be made, as in Paper
No. 97, to present the scales not ordinaUy, but as absolute
measures of the percentage of the population holding parti-
cular attitudes, then a very high level of reliability is needed,
and other firm rules must also be obeyed.
Even if highly reliable scales have been constructed, the
interpretation of the meaning of the scale is, in the last resort,
a matter of personal judgement on the part of the researcher.
His judgement, of course, is likely to be informed by his
knowledge of previous research in the field, by his own ex-
perience in similar work and by his awareness of evidence
from othei, non-survey, sources. In certain cases it is possible
to seek some conf’trmation that scales have.been validly inter-
preted by obtaining logically concurrent results from other
scales or series or by observing behaviour which has been
accurately predicted by the scales. Nevertheless, full validity
can never be assured, and the conclusions drawn from attitude
research remain judgemental in the sense that statistical
evidence can be cited as supporting, but not as demonstrating,
the interpretations adopted by the writer.
It follows from this that results should be presented in a
tone appropriate to the methodology. Where the results of
reliable scales are being reported, the role of personal judge-
men.t in interpreting their meaning should be duly acknow-
ledged and decisive statements implying full validity should
be eschewed. Where the results of scales of doubtful reliability
are concerned, the tone of reporting should be frankly
speculative, especially if the scales relate to a new and un-
familiar field of study.
4 SECTION IV IN PRACTICE
Having briefly summarised the aims of the authors as we
see .them, and the basic elements of the methodology they
have used, it is now possible to turn our attention to the
actual cow, tent of Section IV of Paper No. 97. The principal
task in this section will he to assess how far Section IV in
practice conforms with the established guidelines of attitude
research. This will be done under six headings: concepts,
attitudinal items, application of factor analysis, construction
and use of scales, interpretation and labelling, and presenta-
tion.
(a) Concepts
The authors went through the prescribed process of
reading, pilot interviews pretest, analysis and main survey,
with, presumably, intervals for thought between each. Despite
this the concepts still appear to be confused and unclear.
This lack of clarity concerning the concepts pervades the Sec-
tion and probably underlies many of the other problems
encountered.
The most serious example of lack of clarity, because it
affects the identification of the stimulus presented to respon-
dents as well as the interpretation placed on their replies
concerns the use of the term "IRA". The term is not defined
expllcifly in Paper No. 97, but the tone of certain passages
implies that the results are taken as applying to the Provision-
al IRA. This is clearest from the following (p. 100): "opposi-
tion to IRA activities is not overwhelming and certain~y does
not match the strong opposition so often articulated by public
figures". Public figures in the Republic generally articulate
opposition specifically to the Provisional IRA, and certainJy
not to the "old" IRA in its historical context.4
4, See below p. 65.
If it was intended to study attitudes to the Provisional
IRA, then the terms "Provos", "Pro~dsionals" or "Provisional
IRA" would have been in keeping with Irish vernacular usage.
Irish newspapers and RTE use these terms consistently in
referring to the activities of the group concerned, and it is
only in sections of the British popular press that the initials
IRA are used without qualification to denote any and ever3,
form of militant Irish republicanism.
It should have become clear from the study phase preceding
the first pilot interviews that the label "IRA" is inherently
ambiguous because of the long and complicated history of
Irish republJcanism’s militant wing, and that it is therefore
unsuitable as a stimulus in attitudinal research in Ireland. The
"IRA" could have been taken by many respondents as referr-
ing exclusively to the Provisionals, but it could have been
taken by others as referring to the "old" IRA, which is now
honoured at governmental level through the provision of
state pensions and attendance at funerals and commemorative
ceremonies. Some may even have associated the term with
the Official IRA, which formed the illegal wing of the
republican movement until the foundation of the Provisionals
in 1969, and which remains in existence although militarily
inactive.
The important point is that the emotional responses to
these various potential interpretations are likely to be very
different. The divergence in response to the "old" IRA
and to the Provisionals can be seen in the speeches of almost
any politican or other public figure. An extremely clear
illustration of this divergence was provided recendy by Dr
Cathal Daly, Bishop of Ardagh and Clonmacnoise.s
The term "Irish Republican Army", with the noble name
and record which it earned 60 years ago, .can still evoke
powerful emotional responses. It cannot be too empha-
tically asserted that those who usurp the name now have
no right or tide, historical or moral, to use it. Their
present methods, their aims, their ideology, place them in
a totally different category... The new IRA is a radically
new phenomenon in Irish history - and it is a sinister
one.
5 Quoted in The lffah Times, Ja~ 2rid, 1980.
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Failure to qualify the initials "IRA" in the questionnaire
has led, in our view, to a situation where the emotional con-
tent of the stimulus presented to the respondents was not
clear-cut. Consequendy, the meaning of the responses is
inherently ambiguous and rarity in interpretation is preduded;
A second major example of conceptual confusion concerns
the attitude towards Northern Ireland Protestants. Here the
target group is clearly enough defined, but the nature of the
attitude is uncertain. The authors state that they are seeking
a political attitude and not a measure of social or religious
prejudice. However the meaning of the political attitude is
not explained,and the extent to which it reflects a perception
of difference rather than opposition cannot be ascertained.
Thirdly, the decision to drop the hypothesised attitude
towards British involvement, and to regard this omission as a
gain in understanding, indicates a confusion between the
relative importance of logical models and mere statistical
measurement. In any political analysis of the situation,
Partition and the British presence must he two separate
aspects of the problem, because the possibility exists of a
British withdrawal resulting in a continuation of Partition
between the Republic and an independent Northern Ireland.
Simply to subsume British involvement under Partition,
because of the statistical tests on the results obtained, involves
ignoring the logical basis of the original hypothesis, and
excessive pragmatism in rationalising results which do not
support that hypothesis.
Finally, and pervasively, there is a lack of clarity over the
basic concept of the research, the nature of attitudes as
usually defined. This shows in the assertion that attitudes
remain stable over time (p. 19). Given that attitudes are
essentially affective, one would wish to see convincing
evidence before accepting the assumption that they are
unlikely to change significantly in response to events with a
high emotional impact. The commonsense presumption
would be that attitudes are reasonably stable in normal times,
but that they are by no means immune from the shocks of
current history. The implicit assumption that attitudes to
Northern Ireland were’impervious to the several dramatic
events between the date of the survey and the’date of going.
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to press seems incompatible with the concept of attitude
adopted.
Similarly in their selection of attitudinal items and in their
presentation of results the authors seem frequently to lose
sight of the essentially affective or emotional character of an
attitude and to veer uneasily towards ascertaining their
respondents’ thought-out positions or beliefs about issues.
This will become clear from consideration of the items
selected for the main survey questionnaire.
(b) Attitudinalltems
Drawing on the various authorities already cited, it is
possible to summa.rise as follows the characteristics desirable
in the Likert items selected to elicit each attitude.
1 They should be adequate in number to tap the expected
attitude and to fulfil the remaining criteria.
2 They should be balanced between statements favour-
able and unfavourable to the subject.
3 They should incorporate strong, but not too extreme,
expression of view, using vernacular language where
possible.
4 They should be worded appropriately for the purpose
of eliciting feelings. Factual statements capable of
being interpreted factually, should be avoided.6
5 They should clearly identify the obje~:t concerning
which attitudes are being tapped. Statements that may
be interpreted in more than one way, or that are not
relevant to the psychological object being measured,
should be avoided.
In the light of these criteria, it is instructive to examine
carefully the 17 attitudinal items on which the analysis was
based, which for convenience are set out in Table 1.
6 As Edwards (1957 pp. 11, 121 says, "if a given statement is equally likely to
be endorsed by those with favourable and unfavourab| attitudes, then this state-
ment will not be usefu/in dJfferentlallng between those with favottrahle and those
with tmfavourable attitudes...As a first step in de~eloping an attitude scale,there-
fore, we eliminate from consideration all statements...that are factual or ~at
might be interpreted as facnhM".
o
Table 1 : Attitudinal items employed in Section IV
Item No.* I
1
4
6
7
10
13
8
12
liB
14
16
Ili
2
5
9
11
15
17
Items loading on to Partition Factor
Reunification is essential for any solution to the
problem in Northern Ireland.
This is an island and it cannot be permanently
partitioned.
The presence of British Troops in Northern Ireland
amount to foreign occupation of part of Ireland.
There will never be peace in Northern Ireland unti]
partition is ended.
The sooner we get the idea that the North belongs
to us out of otLr heads the better.
The major cause of the problem ha Northern
Ireland is British interference in Irish affairs.
Items loading on to IRA Activities Factor
Were it not for the IRA, the Northern problem
would be even further from a solution.
The methods of the IRA are totally unacceptable.
The IRA are basically a bunch of criminals and
murderers.
Items loading on to IRA Motives Factor
Leaving aside the question .of the methods, I
basically support the aims of the IRA.
The IRA are basically paU-iots and idealists.
Items loading on to Northern Ireland Protestant Factor
The vast maj6rity of Protestants in Northern
Ireland are willing to reach an agreement acceptable
to the Catholic community.
The basic problem in Northern Ircl:md is that
Protestants are prepared to defend their privileges
at all costs.
Since they are the majority, it is only right that
Protestants should have the last say in how
Northern Ireland is to be governed.
Northern Ireland Protestants have an outlook and
an approach to life that is not Irish.
Items omitted from the Scales
Were it not for the British, the situation in Northern
Ireland would be worse than it is.
The Northern Ireland problem will not be solved
by ending partition.
*The numbering of items is Oaat used in Paper No. 97, and corresponds
with the order of items in the correlation matrix in Appendix Ag to
Pai-t I.
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(i) With regard purely to number of items, 17 could perhaps
be regarded as an adequate total for representing the four
attitudes originally postulated. The items were selected
following a pretest, and were chosen so that at least four
items should be included in the scale for each expected factor.
In the event, however, the J.tems did not group together as
expected, and consequently some of the attitudes identified
by the authors are represented by an inadequate number of
items. The attitudes regarding Partition and Northern Ireland
Protestants may be adequately served by six and four items
respectively, especially as these are more or less in line with
the groupings established by pretest. The attitude relating to
the IRA would also have been tapped by sufficient items had
it not been split into two separate aspects. As it is, these are
based on two and three items respectively, which is too few
for confidence, especially as the existence of these two aspects
had not been established at the pre-test stage.
(ii) Inspection of Table 1 shows that the balance between
favourable and unfavourable expression of items is far from
adequate. Of the six "Partition" items, five are anti-partition
and only one pro-partition. Both of the "IRA Motives" items
can be regarded as favourable. The "Northern Ireland
Protestant" items are evenly divided, while the "IRA
Activities" items are divided as evenly as is possible with
only three items.
It could be, as the authors argue in Part I of this document
that "acceptance response set" is not a major issue in a
survey of this nature, and that consequently any bias impart-
ed by unbalanced items is likely to be relatively minor. All
the same the lack of balance must reduce confidence in the
scales constructed from these items, and the failure of the
authors to allude to the problem in Paper No. 97 exacerbates
this concern. The fact that the lack of balance resulted from
post hoc groupings of items replacing the expected grouping
does nothing to restore confidence.
(iii) How far the terminology employed is too extreme is
largely a matter of opinion, as there is no definite rule as to
what constitutes an extreme statement. However, most
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people would probably perceive "The methods of the IRA
are totally unacceptable" and "The IRA are basically a bunch
of criminals and murderers" as extreme expressions, as also
they would "The basic problem in Northern Ireland is "that
Protestants are prepared to defend their privileges at all
costs". The effect of extreme statements on the pattern of
responses is not really known, but it seems unlikely that they
do not impart some distortion.
(iv) It is with regard to the suitability of the wording of the
items that we most take issue with the authors’ selection.
Remembering that the purpose of attitudinal items is to ellcit
felt responses rather than rationalised answers or beliefs, then
far too high a proportion of the questions invite a thought-
out reply. Opinions may legitimately differ on how far
individual questions are likely to have evoked cognitive
responses. It does, however, seem self-evident that such state-
ments as "were it not for the IRA, the Northern problem
would be even further from a solution", and "the vast major-
ity of Protestants in Northern Ireland are willing to reach an
agreement acceptable to the Catholic community" will have
been interpreted by a significant proportion of respondents
as calling for a rational assessment of the facts, regardless of
their individual feelings towards the IRA or Northern Ireland
Protestants. Although the two questions just quoted de the
clearest examples of inappropriately "factual" items, many
of the others could also have been treated as factual by some
respondents. Certainly it is quite feasible to be implacably
opposed to both the aims and methods of the IRA, however
defined, and yet to concede that its members are basically
patriots and idealists. Throughout history many extremely
unpleasant movements have been motivated by idealism and
patriotism, and even those most hostile to such movements
have been wilting to acknowledge the idealism frorfi which
they sprung.
The criticism that some items are too factual cannot be
adequately answered by pointing out that many respondents’
perception of facts may be coloured by their attitudes. Pro-
vided that any significant proportion of the sample answered
questions in a factual manner which cut across their feelings
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towards the subject, the resulting scales cannot be interpreted
as measuring attitude. If one takes Edwards (1957) dictum
that attitude items should directly and unambiguously
measure people’s feelings, very few of the items fully meet
this criterion. At least half of the items appear to tap beliefs
about "what is" rather than reflect preferences or feelings. It
requires an unacceptable degree of inference to interpret
responses to these questions as expressing affect.
(v) Finally, the items relating, to the IRA are deficient in
respect of defining clearly the object to which the attitude
refers. Not only does the IRA itself remain undefined, as
discussed earlier, but the concepts of "activities" and
"motives" axe never made clear to the respondents. This may
wen be because these are merely labels, attributed post hoc
by the authors, rather than concepts which the survey was
designed to investigate. Whatever its cause, the effect of this
lack of clarity is obvious: neither the authors nor the reader
can interpret with any confidence just what it is that is being
measured. This is particularly damaging in’the case of
"activities", where a mildly positive attitude might mean a
willingness to condone some degree of violence or might
alternatively mean that the respondent is discriminating
between violence and such non-violent activities as H-Block
protests, rent-strikes or the operation of "black-taxis". There
is simply no way of knowing.
(c) Application of Factor Analysis
So far we have attempted to express ourselves in relatively
straightforward language, and have kept our use of technical
terms to a minimum. This and the succeeding section, how-
ever, are inescapably technical in nature, and, although we
shall continue to strive for general readability, the more
widespread use of technical language cannot be avoided.
This is an important section, because the use of factor
analysis is central to the portion of Paper No. 97 which we
are examining. The results of their factor analysis are cited by
the authors (p. 23) as "further confirming and, if necessary
modifying, our initial hypotheses and’interpretations." Simil-
arly the grouping of items on to the scales used to measure
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the hypothesised attitudes is dependent on the factor analysis
carried out. Thus, if the factor analysis itself cannot be
shown to have been correctly carried out, then the authors’
interpretations must be suspect, and their measures will lack
meaning.
Factor analysis is a technique for identifying separate
dusters within a group of variables. More specificatly, it is a
method for studying and grouping the correlations or co-
variances between the variables. Certain common tendencies
underlie the pattern of correlations and account for a propor-
tion of the common variance among the items. These tenden-
cies are referred to as components or factors. There are as
many components as there are items in the group, but most
of them are very weak and account for only a small proportion
of the variance. However, there are usually a few strong
factors present which account for a high proportion of the
total variance, and it is these strong factors which are sought
in factor analysis.
Some of the variance in each individual item is accounted
for by one or more of the underlying factors. The greater the
proportion of an item’s variance which can be attributed to
a particular factor, the more strongly that item .is said to
"load" on to that factor. However, the number of useful
factors mad the way the items load on to them is dependent
on the structure of the basic correlation matrix. As Nunnally
puts it, "factor analysis is nothing more than a set of mathe-
matic~.l aids to the examination of patterns of correlations"
(op. cir. p. 371). Basically, it seeks clusters of variables such
that the average level of inter-correlation between items
within the cluster is high, while the correlations between any
items contained in the cluster and items outside it are relative-
ly slight. Nunnaliy sums up, "a tegt should ’hang together’ in
the sense that the items should correlate with one another.
Otherwise, it makes little sense to add scores over them and
speak of the total scores as measuring any attribute" (op. cit.
p. 215). In other words, for a factor to form a useful basis
for measurement, the items within it should be reasonably
homogeneous, and clearly distinct from items outside.
There are no absolute rules for establishing how many
factors should be extracted from a group of items, or what
the constituents of each factor should be.7 There are, how-
ever, basic guidelines in the use of the technique.
The most commonly used guideline is that originally
suggested by Guttman and restated by Kaiser: all factors with
eigenvalues greater than 1.0 are extracted,s When the corre-
lation matrix is used as the basis for factor analysis, the
eigenvalue of a factor may be interpreted as the proportion
of the variance among all the items that can be attributed to
that factor: If, for example, one has five items in a factor
analysis and the first factor has an eigenvaiue of 2.4, then we
know that the first factor is responsible for 48 per cent of the
variance in the five items. Thus, the eigenvalue rule is a
practical and sensible guideline, for any factor with an eigen-
value lower than one is of less use than would be a single item
¯ from the set. The size of the eigenvalue also has a clear effect
on the interpretability of a factor: "The higher this figure is,
the more substantial can be the claim that the items with
significant loadings have some property in common" (Child,
op. cir., page 42). Other tests such as Bartlett’s9 or Cattell’s
"scree-test",1° have been used as guidelines in the determina-
tion of the number of factors to be extracted. While different
guidelines may suggest the extraction of different numbers of
factors, normal research procedure dictates that whichever
guideline or test is selected it should be used consistently
throughout the exercise. At the very least any change of
criterion should be explained and justified by the researcher.
Having decided how many factors to extract, a solution for
that number of factors is specified. This gives the loading of
items on to each of the factors included. It should be noted
that these loadings will vary if a solution for a different
number of factors is undertaken.
7 The difficulty of applying e-las~c~ statistical tests of "4gnificanc~e to factor
ar~¥a~ imposes some limitation on the inferenoes which can properly be dz~wn
from it. This provides a further argument in favour of adopting a cautious m~nn~
in prt~rntJns such inferences.
8 Kaiser (1960 pp. 141-151). The degree of acceptance of that criterion can be
seen in iu advocacy in, among other, the following basic texts: (~ilcl (1970 pp.
43-44), Rummel (1970 pp. 362-364), Van de G¢~ (1971 p. 147), Tatsuoka
(1971 p. 1471, and Taylor (1977 0. 116).
9 See Part t, p. 23.
10 See below p° 75.
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Once the loadings on to the appropriate number of factors
have been obtained, the next stage is to distribute the indivi-
dual items between the factor’s. One method is to include
each item in every factor, weighting the item’s score by the
item’s loading on to each factor. In this way factor scores can
be calculated which make use of all the information contain-
ed in the factor loadings. A further advantage is that this
method recognises that the distribution of answers to an item
may be influenced by two or more underlying attitudes. For
these reasons this is now the generally preferred method
of utillsing factor analysis in the construction of scales.
An alternative, much cruder, method is adopted in Paper
No. 97. This is to assign each item exclusively to the single
factor on to which it loads most heavily, providing that this
loading is above some arbitlaz-y cut-off point and that the
loadings on to other factors are below this point. The
common choice for the cut-off point is 0.30, but a loading of
0.40, which is generally followed in Paper No. 97, has
occasionally been used.
The major drawback of this method is that it wastes much
of the information available. In the first place, items with
split loadings of 0.40 or above on two factors, or just failing
to reach 0.40 on any factor, have generally to be discarded,
even though their relationship with each of the factors is
highly significant. In the second place, the assignment to
single factors involves treating any loading of 0.40 or higher
as if it were a loading of 1.0, and any loading of 0.39 or
below as if it were a loading of 0. Those latter include many
statistically significant loadings, which are lost through the
use of this method,tl
Despite these drawbacks, the method has the benefit of
simplicity and it remains quite widely used. Standard practice,
of course, is for the selected cut-off point, whether it be 0.40,
’ 11 Approximate formulae for calculating tampilng error’s of factor loadings were
developed by Holzinger and Harman {1941) a~td axe widely used today (e.g.,
Otter 1979). These suggest that 0.40 is comiderably higher than the level required
for a loading to atta~ significance with a sample size of 2,000. Although still
axbit~at’y, a lowtr oat-off point would thus have been prtfet~ble, but would
have intensified the problem of split loadingt which was serious enough even
when the 0.40 level ,ads used. If factor itcores are u.~d, split loading$ ceas to bca
problem.
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0.30 or any other level, to be specified by the researcher and
to be used consistently throughout the exercise.
The pattern of correlations between the 17 attitude items
was not shown in Paper No. 97. The authors have, however,
made it available as Appendix Table A3 to Part I of this
document. It provides the starting point for the factor
analysis.
Following the !pr~est, the hypothesis on which the authors
based their selection of items was that four separate factors
should be identifiable from this matrix of correlations. These
four factors should represent attitudes towards Partition, the
IRA, Northern Ireland Protestants, and British Involvement.
As Table 2 shows, there are indeed four factors with eigen-
values greater than 1.0, although the first of these factors is
clearly much stronger than the other three?2
Table 2: Eigenualues and their corTesponding percentages of variance:
17 attitudinal items
Cumulative
Component Percentage of    percentage of
number Eigenvalue oarlance variance
1 4.61 27.1 27.1
2 1.65 9.7. 36.8
3 1.33 7.8 44.6
4 1.08 6.3 50.9
5 ~94 5.5 56.4
6 .83 4.9 61.3
7 .78 4.6 65.9
8 .74 4.4 70.3
9 .68 4.0 74.3
10 .66 3.9 78.2
11 .61 3.6 81.8
12 .59 3.5 85.3
13 .54 3.2 88.5
14 .52 3.1 91.6
15 .50 2.9 94.5
16 .49 2.9 97.4
17 .44 2.6 100
17 100
12 Cattdl’s "scree test" gives somewhat indeterminate results. The slope resulting
from plotting the proportion of variance explained by each factor declines to an
approximately straight line after five factors, incllcathag that this is the solution to
be sought. However, the test could just po~tibly.be interpreted n~ allowing a 1, 3
or 4 factor solution lust~ad. Bartlett’s test indlcatcs that five factors could be
ex la’acted.
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Given this indication of the presence of four viable factors,
and their hypothesis that there should be four specified
factors present, the authors must have sought a four-factor
solution in the next stage of their analysis. No results of this
exercise are quoted in Paper No. 97, so we have ourselves
undertaken it, using the correlation matrix and supporting
information provided by the authors. The outcome is shown
in Table 3. This indicates that at first sight the four-factor
solution is moderately satisfactory, as would be expected
from the eigenvalues shown in Table 2. All 17 items load on
to factors at above the 0.40 cut-off point, although two of
the items load at above this level on to two separate factors.
"The vast majority of Protestants in Northern Ireland are
willing to reach an agreement acceptable to the Catholic com-
munity" loads on to both Factor 3 and Factor 4, while "The
sooner we get the idea that the North belongs to us out of
our heads the better" loads on to both Factor 1 and Factor
4. Leaving these two items aside, there are clear-cut loadings
of six items on to Factor 1, five items on to Factor 2, 2 items
on to Factor 3, and two items on to Factor 4.
Table 3: Factor anodysix of l 7 Likert items from Paper No. 97: Loadings
on four factors (uarimax rotation), principal factoring without iteration
Factors
1      2     3    4 ".      Communatity*
1 Rcurdfication is an essential
condition for any solution
of the problem in Northern
Ireland
,74
2 The vast majority of
Ptot~ta~ts in Northern
Ireland are ~il/ing to reach
an agreement acceptable to
the Catholic communJ~
. l I -.04
-.45
3 Were it not for the IKA, the
Northern problem would be
even further from asolufion .25 .66
4 This is an island and it
ear, not be permanently
pa~itioned
,75 .02
5 The basic problem in
Northern Ireland is that
Protestants ate prepared to
dtf~-ad thch" prlv~ege$ at all
COSTS
.17 .14 .01 ,59
.55 .52
.12 .08 .52
.09 -.07 .58
.23 . -.02 .69 -.04
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Table 3: (Continued)
F~ctor$
1 2 3 4 Community"
5 The presence of British
Troops in Norshem IreLand
amounts to foreign
occupation of part of
Ireland
.55 .18 .38 -.23 .53
7 There will never be peace in --
Northern Ireland until
partition is ended
.74 .16 .20 .51 ,61
8 The methods of the IRA are --
totally unacceptable .07 -.73 .05 .10 .55
9 Since they are the majority,
it is ord¥ right that the
Protestants should have the
last say in how Northern
Ireland is to be governed
-.07 " .03 -.07 .73 .54-
l0 The sooner we get the idea
that the North belongs to us
out of our heads the better -.51 -.12 .0] .47 .50
11 Northern Ireland Protestants ............
have an oudook and an
approach to life that i~ not
.08 .09 .71 -.06        .52 -
12 The IRA are basically a
bunch of crimlmds and
murderers
-.08 --.73 .05 .25 .61
13 The t~ajor cause of’the
problem in Northern Ireland
is British interference in
Irish ~ffairs
.4~ .27 .~8 -.16 ,43
14 Leaving aside the question .........
of their methods, I basically
support the airr~ of the IRA .29 .57 .16 -.27
.50
IS Were it not for the British,
the situation in Northern
Ireland would be worse thtm
iris
-.18 -.25 -.02 .51 .36
15 The IRA axe b~ic~5’
patriots and idealists
.24 .57 .11 .07 .40
17 The Northern Ireland " --
problem will not be solved
by ending partition
-.47 -.23 .24 .24 .39
*Communaliry is a measm’e of the common variance among the items,
representing the correlation between the item concerned and the
factors extracted from the original matrix.
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From the point of view of interpretation or measurement
the four-factor solution is less helpful. Factor 1 is fairly satis-
factory, including four expected Partition items, and two
postulated British items. One expected Partition item is
subject to a split loading although its heaviest loading is on
this factor. Factor 2 is even dearer, with the five expected
IRA items loading unambiguously on to it. Factors 3 and 4
are awkward. With only two items clearly on each, they are
not suitable as measurement scales, while the content of the
items makes interpretation very difficult. Indeed, one possible
interpretation, especiaUy if the split loaded Item 2 is attribu-
ted to Factor 4, is that Factor 3 groups together items
antipathetic to Northern Ireland Protestants, and Factor 4
items sympathetic to them and their British connection,
which would indicate that "response set" may have been a
problem after all.
What is clear is that these factors do not represent the
hypothesised attitudes towards Northern Ireland Protestants
and the British presence respectively. The authors at this
stage were obviously in some difficulty, with which we can
fully sympathise. In spite of the proper sequence of pilot and
pre:test, the items selected had not clustered in the expected
manner. This is by no means a rare occurrence in social
scientific research, and the problems posed by such a situation
have been faced by many research workers. The purest
solution, which is in keeping with a strict hypothesis-testing
approach to research, is simply to report the results and con-
cede that parts of the hypothesis have failed to be borne out
and must be abandoned at this stage. Attention can then be
focused exclusively on the parts which have received con-
firmation, in this case Factors 1 and 2. Alternatively it is
quite legitimate to argue that the results may indicate flaws
in the original hypothesis and proceed, in an exploratory
manner, to seek alternative hypotheses which would be com-
patible with the results.
What is not legitimate is to move on to an alternative three-
factor solution, without reporting the four factor, and to
announce to the reader that the factor analysis "produced
not four but three factors" (p. 94). Nor is it acceptable to
claim that this procedure, which involves abandoning the~
78"
hypothesis on which the items were selected, can "be seen as
a substantive gain in terms both of our understanding of the
attitudes in question and in terms of our confidence in the
validity of our composite measures" (p. 94).
As we have seen, the eigenvalues provide no basis for
adopting a three-factor solution. Even if a level of 1.0 is
regarded as arbitrary, there are no obvious grounds for adopt-
ing, without explanation, a cut-off point somewhere between
1.08 and 1.33. The three-factor solution possesses no advan-
tage in terms of the loading of the items. There are still two
items, although a different two, with sprit loadings, and in
this case they fail to reach 0.40 on any factor rather than
reach it on two at once. Moreover, one of the items "lost" in
the three-factor solution, "The Northern Ireland problem will
not be solved by ending partition" is one of the most direct
of the Partition items and one which loaded satisfactorily and
unambiguously in the four-factor solution.
Nevertheless, the three-factor solution, like the four-factor,
provides two clear factors, with six and five items respectively,
and reasonably in line with the expected groupings of items.
The third factor, however, is very weak, although it does con-
tain the four expected Northern Ireland Protestant items. As
Table 4 shows, the average inter-correlation among its items
is only 0.19 and one correlation within it is as low as 0.09.
This means that the two items concemed share less than one
per cent of their variance. Moreover, the four items in the fac-
tor have correlations with severa/ items from other factors
which exceed those they have with one another. Thus, as a
potential scale, the factor possesses neither homogeneity nor
distinctness. In Nunnally’s term, it does not "hang together".
Any scale derived from it will lack clear meaning and as will be
seen later, lack statistical reliability.
If Table 4 demonstrates that the third factor is too weak
to use, it also shows that the first two factors do "hang
together" reasonably well. In each case the pattern of corre-
lations is relatively homogeneous and shows little overlap
with items loading on to other factors. The authors, however,
seek to establish that the IRA factor, which emerges quite
clearly and unchanged from both the four and three-factor
solutions, is in fact "two clearly different factors relating to
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Table 4: Correlation between items within factors
3 factor solution, coefficients of correlation, signs omitted
1 4
-- .47
Number of correlations
with items outside
L Items loading on to partition factor factor higher than
lowest correlation
Item * 6 7 10 13 within factor
1 .41 .55 .32 .33 0
4 .41 .49 .34 .31 0
6 -- .43 .34 .46 1
7 -- .32 .37 0
10 -- .28 1
13 -- 2
Average coefficient among partition items = ,389
II.    Items loading on to IRA Factor+
Item* 3 8 12 14 16
3 IIA F-----’-~33----.37" .35 .29 0
8 (acti’Oties) --    .42 .28 .20 1
12 ~t_ .......-- __.4_3_._34. 0
]
14 lIB -- .39 I 6
16 (motives) t. .....-~-2 4
Average coefficient among "activilies" items (3, 8, 12) =.373
Average coefficient among "moti-,~s" items (14, 16) = .39
Average coefficient between "activities" and "motives" items =.315
Average coefficient among all IRA items (3, 8, 12, 14, 16) =.340
IlL Items loading on to Northern Ireland protestant factor
Item * 2 5 9 11
2 -- .22 .24 .21 0
5 - .09 .26 10
9 -- .12 9
11 -- 7
Average coefficient among N.I. Protestant items = .190
¯ Items numbered as in Appendix Table A2 Part I.
+Correlations within each IRA sub-factor are indicated by the dotted
tines.
the IRA" (p. 94). The reason given in Paper No. 97 for divid-
ing the factor is that "the different levels of support which
these items relating to the IRA showed in the nationwide
sample suggested that, although these five items clustered
together in a global factor analysis, the attitude towards thel
8O
IRA which they measured might itself be multi-dimensional"
(p. 94). This is amplified (p. 98) as: "If our identification and
interpretation of a two dimensional attitude to the IRA is
valid, then the two dimensions should have contrasting dis-
tributions in the population. This is in fact the case".
This claim is based on a statistical fallacy. The marginal
distributions of two variables are irrelevant to the relationship
between them. Correlation, on which factor analysis is based,
measures whether responses to items tend to move together,
not whether they are of similar magnitude. If most individuals
who score two on one item score five on the other, while
those who score three on the first score six on the second and
so on, then the two items will be highly correlated, although
their means and marginal distributions are quite different. The
claim Is also extraordinary because at is quite simply not the
case that there is any clear-cut discontinuity in the marginal
distribution of replies to the five IRA items. Appendix Table
A1 to Part I shows that while there is a considerable spread
in the percentage responses to the five individual items, the
distributions cannot be sensibly divided into two contrasting
groups on this basis.
The method chosen to subdivide.the IRA factor was to
carry out a second stage of factor analysis, seeking a two-
factor solution for the five IRA items in isolation. This is a
most unusual procedure. One should not, of course, condemn
an approach just because .it is novel, for innovation is necessary
if methodology is not to stagnate. However, it is incumbent
upon authors in such circumstances to justify their techniques.
This the authors of Paper No. 97 do not attempt, and indeed
it would be difficult for them to do so in this case.
In the first place five items are too few for the proper
identification of two factors, especially in the absence of a
relevant pretest.. Taylor, (1977), for example, recommends
that "in practice the number of variables be at least five times
the number of factors". While minor deviations from this
criterion may be disregarded, halving the recommended
guidelines is not reasonable. It ensures that, at best, the new
tactors will contain three and two items respectively, which
in turn means that the resulting scales are likely to be un-
balanced and unreliable.
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In the second place, the procedure adopted violates the
logic of the method. The initial factor analysis provided a
factor that is orthogonal to the other factors; that is, a cluster
of items that were answered with a high degree of consist-
ency and with maximum independence from all other
clusters. To apply a further stage of factor analysis implies
that these five consistent items can then be further broken
into two groups which are independent of each other. For
the assumption of independence to hold, it must be plausible
for each of the four combinations between the two factors to
be held by some people. In this instance, independence pre-
supposes that some may be favourable to both the activities
and motives of the IRA, some unfavourable to both, some in
favour of motives but unfavourable to activities and some
favourable to activities but unfavourable to motives. It is
reasonable to expect a considerable number of respondents
to hold each of the first three of these combinations of
attitudes, but it is exceedingly implausible that the fourth
cell would be populated. Yet unless it can be postulated that
some people do accept IRA activities while rejecting IRA
motives, then independence between the "attitudes" cannot
be hypothesised.
Such a hypothesis was advanced in Paper No. 97. In Part I
of the present document, the break among the IRA items is
justified using an oblique rotation, which allows the two
factors to be correlated. The result is what NunnaUy advises
us to expect: the loadings on the oblique factors are dearer
than those from orthogonal rotation and the results of the
two rotations are rather similar. (see Nunnally, op. cir., pp.
325-327). This hardly overcomes the strength of the evidence
that in fact only one factor is present for the IRA items, nor
can it legitimise the novel "two stage" approach to factor
analysis developed by Davis and Sinnott.
Leaving aside our objections to the very practice of per-
forming a second-factor analysis on a five-item factor, it is
clear that in this case the procedure does not result in the
identification of two separate factors. The first factor emerges
with an eigenvalue of 2.34, while the second factor has an
eigenvalue of only 0.84. This is clear evidence that only one
- 82
viable factor is present in the five items. All five items load
satisfactorily on to this single factor, as follows:
Item 3 0.683
Item 8 -0.642
Item 12 -0.761
Item 14 0.719
Item 16 0.634
There seems to be no basis here for distinguishing between
the first three items and the remaining two.
In view of this evidence that only one factor exists, it is
not surprising that in order to allocate their items between
their two sub-factors the authors are obliged to abandon the
general rule of thumb, which they have used in the first stage
of their analysis, that items with a 0.40 loading or better are
included in a factor. Item 12 ("criminals and murderers")
loads 0.66 on to their first’sub-factor and 0.41 on to their
second. Rather than discard either the item or the approach,
they arbitrarily, and without explanation in the text of Paper
No. 97, raise the threshold for inclusion of an item from 0.40
to 0.60.
In.any caae, these factor loadings must be approached with
considerable caution. There is some disagreement among the
authorities concerning the correct treatment of the diagonal
in a correlation matrix when factor analysis is to be applied.
It is now widely accepted that communalities should be
inserted on the diagonal (Tatsuoka o/~. cir. p. 145). Since
these measure the common variance among the items, and
exclude the variance which is unique to each item, it is argued
that their use minimlses error, both systematic and random,
and permits greater conf’ldence to be placed ~n the results of
the factor analysis. On the other hand, Nunnally (op. cir. p.
355) prefers in general the use of unities, which represent
each item’s perfect correlation with itself.
However, on two points there is no disagreement. The
researcher should make clear which method is being adopted.
This is not done in Paper No. 97. Secondly, where very small
numbers of items are involved, the use of unities artifically
inflates the factor loadings (Nunnally op. cir. p. 369). Thus,
if an attempt is to be made to obtain two factors from a set
of five items, then communalities, rather than the unities
employed in Paper No. 97, should be used. The use of
communallties in a two-factor solution for the five items
concerned yields the following loadings.
/tem
3 Were it not for the IRA, the Northern
problem would be even further from a
solution .41 -.38
8 The methods of the IRA are totally
unacceptable -. 18 .69
12 The IRA are basically a bunch of
criminals and murderers -.48 .48
14 Leaving aside the question of their
methods, I basically support the alms
of the IRA .64 -.24
16 The IRA are basically patriots and
idealists .55 -.16
Factor 1 Factor 2
With two of the five items loading almost equally on to
each factor it seems clear that, if communalifies had been
used, the two-factor solution could not have been adopted as
the basis for sub-dividing the IRA items.
Against the manifold evidence that the IRA items form
just one cohesive factor, the authors could argue that some
statistical tests do indicate the presence of more than one
factor, although as they rejected the findings of such tests
when adopting a three-factor solution in their main analysis,
they cannot legitimately rely on them in their secondary
analysis. The clearest of such tests is probably that put for-
ward .by Bartlett.x3 This indicates that there should be three,
not two, sub-factors among the five items.14 However, Taylor
(op. tit.) shows that such a solution is mathematically invalid
when only five items are used. It might be noted that the
danger of looking only at the factor loadings is weU illustrated
13 Quoted in Kcr~dall ~nd Stuart, (1968) Volume $, paSe 292.
14 This is also the rcszdt of the "sc~ee test".
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by the trivial three-factor solution, since it appears to yield
results which are at least as interpretable as those of the two-
factor solution adopted in Paper No. 97.
In assessing the use of factor analysis in Paper No. 97, it is
as well to keep constantly in mind Nunnally’s dictum: "One
way to fool yourself with factor analysis is to ignore the
correlations that are used to define a factor" (op. tit. p. 368).
By paying too little attention to the underlying correlations,
the authors would appear to have made the following major
errors in their application of factor analysis.
1 .To adopt a three-factor solution, where both the eigen-
values obtained and their own hypothesis suggest a
four-factor solution should have been used.
4
To have accepted as meaningful a Northern Ireland
Protestant factor lacking in homogeneity and which is
so unstable that it disintegrates when a four-factor
solution is applied.
To have forced through a sub-division of a clear IRA
factor which the eigenvalues, the matrix of correlations
and the single-factor Ioadings all show .to be a single
factor.
To have used methods which breach normal practice
and infringe the rules of logic in effecting this sub-
division.
Thus three of the four scales derived by the authors are
based on misapplications of factor analysis. Even the fourth
scale, that relating to attitudes to Partition, is imperfectly
specified, in that the four-factor solution provides it with a
slightly different content of items. If the four scales are to be
justified, it must be on the grounds of evidence other than
the factor analysis. No such external evidence is provided in
Paper No. 97.
(d) Construction and Use "of Scales
The principal purpose of the factor analysis is to group the
17 Likert items into a number of clusters. The responses to
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each item within a cluster or factor are then combined
together into a scale which is taken to measure the attitude
hypothesised by the authors.
(i) Reliability
For such a summated scale to be taken seriously it must
possess a reasonable level of reliability, meaning that the
measurements obtained from the survey should he repeatable..
Any scale will contain a certain amount of error, both random
and systematic, but provided that the items in a scale are
measuring a common phenomenon, and that the items are
ans’:qered consistently, with errors from the various sources
tending to cancel each other out, the scale will be sufficiently
reliable to use in research.
The reliability of a scale can be tested, and Nunnally (op.
cir. p. 194) recommends the use of the "coefficient alpha"
test since " . . . in many ways this is the most meaningful
measure of reliability". This test sets an upper limit on a
scale’s reliability, based on (a) the consistency among the
items as expressed by their intercorrelations, and (b) the test
length, or number of items in the scale. The alpha coefficient
can range from zero to one, and is the estimated correlation
between a scale as measured and the "true scores" that would
have been obtained had it been possible to measure the
attitude without error.
The alpha coefficients for the four scales used in Section
IV are -
1 Attitude to Partition: Anti versus Pro .793
2 IRA Activities: Support versus Opposition .641
3 IRA Motives: Sympathy versus Rejection .561
4 Northern Ireland Protestants: Anti versus Pro .484
The level of reliability that is required in a scale is governed
by the use to be made of the scale. Nunnally (p. 226) offers
the following guideline:
In the early stages of research on predictor tests of
hypothesized measures of a construct, one saves times and
energy by working with instruments that have only
modest reliabilities, for which purpose reliabilities of .60
or .50 will suffice . . . in many applied settings a relia-
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bility of .80 is not nearly high enough. In basic research,
the concern is with size of correlations and with the
differences in means for different experimental treat-
ments, for which purpose a reliability of .80 for the
different measures involved is adequate.
As the use made of the scales in Paper 1~o. 97 could be
defined as either appfied or basic, it is clear that the reliability
coefficients of three of the scales (those relating to IRA
activities, IRA motives, and Northern Ireland Protestants)
must be considered inadequate. In view of the shortcomings
in the application of ’factor analysis, there can be no surprise
that the scales do not achieve adequate reliability. However,
because an attempt is made to use the scales to measure
precisely the average level of support and opposition to parti-
cular objects, the absence of adequate reliability in the scales
takes on an added importance.
(ii) Neutral Point
Even the individual Likert items are essentially ordinal
measures, in that the participant is asked to agree or disagree
with a statement more or less strongly. The placing of num-
bers on responses, such as a score of one for strong disagree-
ment or six for-moderate agreement with an item, although
standard practice in attitudinal research, is an arbitrary pro-
cedure. The score on an individual item can in no way be
compared with precise measures, such as those of length,
weight or temperature. Rather it is a somewhat crude numeri-
cal representation of an order of ranking and equal intervals
between the points of the score cannot, strictly, be assumed.
A problem in the application and scoring of individual
Likert items is the treatxnent of the neutral point, where
answers change from being in some degree favourable to
some degree unfavourable. The purist approach is to have six
potential scores, with no point intervening between slightly
favourable and slightly un’favourable. This appears to have
been the authors’ intention, as the Likert items presented to
respondents contained no box for a "don’t know" ~core.
Nevertheless, in spite of encouragement from interviewers to
select a definite response, a small proportion of respondents
insisted on returning a "don’t know" answer. These were
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accommodated by inserting a "don’t know" category in the
reported scores, and according this a score of four on a scale
ranging from one to seven.
This practice allows a small area of indetermination in the
score of each individual Liken item. It can be argued that it
also leads to some distortion of the scale, as the pattern of
answers received is probably somewhat different to that
which would have been obtained had the respondents been
offered a "don’t know" category in the fLrst place. A tech-
nical consequence of the constricted "don’t know" area in the
centre of the scale is that it tends to lead to a bi-modal dis-
tribution of answers, with a dip at the middle of the scale.
This in turn implies that the items will not possess a normal
distribution of responses, yet the assumption of normal dis-
tribution is a standard requirement for drawing inferences
from correlation analysis, including factor analysis.
Although there is no discussion of the matter in the course
of Paper No. 97, it could Well be, as the authors argue in
Part I of this document, that the issue of the neutral point on
individual Likert items is not of great importance, and does
not significantly affect the results obtained.
It is when we turn from individual Likert items to the
summated scales that the difficulties caused by the treatment
of the neutral point become severe. On an individual item,
the neutral point between favourable and unfavourable
responses possesses psychological meaning, even if it does
pose problems in measurement. When individual items are
added together no such psychological neutral point can be
postulated. On, say, a four-item summated scale an average
score of four can be obtained by dozens of different combina-
tions of scores on the component items, ranging from two
"strongly agrees" combining with two "strongly disagrees",
through many mixtures of agreement and disagreement, to
four genuine "don’t knows". To interpret all these possible
combinations of agreement and disagreement as neutrality
towards the stimulus is not justifiable. Rather, the scores
towards the centre of a summated scale can only be inter-
preted as indeterminate.
Secondly, even if the answers to questions are consistent
in the sense that they correlate highly, it can;not be assumed
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that all items tap the attitude in question with equal inten.
sity. Consequently a score of, say, two on one item does not
necessarily imply the same degree of favourability towards
the attitude as the same score on a different item. It follows,
crucially, that the changeover points from positive to negative
responses to different specific items may bear differing
relationships to the change from a favourable to ma unfavour-
able position on the attitude as a whole.
Opperdaeim (op. tit. pp. 140-141) sums up this argument
as follows:
With regard to the neutral point, We must agree that this
is not necessarily the mid-point between the two extreme
scale scores; moreover, scores in the middle region could
be duc to lukewarm response, lack of knowledge, or lack
of attitude in the respondent (leading to many
"uncertain" responses), or to the presence of both
strongly positive and strongly negative responses, which
would more or less balance each other.
Of course, scales containing items with a poor level of
intercorrelation exhibit this problem in an acute form. They
will suffer from a high proportion of inconsistent answers,
while the relationship of each of a set of weakly linked items
with the underlyin’,g attitude must be regarded as tenuous.
Not only does the mathematical mld-point on such a scale
lack any meaning, but the other points towards the centre of
the scale are also likely to contain a large number of indeter-
minate sets of answers, so that they too cannot be interpreted
with any degree of confidence. Only average scores, which
are extremely high or low, approaching one or seven, can be
interpreted without ambiguity, as such averages can only be
obtained if the scores on all component items are similaxly
extreme. Obviously, unless a scale possesses adequate relia-
bility it cannot sensibly be used as a measure at all..
Among scales which are reliable, the seriousness of the
problem concerning the neutral point depends largely on the
use to which the scale is to be put. Traditionally summated
scales have been most widely used in personality research,
where the nature of research requires ordinal measures. In
attitude research, reliable summated scales are frequently
used to compare the co-variance of two attitudes, or to
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examine the relationship between certain socio-demographic
variables and the strength with which an attitude is held. So
long as applications of summated scales are limited to such
ordinal uses the issue of the neutral point is not important,
but in any attempt to interpret the scales as cardinal measures
it becomes crucial.
A useful summary of the matter is given by Edwards (1957,
¯ p. "157)
.... nor is there any evidence that the "neutral" point
on a summated-rating scale necessarily corresponds to the
mid-point of the possible scores . . . If in terms of
research, our interest is in comparing the mean change in
attitude scores as a result of introducing some experi-
mental variable, such as a motion picture film, then the
lack of knowledge of a zero point should cause no con-
cern. Similarly, if our interest is in comparing the mean
attitude scores-of two or more groups, this can be done
with summated rating scales .... Or if we wish to
correlate scores on an attitude scale with scores on other
scales or with other measures of interest, this can also
be done without any reference to the zero point on the
favourable-unfavourable continuum...
But he also warns:
The absence of knowledge of such a point is a handicap
only if our major interest is in being able to assign, on the
basis of an attitude score, a single subject to the class of
those favourable or unfavourable in attitude toward the
psychological object under consideration.
If percentages pro- or anti- a particular group or pheno-
menon are to be quoted, then it is, of course, necessary to
designate individuals as favourable or unfavourable in their
attitude. Some method of defining the psychological neutral
point therefore becomes essential. Techniques have been pro-
posed whereby the information contained in the responses to
individual items can be analysed to obtain a neutral point
possessing a reasonable degree of psychological meaning.Is
However, such techniques can only be properly applied if the
scale is reliable in the first place.
15 Suchman (195o).
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Alternatively, an attempt couldbe made to establish the
neutral point through the use of criteria from outside the
scale. This generally needs to be planned for when the Survey
questionnaire is being designed. On a crude level some indica-
tion of the neutral point could be obtained through asking a
direct question, not included in the scale itself, concerning
the general attitude towards the stimulus. A more acceptable
practice is to ascertain from each respondent the strength of
his feeling about an item as well as his degree of agreement
or disagreement. This provides sufficient information to
allow the use of intensity techniques16 which reveal the area
of neutrality concerning the attitude. Whatever the method
adopted, the aim remains the same: to replace the mid-point
of the scale with a psychological neutral point which has
been established by means of a deliberate and clearly
explicable procedure.
(iii) Assessment of Scales
It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that in
order to present summated scales as measuring the percentage
pro-, and- and neutral in attitude towards an object such as
Partition, two fundamental conditions must be met.
(a) The scales must themselves be reliable.
(b) The "neutral" point must be independently determined.
The four scales presented in Faper No. 97 in the form of
percentage distributions meet neither of these conditions.
As we have already seen, three of the scales are insufficient-
ly reliable for use in anything except
, 
perhaps, preliminary
exploratory hypothesis formation. The scale relating to
Partition probably has sufficient reliability for use in an
ordinal form, as in the latter part of Section IV, but not for
the applied use of measuring the distribution of an attitude.
For none of the scales was any independent source sought
for establishing a viable neutral point. There is a simple
reliance, against the explicit advice of the authorities in the
field, on the mathematical mid-point of the scales as a.n
expression of neutrality of attitudes. Neither is there any
warning to the reader that this procedure departs from accept-
ed practice.
16 See Guttman.xr~d Suchman (1947).
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The presentation of scales purporting to measure the precise ¯
distribution of attitudes on sensitive topics, when these scales
meet neither of the fundamental conditions necessary for
such measurement, is in our view a serious misuse of sum-
mated attitudinal scales.
(e) Interpretation and Labelling
In the two preceding sections we have expressed our
reasons for believing the identification of the four factors
presented in Section IV and the presentation of these in
terms of absolute percentages of the population holding
particular attitudes to have been mistaken. If, in fact, these
atfftudes have not been properly identified and measured,
then their labelling and interpretation become matters of
secondary importance.
Nevertheless, it is worth considering the issue in isolation,
because we believe ’that the labels adopted in Paper No. 97
would have been unsuited to the findings of the Survey, even
if the factor analysis and scale construction had been correct-
ly undertaken. For the purposes of this section, therefore, we
temporarily suspend our criticisms concerning analysis and
accept the clusters of items selected by the authors as form-
ing their four factors. Thus _w_e can concentrate for the time
being on how these factors are interpreted and labelled.
The interpretation of analysed survey data and the labels
attached to particular factors are closely intertwined. Indeed,
it would hardly be an exaggeration to regard the labels as a
summary of the interpretation adopted. LabeUing is thus a
matter of judgement and not of technique.
To some extent labelling is bound to be arbitrary, but it
ought generally to stay within the limits of common sense
and the ordinary rules of language. Leaving to one side the
major issue of whether attitudes should be labelled in a
dichotomous manner, such as "Pro versus Anti" or "Support
versus Opposition", when no neutral point in the scale has
been established, we can consider the key words used in each
of the labels adopted in Section IV.
There is no call to quarrel with the key word "anti" in
relation to the attitude" to partition. This appears to be an
adequate and accurate reflection of the content of the items.
contributing to the factor. With regard to the IRA Motives
attitude, the principal query is whether this sub-factor exists
as a separate entity. Assuming for the moment that it’ does,
then "sympathy" is probably a reasonable label in relation to
the content of the constituent items. It is the labelling of the
other two attitudes which causes us concern.
From the items on which it is based, the attitude towards
Northern Ireland Protestants would appear to be complex
and somewhat diffuse. It involves a recogafition of differences
of outlook, approach to life and political aims together with
a reluctance to accept that these Northern Ireland Protestant
aims should determine the resolution of the Northern Ireland
problem. Not surprisingly some of these items are correlated
as closely with some of the Partition.items as with each other.
To label this attitude "and" Northern Ireland Protestant is
to simplify it unduly, to imply a coherence which the factor
lacks, and to show a lack of a~rareness concerning the effect
that labelling can have on the reader of Paper No. 97.
The labelling of the remaining IRA attitude is open to even
stronger objections. The factor is based on three items, one
of which concerns the effect of the existence of the IRA, one
of which is ostensibly concerned with their motives, and only
one of which mentions methods. To relate all three to IRA
activities is thus an unjustified interpretation. To go further
and describe the attitude as one of support is to adopt an
interpretation which simply is not in accord with the normal
usage of the English language. Support, in this context,
means an actively positive state of mind, if not also implying
concrete manifestations of agreement.17 There is nothing in
the three items to warrant the use of the word.
If the criterion of support for a political group is a failure
to find its "methods totally unacceptable" or to regard its
members as "a bunch of criminals and murderers", then most
of the adult population of Ireland simultaneousy "support"
Fianna Fail, Fine Gael, the Labour Party, and, for that
matter, the Australian Country Party. On the same basis,
many pressure groups, armed factions and illegal organisations
around the world could claim widespread "support" in
Ireland.
17 See the Oxford En~ish Dictiona~ definition of "support" quoted in Part 1
(p. s0).
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Obviously, the mere absence of outright condemnation
should not be described as "support" and would be more
accurately reflected in the use of more passive terminology
such as "acquiescence in", "toleration of" or even "acceptance
of". This is especially so when the authors themselves are at
pains to point out (p. 98) that they "have no evidence that
an attitude of support for IRA activities, as we have measured
it, leads to any concrete actions, by way of monetary contri-
butions or whatever, in support of the campaign of the IRA."
In passing, it should be noted that this denial of any link
between attitude and action runs counter to most of the
definitions of attitude quoted in Part I of this document. If
attitudes are assumed not to influence behaviour, then much
of the raison d’etre of attitude research is removed.
Apart from the labelling of the factors, there are several
less important points on which the authors’ interpretation of
their results appears unconvincing. The most serious of these
is probably the discussion of the attitude towards IRA
Motives. Here it is claimed (p. 100) that this cannot "be
explained away as an alternative expression of the aspiration
to reunification" on the grounds that one of the items referr-
ed to "aims (plural)" and that the other referred "to patriotic
and idealistic characteristics." This evidence is inadequate for
such a claim. Given that the majority of respondents them-
selves see reunification as highly desirable, it would not be
unreasonable to assume that they would tend to perceive
anybody else holding the same aspiration as being both
patriotic and idealistic. Similarly the mere use of the plural
m "aims" tells nothing about how these aims are actually
perceived by respondents. Either the plural could be over-
looked, or could be taken to encompass complementary goals
such as British withdrawal. The only clear evidence concerning
how the actual programme of the Pro~cisional IRA is accepted
comes in Section Ili, where only eight per cent of respondents
selected the Provisional Sinn Fein policy of a four-province
Federal United Ireland as their f’trst choice solution. The real
point at issue here is that if a deliberate choice was made to
omit any reference to the actual aims of the IRA from the
questionnaire, it is unwarranted to then make f’trm assertions
concerning the meaning of responses in this area. A legitimate
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case can be made in attitude research for leaving such questions
vague, but the inevitable price is that uncertainty about the
exact meaning of the results must be accepted.
(~) Presentation
Our criticisms of Section IV so far have concerned several
aspects of conceptualisation, methodology and interpretation.
Taken together, these would be enough to render the findings
of this Section of Paper No. 97 invalid. The manner in which
the Section is presented greatly exacerbates its shortcomings.
In the first place, it is common practice when presenting
an analysis to allude to, if not to discuss fully, the methodo-
logical problems encountered, and to seek to justify the
particular solutions adopted. As we have shown in this
critique, there are several instances in Section IV where
important issues have not been addressed. This makes it very
difficult for even the informed reader to assess the strength
of the evidence adduced.
More centrally, in discussing the desiderata of attitude
research, we noted that validation of such work could never
be absolute, and that the degree of validity achieved depends
on the value of the concepts as much as on the consistency of
the statistical results. Furthermore we concluded, in line with
authorities in the field, that the presentation of this type of
research should be in keeping with its interpretative and
speculative nature.
In the discussion of methodology in Section II of Paper
No. 97, it is stated, reasonably, that the process of pre-testing
factors "greatly increases the confidence one may place in
the validity of the measures one uses, since the judgement of
validity is based not simply on a priori reasoning, but on
empirical corroboration" (p. 23). Even at the beginning of
Section IV itself there is a reference to a "gain in terms of
our confidence in the validity of our composite measures"
(p. 94). This too is an acceptable form for a statement of the
general role of factor analysis in relation to validity.
However, as the section progresses this concern with the
place of statistical evidence in corroborating a priori reason-
ing, and thus improving confidence in validity, gives way to
much stronger" expression. We Fred such statements as (p. 96)
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"... the homogeneity of the subsets of items has been
empirically established by means of the factor analysis",
(when in fact the correlation between some of the "homo-
geneous" items is as low as .09). Similarly the view that the
attitude towards the IRA might possess more than one
dimension (p. 97) "proved correct in that a separate factor
analysis of the five items produced two distinct factors"
(when, as we have shown, the evidence for the existence of
these two separate factors is totally lacking).
These claims, which we regard as excessive, still relate to
matters of technique, and in themselves are perhaps not very
serious. It is when the authors turn from describing their
methods to reporting their results that the tone of the section
becomes even less cautious, and implies that the findings are
fully validated. Examples of over-confident presentation can
be found in the discussion of each of the attitudes. However,
it is clearest and most serious in the pages devoted to Atti-
tudes to the IRA (pp. 97-100). The three full paragraphs
quoted below illustrate in context the dearth of either qualify-
ing clauses or verbs expressing uncertainty, the consistent use
of definite verbs including the simple "is", and the frequent
occurrence of strong adverbs.
The interpretation of the grouping of the items and thus
of two dimensions identified is that the first three items
all refer to aspects of IRA activities: without their activi-
ties the problem would be worse (Item 1), the methods
underlying their activities are totally unacceptable (Item
2) and their activities make them a bunch of criminals
and murderers (Item S). Taken together the three items
clearly represent Support for versus Opposition to IRA
Activities.
The second set of IRA items relates to the motives of the
IRA: support for their aims (Item 1) and attribution of
patriotic and idealistic characteristics to them (Item 2).
Taken together these two items represent an attitude to
IRA motives - an attitude of Sympathy with, versus
Rejection of IRA Motives. If our identification and
interpretation of a two-dimensional attitude to the IRA is
valid then the two dimensions should have contrasting
distributions in the population. This is in fact the case.
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The contrast is first apparent when We look at the average
scores on each dimension -- these are 3.24 in the case of
support for activities and 3.86 in the case of sympathy
for motives. Both means fall below the mid-point of four
but the" mean value of support for IRA motives is sub-
stantially closer to the mid or neutral point. The contrast
between the distributions of the two dimensions of
attitude to the IRA is also apparent in Table 43 where
the percentage distributions are given on the basis of
rounding the scores to integer values. There are contrasts
at almost every level of the scale in Table 43. If we focus
on the summary percentages, the picture emerges quite
clearly. In. the case of attitude to IRA activities (support
versus opposition), 61 per cent are on the opposed side of
the neutral point compared with 34 per cent on the re-
jection side of the neutral point in the case of attitude to
IRA motives. Correspondingly~ 21 per cent are on the
support side of the neutral point in regard to attitude to
activities compared with 42 per cent on the sympathy
side of the netural point in the case of attitude to
motives.
The identification and measurement of these two distinct
dimensions is of crucial importance in assessing attitudes
to the IRA. Attitude to IRA activities is a clear and ufi-
ambiguous measure. Given the nature of the attitude in
question it is necessary to be particularly careful and pre-
cise in discussing its distribution. The majority of people
(61 per cent) are opposed to IRA activities as we have
measured this attitude. Overall opposition is also evident
in the average score of 3.24 already noted. A further 19
per cent are neutral. In regard to the remaining 21 per
cent support for IRA activities, it should first of all be
noted that this includes 13 per cent who are slightly
supportive as against eight per cent moderately to
strongly supportive. This having been said, the stark fact
remains that 21 per cent of the population emerge as in
some degree supportive in their attitude to IRA activities.
It should also be emphasised that we have no evidence
that an attitude of support for IRA activities, as we have
measured it, leads to any concrete actions, by way of
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monetary contributions or whatever, in support of the
campaign of the IRA. The context in which these figures
for attitude to IRA activity (61 per cent opposition, 19
per cent neutrality and 21 support) should be interpreted
is that these attitudes are part of the overall approach
of people in the Republic to the Northern Ireland issue.
As such it must be acknowledged that, on this evidence,
opposition to IRA activities is not overwhelming and
certainly does not match the strong opposition so often
articulated by public figures.
If these paragraphs, like the rest of the section, do not
imply an assumption of full validity for the scales, then it is
difficult to conceive of a style of presentation that would.
In other words, the findings in this section are presented as
scientifically measured facts. Even if the statistical evidence
were more reliable, the most that should be claimed is that
the authors’ interpretations, while inevitably speculative, are
consistent with the statistical results. This is particularly so
given the evolution of the scales being presented. Because the
final composition of the scales was determined only after the
responses were received, the hypotheses embodied in the
scales must be regarded as being formed from the main survey
data. It is therefore logically untenable to claim that these
data corroborate or confirm the hypotheses.
While our main criticism of the presentation concerns the
unduly dogmatic tone of the reporting, there is another point
illustrated in the quotations above which should not.go un-
remarked. This is the use throughout of the present tense,
implying that a survey carried out in the Summer of 1978
represents views still held, in the same proportions, in the
Autumn of 1979. Nowhere in the relevant sections is there
any discussion as to whether events in the intervening period
might have led to a significant change in attitudes.
Because of the innate characteristics of the methodology
used,, because the application of that methodology diverges
at several points from accepted practice, and because of the
time-lag between survey and report, the reader ought to be
warned that the results set out in Section IV should be treated
with caution. The complete failure to state, or even imply,
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that such caution is necessary is not merely a question of
using an inappropriate style. When such sensitive subject
matter is involved, it could encourage the misuse of the find-
ings by those who are unaware of the limitations inherent in
the calculations.
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5 SUMMARY
(a) The sample on which Paper No. 97 was based appears to
have been well drawn, and the questionnaire properly admin-
istered. It follows that the answers to individual questions
collected in the Survey can be taken as representative of the
responses of the population as a whole.
(b) The eliciting of opinions concerning alternative solutions
to the Northern Ireland problem and the policy options open
to the Irish and British Governments was well conceived and
competendy executed. Section III of the Paper, in which
these results are reported, is, in our opinion, a solid and useful
contribution to knowledge.
(c) The methodology of attitude research is well established
and an extensive literature lays down clear guidelines for its
appfication. Section IV seeks to apply this methodology and
it can therefore be judged largely on the extent to which it
adheres to these guidelines and on how well the authors justify
any major departure from them.
(d) In any social research, it is important that the concepts
used be clear. In Section IV there appears to be considerable
conceptural confusion. Among seyeral instances where clarity
is lacking, two stand out. Unnecessary ambiguity is caused by
using the simple initials "IRA", with their complex historical
associations, when the object of the research would appear to
be attitudes to the Provisional IRA. More fundamentally
there is uncertainty about the basic concept of the entire
section, the nature of an attitude. This uncertainty is shown
in various ways, but it is reflected most obviously in the
wording of the questions chosen to tap the attitudes being
studied.
(e) Attitudes are commonly defined in social psychology as
emotional dispositions towards particular objects or stimuli.
Questions designed to identify or measure attitudes should
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therefore be concerned with the respondent’s feelings towards
the stimulus, not with his considered opinions, beliefs or
behaviour. Of the 17 questions in Section IV, far too many
are worded so as to invite beliefs or thought-out positions,
and there is no evidence that the answers to these axe corre-
lated with basic emotions.
(f) In attitude research, several questions, or items, are usually
taken together as representing and measuring an attitude. To
select items which group well together for this purpose,
(actor analysis is normally applied at the "pretest" stage of a
study. It is generally used again on the results of the main
survey, to confirm that the items fall into the expected
clusters. Like other statistical techniques, factor analysis
should be applied according to well established rules. We have
shown that these rules are breached in Section IV, with the
result that the factor analysis of the main survey data contains
at least four serious errors. The final grouping oi" items into
three factors, one of which is then divided into two sub-
[actors, is quite unacceptable.
(g) Following factor analysis, the results of each cluster of
items are combined to produce summated scales. These can
be tested for reliability. Only the scale measuring Attitude to
Partition shows a level of reliability which would justify its
use in some form of further analysis. The other three scales
presented are simply not reliable enough to be regarded as
measuring any attitude consistently.
(h) Even where reliable scales have been obtained, the mid-
point of the scale cannot legitimately be taken as the division
between favourable and unfavourable attitudes towards the
stimulus in question¯ This does not matter much if the scale
is to be used ordinally for purposes of comparison. However,
if the scale is to be presented as a cardinal measure, then it is
essential to establish the psychological neutral point indepen-
dently. This neutral point must be substituted for the mid-
point of the scale before the percentages pro- or anti- a
particular stimulus can be calculated. In Section IV, there is
total reliance on the mid-points, and no attempt is made to
establish independent neutral points for the scales. Thus the
percentages quoted in relation" to each attitude would be
misleading, even if the scales themselves were reliable. In the
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event, of course, the presentation as cardinal measures of
scales with such low levels of reliability cannot be accepted.
(i) The interpretation of the scales, as embodied in the
labeUing adopted, involves a debatable use of the English
language. The content of the items on which they are based
does not, in our view, justify the use of the word "support"
in relation to the activities of the IRA, nor of the word
"anti-" in relation to Northern Ireland Protestants.
(j) The style of presentation in Section IV implies that the
scales produced are fully validated. In view of the demon-
su’ably low reliability of the scales, and of grave doubts
whether the concepts used were sufficiently clear to be
measurable, this assumption of validity is unjustifiable. The
definite and over-confident tone used is therefore highly in-
appropriate, and serves to compound the methodological
faults already summarised.
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6 CONCLUSION
On the basis of a careful comparison of the methods used
in Section IV with the standard practices of the methodology
employed, we have indicated serious shortcomings in con-
ceptuallsation, selection of questions, application of factor
analysis, construction and use of scales, interpretation and
presentation. Each, on its own, would cast doubt on the
findings of Section IV. Taken together, they completely
invalidate the findings. In our view, the evidence adduced in
Section IV does not justify the ’conclusions reached.
The issue is not that the figures presented are wrong, in the
sense that a more rigorous analysis of the data would produce
alternative, more accurate, percentages. It is rather that the
scales presented in Section IV are inadequate measuring
devices. Standard tests show them to be statistically unreli-
able, while their meaning in relation to the attitudes they are
designed to represent is problematic. Quite simply, these
scales cannot legitimately be used to determine the percen-
tages of the population holding favourable or unfavourable
attitudes towards Partition, IRA Activities, IRA Motives, or
Northern Ireland Protestants.
Because the sample was satisfactory and the questions
appropriately selected, we regard Section HI of Paper No. 97
as a useful and instructive exercise. Even parts of Section IV,
where the Partition scale is used ordinally to compare the
strength of the attitude with various socio-demographic
features or with the holding of certain opinions, could have
been a potentially valuable contribution to an understanding
of Irish problems. It is unfortunate that the virtues of a large
part of Paper No. 97 tend to be obscured by the deficiencies
contained in the first eight pages of Section IV.
Note: The agreed format for this publication precludes our replying to the points
raised in Part I11. We should like to make clear that, having studied Part ILL we
stand by our major condusiorts as set out in Part IL
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I INTRODUCTION
We would like first of all to thank our four coneaguesI for
their joint critique of our paper. While we believe that the
conclusions they have drawn are wrong, publication of their
critique, nevertheless, is to be welcomed in that it provides
the opportunity for a full examination of the basis of their
publicly stated disagreement with. our conclusions.
Before replying in detail, we note that the overall scope of
the criticism in Part II is limited in two important respects.
Firstly, criticism is directed only at Section IV of Paper No.
97, the findings of which have already excited so much
controversy. Secondly, Baker et al. profess to share a common
methodology with us. Although, as we shall show, they have
misinterpreted this methodology in crucial respects, the fact
remains that their criticism is related to the application of
our methodology rather than its nature. Since this Rejoinder
is concerned only with examining the critique in Part II, we
do not discuss again the basis of that methodology, except in
so far as is necessary to indicate the ways in which the
methodology is wrongly interpreted by the authors of the
critique. The reader who is interested in the wider questions
of the methodology used in Paper No. 97 is referred to that
paper itself and the amplification of various issues in Part I of
this document.
The critique in Part II may be summarised as follows:
1 We are said to have been conceptually confused.
2 We are said to have failed to meet relevant methodological
criteria; and
3 Even though (1) and (2) would, if true, render our findings
valueless anyway, we are still adjudged to have interpreted,
labelled and presented these (valueless) findings in an
unacceptable manner.
1. For ¢ortvcnlcnc~ we rcfta" to them as Bakex et -7
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All of the detailed criticisms in Part II fall under one or other
of these headings, and we shall deal with them accordingly
in the following three sections. In Section V we present a
summary which corresponds point by point with the summary
by Baker et al. of their critique. Finally in Section VI we
offer our overall conclusions on their critique.
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11 CONCEPTUAL ASPECTS
A The Concept of Attitude
Baker et al. attribute to us a concept of attitude which we
do not use. They conceive of the object of attitude research
as essentially emotional and they explicitly place rational
evaiuadons and thought-out positions or replies outside the
compass of such research.2 This is to confuse attitude as such
with just one of the possible bases on which attitudes are
held. Two individuals, for example, may each have a similar
unfavourable attitude to fox-hunting, and yet hold those
attitudes on quite different bases. The one, a city dweller,
may have an emotional revulsion to the practice; while the
other, a tillage farmer, may have an unfavourable attitude
because of potential damage to fences and crops. The two
individuals have different bases for their attitude - one largely
emotional, the other largely rational. In each case their
response is, however, an attitude as we have defined and
sought to measure this phenomenon.
Although we ourselves would not regard their concept as a
useful one, Baker et al. are entitled to adopt their own con-
cept for purposes of any research they may be undertaking.
But they are not entided to claim that the concept they
2. Thus, for example, they say that the evaluation involved in an attitude is
"... essentially on an emotional, rather than a rational, pIane" Ip. 61); "...atti-
tudes are on an emotional rather than a rational level . . .- (p. 61); "... the
authors seem frequently to lose sight of the es.~nd~JJy affective or emotional
character of an attitude and to veer tmcasUy towards ascertaJnlng their respon-
dentk thought out positions or beliefs about issues" (p. 67); "Questions designed
to identify or measure attitudes should therefore be concerned ~dth the respon-
denu feelings towards the stimulus, not with his consdde~d opinions, beliefs or
behaviour" (pp. 100-101); "Of the 17 questions in Section IV, far too mmay axe
worded so as to invite beliefs or thought-out positions, and there is no evidence
that the answers to these are correlated with basic emotions" {p. 1011.
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propose, which limits the term attitude to the emotional
rather than the rational level, is the same as that in general
use in the relevant research literature.3 The reader who refers
to the definitions given by various authorities in Part I can
judge this for himself.
Still less are Baker et al. entitled to claim that their concept
of attitude is the same as ours, given that we were at pains in
Part I to amplify our position. Admittedly, in response to
earlier critics who held that attitude research should only be
concerned with reasoned evaluation, we did say (correctly)
that "an attitude is not necessarily a reasoned response arrived
at as a result of comprehensive reflection and consideration".
But it would be an elementary logical fallacy to deduce from
the statement "an attitude is not necessarily a reasoned
response" that an attitude can never be a reasoned response.
Evidently this is the mistaken inference that Baker et al. have
drawn: otherwise they could not claim that we aimed to
measure attitudes on an emotional rather than a rational level.
We have dwelt on this point, not to demonstrate a logical
fallacy on the part of the authors of the critique, but because
their confusion about the concept of attitude is at the root
of many of their detailed criticisms of our approach. It
underlies, for example, the allegation that there is a pervasive
lack of clarity over the basic concept of the research, i.e., the
nature of attitudes (Baker et al., p. 66). The alleged lack of
clarity arises solely from the simplistic view of Baker et aL
that attitudes are to be equated with emotions.
The same mistaken concept of attitude is the basis of what
they regard as their most serious criticism of our attitude
items, namely, that too many of the items invite a "thought-
out reply" or are likely to be interpreted by respondents as
calling for a "rational assessment of the facts" (Baker et al.,
p. 70). This criticism is valid only if one accepts the view of
Baker et aL that the notion of attitude excludes rational
responses. We have shown that this view is confused and
3. In making this daJm, Baker eta/. say, "In technical terms, attitude research
looks for ’affcctive’ rather than ’cognitive’ responses" (Baker et aL, p. 61). This
proposition is true only if the term a.ff©¢tive is understood as including all forms
of evaluative orientation (see, for example, T~-iandis, 1971, p. 8). But Baker et
a/. limit the term affective to evaluations which are essentially emotional,
contrary to the normal usage of the term, which includes
forms of evaluation other than the purely emotional. Thus,
the fact that some respondents may have given what they
considered to be a rational, rather than an emotional, response
to our items, does not in any way detract from the fact that
agreement or disagreement with the items indicates how
respondents evaluate the group or object in question which
is what is relevant in terms of the accepted meaning of
attitude (see discussion in Part I, pp. 3-5).
In developing this, their professed major criticism of our
items, Baker et al.4 state "At least half of the items appear to
tap beliefs about ’what is’ rather than reflect preferences or
feelings" (Baker eta/., p. 71f). This criticism appears to be
based on the fact that many of the items are cast in the form
"A is B" rather than in the form "I like A". This first form of
statement is required in view of the need to measure attitudes
indirectly (see Part I pp. 5-8). The attitudinal nature of the
items, however, is determined not by their form but by their
content. The content of the items is evaluative and the items
therefore tap evaluative orientations (i.e., attitudes). The
argument of Baker et aL represents a confusion between the
form of a proposition and its meaning.
B The Concept "’IRA ""
The authors of the critique raise here what they regard as
the "most serious example of lack of clarity" in the concepts
employed in the research (p. 64). The lack of clarity arises,
so they suggest, from our use of the term IRA, whereas they
believe that "if it was intended to study attitudes to the
Provisional IRA, then the terms ’Provos’, ’Provisionals’ or
’Provisional IRA’ would have been in keeping with Irish
vernacular usage" (Baker et al., p. 64). We deliberately used
the term IRA rather than Provisional IRA so as to include
all repubfican paramilitary organisations active in relation to
4. Baker ¢t aL also ~riticise the items teed from the point of view of number,
balance and extremity. These points have been fully dealt with in Part I of this
document (pp. 13-16 and pp. 21-26). We deal with the fifth and final cnl~m
of our items (that relating to the terms "IRA" and ’~IRA activities") in the
rtcxt sc¢~on.
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the current troubles in Northern Ireland. The genera/ usage
waS adhered to in our items and in our reporting of the
results,s As discussed in Part I (p. 19), the term IRA has the
advantage of being genera/ enough to include all republican
paramilitary organisations while at the same time being
frequently used aS a designation of the main such organisation
-- the Provisional IRA.
There are two aspects to the issue raised by Baker et al. The
first is the possibility that people may attribute what they see
as positive ehaIacterisics of the Old IRA (i.e., the IRA of the
period 1919-21) to the contemporary IRA. This possibility
underlies the remarks of Dr Cathal Da/y which Baker et al.
quote. The bishop’s evident concern is to warn people against
attributing the "noble characteristics" of the IRA of sixty
years ago to the new IRA. But if, in fact, people in respond-
ing to our attitude items do credit the contemporary IRA
with some of the characteristics of the Old IRA, then, how-
ever mistaken they may be in this, it is still a component of
their attitudes to the new IRA. Dr Da/y counsels people
against making this identification, but we, as research
workers, are concerned to measure what ,~, rather than what
ought to be. The fact that attitudes to the Old IRA may
condition and influence attitudes to the contemporary IRA
and its activities does not in any way imply that the use of
the general term IRA to refer to the republican paramilitary
organisations active in the current Northern Ireland conflict
is inappropriate. I~deed, it is quite evident that Dr Daly
himself does not draw any such inference. In a recently
published expanded version of the address from which Baker
et al. quote, Dr Daly consistently uses the term IRA when
referring to the current republican campaign Of violence
(Da/y 1980, passim ).
The second issue is the objection of the authors of Part II
that the term IRA could have been taken by some respon-
dents as actually referring to the Old IRA (Baker etal., p. 65).
5. Baker et ¢Z claim to have had to rely on the "tore of cermln pa_~ag,$" to
~ccrtain that the resulu reported in F]SR.I Paper No. 97 were not intended to
apply to the Old IRA (i.e., the IRA of 1919-21). We lea,~e it to the ~adcr of
Paper No. 97 to deride for himself whether such subtle cxege~q, i¢ in fact
neccs~ca~.
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The question here is whether people, when faced with our
statements relating to the IRA in the context of a survey
carried out in 1978 dealing with the current Northern Ireland
situation, interpreted these statements as applying to the
contemporary IRA, or whether they thought they were being
asked about the Old IRA of the period 1919-21. The latter
seems to us to be exceedingly implausible. In support of their
argument (that the term IRA could have been understood as
referring to the IRA of the period 1919-21), Baker et al. say
"Irish newspapers and RTE use these terms (Provisional IRA,
Provisionals, Provos) consistently in referring to the activities
of the group concerned and it is only in sections of the
British popular press that the initials IRA are used without
qualification, to denote any and every form of militant Irish
republicanism" (Baker et al., p. 65). To establish the im-
portant point of Irish newspaper usage, we have analysed
front page stories in the three Dublin-based national morning
newspapers in the Republic of Ireland for a six-month period
consisting of the three months befoer and the three months
during which the fieldwork was carried out (i.e., April to
September, 1978). The results were as follows: 22 of the 25
stories dealing with republican paramilitary activity can be
identified as relating to the Provisional IRA. Fifteen of the 22
accompanying headlines refer to the IRA and only seven to
the Provisional IRA, Provisionals or Provos; likewise 70 of the
references in the actual text of these stories employ the term
IRA compared to 64 references employing the term Provi-
sional IRA or any of its derivatives.# The use of the term IRA
ifi a majority of cases in both headlines and text shows that
the assertion by the authors of the critique concerning con-
sistent Irish newspaper usage is without foundation; the
terms IRA and Provisional IRA are used interchangeably.
Furthbr evidence that the use of the initials IRA is not
confined to "sections of the British popular press" comes
from the report Violence in Ireland: A Report to the Churches
6. SimilLr results emerge from an analy~s of ektract* from main news headlines
during the period AuEust 1972 to April 1973 which are presented by MacGr~il
(MacGr~il 1977, Appendix B, pp. 573-593). Out of 31 entxles referring to rc-
pub~c~m paramilltm3, organir~tions, 29 use0 th~ term IRA, 10 uaed the ~erm
Provisional IRA or Provos and 1 used the term Official IRA.
116
which was prepared under the auspices of the Irish Council of
Churches/Roman Catholic Church Joint Group on Social
Questions. The report uses the unqualified term "IRA" or
the terms "Republican violence" or "violence by the Repub-
lican Movement" as an umbrella term and only uses qualified
terms (Official IRA/Provisional IRA/Provisional wing of the
IRA) when discussing specific aspects or activities of one or
other organisation (Violence in Ireland: A Report to the
Churches, pp. 21-55). This indicates both the need for a
general term of reference and the acceptability of the term
IRA for this purpose. Our research also required a general
term and we employed the term IRA. We have shown that
there is no substance to the allegation that use of this term
involves co~icei~tual confusion on our part and that the term
IRA is widely employed in the sense in which we used it.
We see no reason to believe that there is any danger that
respondents misunderstood the meaning of the term.
The fifth criticism of our attitude items is that the items
relating to the IRA do not define clearly the object to which
the attitude refers (Baker et al., p. 71). The arguments just
presented a~d the supporting data show, we believe, that
there is no lack of clarity in regard to the meaning of the
term IRA in the context of discussion of the current Northern
Ireland problem. The critics further complain that the terms
"activities" and "motives" are not made clear. In both
cases, of course, our attitude measures.refer to activities and
motives as these are perceived by respondents. We have
already discussed the issue of perceptions of IRA motives in
Part 1 (pp. 31-32). In regard to activities, the central and
obvious feature of IRA activity is the campaign of violence
to which the other activities, mentioned by Baker et al. --
prison protests, rent strikes, operation of local transportation
services, etc. - are mere adjuncts. It seems to us perverse to
suggest that respondents, in replying to our activities items,
had-uppermost in their minds, the purely peripheral activity
to the neglect of the central activity of the IRA. Certainly,
examination of the items themselves gives no grounds for
such an interpretation.
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III METHODOLOGICAL CRITERIA AND
PROCEDURES
A Factor Analysis
1 Guidelines governing the number of factors
Baker et al. acknowledge that there are no absolute rules
but only guidelines for establishing the number of factors
which should be extracted in any given factor analysis. Never-
theless, they take one of these guidelines (all factors with
eigenvalues greater than 1.0 are extracted) and proceed to
rely on it as if it were an absolute rule. The extent of their
reliance on this criterion can be seen in the fact that its
application is basic to two of the four allegations of "major
errors" in our factor analysis (Baker et al., p. 85). In contrast
to the weight which the authors of the critique attach to the
eigenvalue-one criterion, the literature on factor analysis
refers to it and to the other criteria governing the choice of
number of factors as mere rules of thumb. This tentative and
approximate status of the eigenvalue-one criterion is in fact
obscured by the statement of Baker et al. that "The degree of
acceptance of that criterion can be seen in its advocacy in,
among others, the following basic texts: Child (1970, pp.
43-44), Rummell, (1970, pp. 362-364), Van de Geer (1971,
p. 147), Tatsouka (1971, p. 147) and Taylor (1977, p. 116)".
The reader who has not time to consult all these texts should
not infer, as Baker et aL imply, that their authors regard the
eigenvalue-one test as pre-eminent. Far from it. Thus the first
reference cited presents what the author describes as "two
popular methods . . . simply to give the reader an idea of
criteria in use" (Child 1970, p. 43). No pre-eminence is
accorded by the author to the eigenvalue-one criterion over
the other criteria offered despite the fact that his application
of the two criteria to the same data shows different results.
The second reference says "Given the effect that various
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design decisions can have on the eigenvalues, it seems fool-
hardy to apply the eigenvalue-one criterion mechanically"
(Rummell, 1970, pp. 363-364). The third reference is even
more cautious about the eigenvalue-one criterion, saying:
Although we are not dealing with statistical ¯matters, in
this book, I can at least indicate a coarse rule of thumb. I
do so with hesitation, because the rule is, in fact, very
coarse, and should certainly not be applied as a final
criterion (Van de Geer, 1971, p. 147).
The fourth reference introduces the question of the determi-
nation of the number of factors with the comment that it is
a "big question, indeed, for which there is no general
consensus on how to go about answering, let alone what¯
constitutes the correct answer" (Tatsouka.1971, p. 146).
Tatsouka goes on to point out that the eigenvalue-one
criterion is not immune to criticism and, having presented
the Bartlett test and the scree test as well, concludes "it
should be mentioned that, in practice one usually employs
a judicious combination of two or three such criteria (ibid.,
p. 147). The fifth and final referen~:e cited by Baker et al.
adverts to the development of "many rules of thumb" and,
in relation to the eigenvalue-one rule, states "The usefulness
of this rule is severely limited because it ignores all sampling
fluctuations in tlie data" (Taylor, 1977, p.’116). None of
¯ these quotations warrants the degree of reliance Baker et al.
place on this particular criterion.
Not only is the ei~envalue-one criterion tentative rather
than definitive but, in addition, different criteria frequently
give different results.7 This is a further reason for not treating
any of them as decisive, although the Bartlett test can
probably be taken as providing an upper limit on the number
of factors which one could extract. Given this situation, the
researcher’s judgement as to the interpretability or meaning-
fulness of identified factors assumes-major importance.
Rummell describes the application of the criterion of
meaningfulness to the choice of number of factors as taking
7. In the case of our factor amflysis of the seventeen item~, the eigenvalue-one
criterion suggests four factors and the Bartlett test suggesU five. CaueU’s "sc:ree
test" aJso suggests five but, as Baker et al. point out (footnote 12, p. 75), it co’aid
be interpreted as suggesting a one, three, four or five factor solution.
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into account the interpretability of a factor, its consonance
with other research findings, its loadings, and its proportional
factor variance in deciding to accept or reject a factor.
Rummell gives this criterion considerable priority relative to
the various rules of thumb. He says:
For the investigator who has considerable practical
experience and is substantively grounded in the data area,
this may well be the wisest course. It appears foolish to
allow an analytic decision criterion to over-fide a "research
sense" of the data. If, however, one has not developed
this competence, or if a domain has had little benefit of
systematic analysis, the analytic decision criteria or
rules of thumb discussed below will certainly be helpful.
(RummeU, 1970, p. 35).
This quotation expresses an approach to factor analysis
which is consonant with our use of it as an exploratory and
interpretative aid. In the case of data of this sort, the ’’research
sense" and competence to which RummeU refers must be
grounded in familiarity with the literature on all aspects of
the problem and in extensive pilot and pretest interviewing
of the type undertaken for this project (see ESRI Paper No.
97, pp. 22-23 and Part I of this document, pp. 10-13 and
20-21). In our conclusion to Part I above we reminded the
reader that ’~o methodology allows one to dispense with
the judgement of the individual researcher" (p. 42). Still less
does one of many available "rules-of-thumb" permit such
dispensation.
In Paper No. 97 we described our hypothesised interpreta-
tion of the attitude items in terms of four dimensions of
attitude to the Northern Ireland problem, viz., attitude to
partition, attitude to the IRA, attitude to British involvement
in Northern Ireland, and attitude to Northern Ireland
Protestants. The factor analysis did not confirm this hypothe-
sised config’.~r.ation. In both the four-factor and three-factor
6olutions, tWO of the three British ire Cms are included in the
partition factor (see Part I, Appendix A, Table A2). This
suggested a modification of the original hypothesis, i.e., that
attitude to British involvement, as represented by these two
items, is not distinct from attitude to partition. As Paper
No. 97 put it: "... the items are seen from a perspective of
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attitudes towards partition and the salient element in each
item is the reference to the unity of Ireland" (ESRI Paper
No. 97, p. 96). The revised interpretation therefore suggests
three factors - attitude to partition (incorporating attitude
to British involvement), attitude to the IRA and attitude
towards Northern Ireland Protestants. The thre~:-factor solu-
tion corresponds to this configuration and thus has consider-
able advantages over the four-factor solution on the criterion
of interpretability. Given this advantage in terms of interpret-
ability, and given the merely approximate nature of the
various rules of thumb for determining the number of factors~
the extraction of three factors is quite legitimate and fully
in accord with Rummell’s recommended approach.
In an earlier section of the critique (thai dealing with
alleged conceptual confusions), Baker et al. criticise this
aspect of our factor analysis as indicating "a confusion
between the relative importance of logdcal models and mere
statistical measurement" (Baker et al., p. 66). Our view of
science, and much of our argument in this paper, is that a
balance must be struck between what is suggested on the
basis of a pHoH reasoning and what is suggested by the data.
In the case in point, a priori reasoning may suggest that, in
the words of Baker et al., "in any political analysis of the
situation, paxtltion and the British presence must be’ two
separate aspects of the problem because the possibility exists
of a British withdrawal resulting in a continuation of partition
between the Republic and an independent Northern Ireland"
(Baker et aL, p. 66). While this may be logical, the data do
not confirm that it represents the approach of respondents to
the issue. Rather a reasoned interpretation of the data
suggests that British presence and partition are linked in
people’s minds,a The value-of factor analysis lies in its
0. Baker et aL *lso cridclse the three-factor soludon because it suggests that the
term *’The’Northern Ire|mad problem wlU not be solved by ending partldon"
should not be included in the subset of items used to estimate the factor, whereat
they view this item as "the most direct of the Partition items". Again the analy~fi$
of the data does not bear out their view, since the item in question does not
emerge as one of the most direct of the partition items in elth~ the three- or the
four-factor solution (it has a loading of 0.35 on two factors in the three-factor
solution; in the four-factor solution it loads at 0.47 on the Partition factor where-
as the other items dealing directly with partition load at 0.74 and 0.75 Isce Part
I, Appendix A, Table A2). ’
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capacity to uncover such linkages (or distinctions) and the
evidence cannot be dismissed in the name of the "importance
of logical models" or "confidence in the logical basis of the
original hypothesis".
In their final assessment of our use of factor analysis, the
authors of the critique allege that we made four "major
errors" (Baker et al., p. 85). Their first" allegation of error is
based on the reasoning analysed above. In their concluding
assessment on page 85, they present two reasons why we
should have chosen a four-factor solution and why our
decision to adopt a three-factor solution is" a major error. The
reasons are that the eigenvalues and our own hypothesis
suggest a four-factor solution. We summarise our view on the
latter reason first. We spelled out in Paper No. 97 and we
have re-described above the four hypothesised dimensions of
attitude with which we approached the data. The whole
point of the analysis is that four factors with these meanings
were not conf’uTned by the factor analysis and that a three-
factor solution was in accord with a meaningful reinterpreta-
tion of the original hypothesis. Given the importance of the
criterion of meaningfulness and interpretability in factor
analysis, revision of an hypothesised interpretation in the
light of the results cannot conceivably be regarded as an
error. The other reason advanced by Baker et al. is that the
eigenvalues suggest a four-factor solution. In point of fact
this statement "is inaccurate: there axe different legitimate
procedures for in.terpreting the eigenvalues as a guide to the
choice of number of factors, and these, as we have seen, give
different results. More importantly, the criterion of meaning-
fulness suggests a three-factor solution. Thus what Baker et
al. should have concluded is that the application of one
particular approach (in fact a mere rule of thumb) suggests
a four-factor solution. Had they said this, however, the
weakness Of their argument that we made a major error in
our application of factor analysis would have been obvious.
The. second allegation by Baker et al. of a major error is
that we "accepted as meaningful a Northern Ireland Protestant
factor lacking in homogeneity and which is so uns.table that it
disintegrates when a four-factor solution is applied" (Baker
eta/., p. 85). The point about instability is in conflict with
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their own earlier acknowledgement that ’qoadings will vary if
a solution for a different number of factors is undertaken"
(Baker et al., p. 73). Given this dependence of rotated factor
loading on the number of factors extracted, it is necessary to
compare the patterns of loadings in different solutions. In the
present case this comparison suggests that the three-factor
solution is to be preferred on the grounds of interpretability.
Turning to their statement about an alleged lack of
homogeneity, it is important to be clear on what is at issue.
There is no dispute as to the existence of a third factor -
Baker et al. in fact argue for the existence of four factors.
The question is whether the configuration of items in the
third factor of the three-factor solution is more or less satis-
factory than the configuration in the third and fourth factors
of the four-factor solution. In rejecting the former, Baker
et al. apparently rely on visual inspection of the correlation
matrixs (Baker et al., pp. 78-79). The appropriate approach
in our view is to compare the factor solutions and select that
which is most interpretable or meaningful. On such a com-
parison the third factor of the three-factor solution is clearly
more satisfactory and was accepted by us on these grounds
(see Table A2, Part I).
Further evidence as to the acceptability of the third factor
of the three-factor solution is derived from the multiple
correlation of the subset of defining variables with the factor
score. Nunnally suggests this criterion and specifies a level of
correlation of 0.70, though he adds that a correlation of 0.50
could be regarded as "a very minimum" (Nunnally 1967,
p. 360). The multiple correlation of the third factor with the
four high loading variables is 0.87.l° Thus the third factor is
9. The scaling impllcations of the average correlations berwecn the items is a
distinct matter to which we return below (pp. 126-127).
10. The attitudes scores reported on in Section Ud of ESRI Paper No. 97 arc
comporite scores based on unwelghted combinations of the high loading
v~i~bies on each factor. Baker et aL czitldse this procedure, describing it as
"much aruder" th~n using factor u;o~res (i.%, weighted combinations of all the
va~ables on each factor). They do acknowledge, however, that OUt procedure
is quite widely used. More important is the consideration that the correlations
between the far’tot score and the ,ubset of items which we used is, in the case
of each attitude, very high. This indicates that our simpler and "ca-uder’" method
in fact provides very good estimates of the factor score. In the cave of at~tude
towards Northern Ireland Protest~mts the multiple correlation is, as we have just
seen, 0.87, in the case of attitude to partition it is 0-q7, Lad for at litudes to IRA
activities and motives it is 0.99 and 0-95, respectively.
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acceptable on the basis of this last criterion which Nunnally
introduces as "a conservative rule Of thumb for accepting a
factor as ’real’" (ibid., p. 357). The ultimate test of the
reality of a factor is replication, and we have indicated in Part I
the desirability of further investigation along these lines.
l,~nat can be concluded on the present evidence is that there
is no basis to the allegation by the authors of the critique
that our acceptance of the Northern Ireland Protestant factor
is an error, major or otherwise.
The third allegation by Baker et al. of a major error on our
part is that we "forced through a subdivision of a clear IRA
factor" (Baker et al., p. 85). In seeking to substantiate this
allegation they first of all cite the eigenvalue-one criterion.
Thus, in relation to the factor analysis of the five IRA items,
they say "The first factor emerges with an eigenvalue of 2.34,
while the second factor has an eigenvalue of only 0.84. This
is clear evidence that only one viable factor is present in the
five items" (Baker et al., pp. 82-83). In their final assessment
of our factor analysis they claim that the eigenvalues "show"
that the five-itein group is a single factor (Baker et al., p. 85).
Enough has been said above about the status of the
eigenvalue-one criterion as a "rule-of-thumb" to show that it
is incapable of furnishing definitive evidence. In fact, the
Bartlett test (discussed in Part I, p. 23) and Cattell’s scree-test
indicate the acceptability of extracting up to three factors..1
A two-factor solution is afortiori statistically acceptable
and the interpretability of the resulting configuration of
items supports the two-factor choice. In addition, Baker et al.
say that the matrix of correlations shows the five-item cluster
to be a single factor, but support this only with the vague
assertion, again apparently based on visual inspection of the
correlation matrix, that "the pattern of correlations is
relatively homogeneous" (p. 79). In Part I (p. 11) we noted
NunnaUy’s view that factor analysis is indispensible as an aid
to the examination of patterns of correlations. Application of
this aid, used in conjunction with an appropriate test of
significance, indicates the assertion by Baker et al. that "the
matrix of correlations . . . shows (the five items) to be a
II. Though a thre©-~,ctor solution would be trivia/; of. the discussion of the
L~uc of [he ratio of variables to factors be.low (pp. 125ol 27).
single factor" is unfounded. Finally, Baker et al. say that the
loadings of the five items on a one-factor solution show the
five items to be a single factor. As we have already noted,
however, they themselves point out that loadings vary as
different numbers of factors axe extracted and rotated. It is,
therefore, necessary to compare the loadings produced by the
different possible factor solutions in the light of the criterion
of interpretability. This comparison supports the two-factor
choice.
2 Other issues related to the subdivision of the IRA factor
The fourth allegation by Baker et al. of a major error in
our use of factor analysis is that we "used methods which
breach normal practice and infringe the rules of logic in
effecting (the) subsidivion (of the IRA factor)" (Baker eta!.,
p. 85). This contention subsumes a number of points, each of
which we ~ deal with in turn.
(i)"A claim based on a statistical fallacy". The authors of
Part II allege that our discussion of the possible implication
of the different levels of support for the individual IRA items
involves a claim based on a statistical fallacy (Baker et al.,
p. 81). The statement which they quote
¯ . . the different levels of support which these items relat-
ing to the IRA showed in the nationwide representative
sample suggested that, although these five items clustered
together in a global factor analysis, the attitude towards
the IRA which they measured might itself be multi-
dimensional
simply spelled out our reason for undertaking a further factor
analysis for the purpose of testing the interpretation that the
items might contain two factors. As we have indicated in
Part I (p. 22), d/ere are other possible interpretations of the
range of responses. This tentative argument for merely
carrying out a factor analysis is transmuted by Baker et al.
into "the reason given for dividing the factor" (Baker et al.,
p. 80). Thus the alleged claim was never in fact made. To
decide to divide the factor in the light of the differences
between the distributions on the items might well be open
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to the charge of being a statistical fallacy. This we did not do
and did not claim to do. To decide, in the light of those
differences, to carry out a further factor analysis in order to
determine whether the factor should be divided involves no
statistical fallacy and is merely an intelligent exploration of
one possil~le interpretation suggested by the data. To support
their erroneous interpretation of the above quotation, Baker
et al. link it to a sentence which occurs four pages later and
which they claim is an ampfificationof the basic statement.
There is no basis in the text for regarding one as an amplifi-
cation of the other. The statement on page 98 (ESRI, Paper
’No. 97) says: "If our identification and interpretation of a
two-dimensional attitude to the IRA is valid, then the two
dimensions should have contrasting distributions in the popu-
lation. This is in fact the case". This statement involves no
claim such as is suggested by Baker et aL It merely refers to
the meaning or the interpretation of the attitude and says, in
effect, that given an attitude to IRA activities and an attitude
to IRA motives, one would expect more favourable responses
to the latter than to the former. The ensuing discussion
indicates that this is the case. The allegation of a "statistical
fallacy" is based on a misinterpretation of what was actually
said in ESRI Paper No. 97.
(ii) "’Too few items for the proper identification of two
factors’: Baker et aL state categorically that five items are
too few for the proper identification of two factors. They
quote C. C. Taylor as recommending that "in practice the
number of variables be at least five times the number of
factors" (Baker et al., p. 81). Taylor gives such a recommen-
dation, but a recommendation is not an imperative. Obviously
it is imperative to reject what Taylor calls trivial outcomes,
the situation of an infinite number of po.ssible solutions.
Taylor provides a method for determining the minimum ratio
of variables to factors necessaxy to avoid such a situation. This
ratio is expressed in the following formula: (p_q)2 > p+q .
where p is the number of variables and q the number of
factors (Taylor 1977, p. 113). Application of the formula
to the present case shows that the condition is met (i.e.,
(5--2)2 > 5+2). It is therefore legitimate to extract two
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factors from five variables. And what about the recom-
mended ratio? While Taylor recommends a ratio of 5:1,
others suggest a ratio of 3:1 (e.g., Nunnally 1967, p. 357).
Our ratio of items to factors is 2½:1 or one item less than
Nunnally’s recommendation.
(iii) "’Violation of the logic of the method’: In seeking to
substantiate this allegation, the authors of the critique argue
that the assumption of independence between the two
dimensions of attitude to the IRA is untenable. This in turn
is based on the contention that the combination of an
attitude of some degree of support for IRA activities and an
attitude of s6me degree of rejection of their motives is
"exceedingly implausible" (Baker et al., p. 82). Baker. et at..
assert this view without further argument. When one examines
the issue, it is apparent that such a combination is by no
means implausible. Conservatively-minded republicans, for
example, might entertain two views conducive to such a
combination -- that the IRA is tinged with socialism and/or
aims to overthrow the institutions of the State as enshrined
in the Constitution and, at the same time, "that its activities
are the only way a final British withdrawal from Ireland
could be achieved. Such a person might well have a favourable
attitude to IRA activities while rejecting its motives as he
perceives them. The combination may or may not occur
frequently; it is, however, by no means implausible, still less
"exceedingly implausible".
It is also incorrect to say that complete independence was
implied in Paper No. 97 by our use of orthogonal rotation.
While it is true that orthogonal rotation implies an assumption
of a greater degree of independence between factors than is
implied by oblique rotation, it is also true that orthogonal
rotation is frequently used in situations in which some
researchers would argue that oblique rotation would be more
appropriate. The issue is not, however, clearcut, as is evident
from Nunnally’s statement that "which is used boils down to
a matter of taste" (Nurmally, 1967, p. 327), while RummeU
says that the question need not be phrased in "an either-or
manner" and that "the researcher can try both options, and,
with oblique and orthogonal results at hand, he can then
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commit himself to one of them" (Rummell, 1970, p. 388). In
the light of this, a~d contrary to what Baker et al. suggest
(p. 82), it is clear that use of orthogonal rotation in Paper
No. 97 does not mean that a hypothesis of strict independence
between the attitudes was being’ advanced. There is, therefore,
no conflict between the use of orthogonal rotation in Paper
No. 97 and the use of oblique rotation in Part I of the
present document. In presenting the oblique rotation we are
simply following Rummell’s pragmatic advice of trying both
options. The oblique rotation is more clearcut. In Part I we
merely argue that this lends further support to our decision
to split the factor.
(iv)Interpretation of factor loadings. In interpreting the
factor loadings on the five IRA items, what we did was to
take more information into account than can, in the nature
of the case, be incorporated into a simple rule of thumb (e.g.,
include all items with a .40 loading or higher). The additional
information is that the variable in question (Item 3 in Table 3,
p. 25 in Part I) has a loading (.41) on the second factor which
is barely above one of the conventional cut-off points (.40),
that at the same time it has a much higher loading (.65) on
the first factor and that there is a very large gap between the
.41 loading on Item 3 on the second factor and the next
highest loading on the same factor (i.e., the .71 loading of
Item 4). This is a cautious interpretation of low factor load-
ings, that is, an interpretation which avoids attaching too
much weight to such loadings. As we shall see in a moment,
such caution is especially appropriate in the particular cir-
cumstances.
Baker et al. criticise our procedure of using unities rather
than communalities12 in the diagonal of the correlation
matrix on the grounds that it tends to inflate factor loadings.
¯They quote a statement from Nunnally concerning this
inflationary effect (Nunnally, 1967, p. 369) and then
¯ conclude "Thus, if an attempt is to be made to obtain two
factors from a set of five items, then communalities, rather
12. This is a technical issue on which Baker et aL say there is "some clisa~’ee-
merit among the authorities". In fact, they understate the extent of the
dLca~’eement, which ~ very cor~iderable.
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than the unities employed in Paper No. 97 should be used"
(Baker et al., pp. 83-84). The inference actually drawn by
Nunnally, however, is to interpret small loadings cautiously.
The point is that our interpretation of the loadings exhibits
such caution, in comparison to which strict adherence to the
.40 cut-off point would be quite mechanical.
In summary, for the fourth time, the authors of the
critique have alleged that a major error exists in our appfica-
tion of factor analysis. We have examined the reasons given
for this conclusion and, for the fourth time, we must con-
clude that there is no basis for the allegation.
B Construction and Use of Scales
1 Reliability
In the opinion of Baker et al., none of the four scales used
in Section IV of Paper No. 97 are reliable (see"assessment of
scales", p. 34). The standard index of reliability is coefficient
alpha. Baker et al. evaluate these coefficients by reference to
standards which they present by means of a quotation from
Nunnally and they conclude "As the use.of the scales in
Paper 97 could be defined as either applied or basic, it is
dear that reliability coefficients of three of the scales (those
relating to IRA activities, IRA motives and Northern Ireland
Protestants) must be considered inadequate" (Baker et al.,
p. 87).
This conclusion is incorrect. Firstly, in the paragraph from
which Baker et al. quote (Nunnally, 1970, p. 226) Nunnally
relates the term applied to research undertaken for the
purpose of making decisions about a specific individual -- for
example, in the area of educational selection and streaming.
Because such research is to be the basis of decisions about a
single individual affecting that individual’s life, and because
there is no scope for offsetting errors, extremely high levels
of reliability are obviously needed and these require lengthy
batteries of tests. Our research is not appfied research in this
sense, and indeed it is difficult to think of any survey
research which would fall into this category. Nunnally’s
criterion of .80 being "not nearly high enough" is therefore
irrelevant.
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Secondly, as regards basic research, which is the relevant
category for our work, Nunnally’s statement as to the
adequacy of reliabilities of .80 refers to an upper limit not
a lower limit. This vitally important point does not emerge in
the quotation presented by the authors of the critique
because the quotation is highly selective. A paragraph and a
half of Nunnally’s text is omitted, with the quotation resumed
in mid-sentence, one: of the sentences omitted is crucial to
understanding the standard which Nunnally is putting
forward because in it he suggests that .80 is an upper limit
of the reliability that need be sought in basic research, not
a lower limit as Baker et al. imply.13
Guilford makes a distinction similar to that made by
Nurmally between the level of reliability coefficient required
for individual testing such as achievement examinations,
clinical diagnosis and personnel classification and vocational
guidance (what Guilford calls practical purposes) and the
level required for research purposes (Guilford 1954, p. 388).
Applying this distinction, he summarises the issue of the
desirable levels of reliability as follows:
As to how high reliability coefficients should be, no hard
and fast rules can be stated. For research purposes, one
can tolerate much lower reliabilitles than one can for
practi~:al purposes of diagnosis and prediction. We are
frequently faced with the choice of making the best of
what reliability we can get, even though it may be of the
order of only .50, or of going without the use of the test
at all (Guilford, 1954, pp. 388-389).
There is no basis in the remarks of Guilford or in the (full)
remarks of Nurmally on this issue to justify the conclusions
of Baker et aL in regard to the three attitude measures
concerned that "it is clear that the reliability coefficients...
must be considered inadequate" (p. 87), and that they are
"simply not reliable enough to he regarded as measuring any
attitude consistently" (p. 10~:). This is not to say that further
research could not improve on this aspect of our attitude
measures. Baker et al. would’have been correct had they
IS. The deleted sentence reads: "For basic research it czn be argued that in~re~-
ing rellabillties*beyond 0.80 is often w~tefui" (Nunnal]¥ 1970, p. 226}.
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confined themselves simply to saying that the reliability
coefficients of three of those measures are, to use Nunnally’s
term, modest. In the case of the two measures of attitude to
the IRA, the modest level of reliability (activities .64;
motives .56) results from the decision to split the five items
into groups of three and two items respectively. The reliability
of the five-item cluster would have been .72. This illustrates
the point that reliability is a function not only of the average
inter-item correlation but also of the number of items. Thus,
one can have scales with a relatively high intercorrelation
between items and only modest reliabilities, if there are few
items, and, equally one can have scales with very low inter-
item correlations and high levels of reliability, if there are
m/my items. We have already outlined our reasons for
believing that the splitting of the five IRA items is both
justified on empirical grounds and yields more satisfactory
and informative measures. In our view this gain more than
compensates for the small fall in the reliability coefficient.
The reliability coefficient of our measure of attitude to
Northern Ireland Protestants is .49. That there is some room
for improvement in this aspect of the measure of attitude
towards Northern Ireland Protestants has been noted in
Part I above (pp. 27;28). We have indicated both the need for
further research in this area and our belief that given previous
research results consistent with our findings (Mac Grail, 1977,
p. 248), such further research would confirm our conclusions.
2 The Neutral Point
Baker et al. criticise our interpretation of the mid-point of
the summated scale as the neutral point in relation to the
attitude concerned. Our procedure involves assumptions of
the kind that are fundamental to any attempt to quantify
attitudinal, or, indeed, any qualitative data. In attitude
research, for example, even the application ’of an ordinal
scale to the responses to a single item assumes that each
degree of positive or negative response has roughly the same
force for every respondent. Otherwise a common ranking
could not be applied to the responses of different individuals
and the scale could not be regarded as measuring anything
consistently. Similarly, the’ assumption of equal intervals
underhes the use of product moment correlations, regression
analysis and factor analysis. To some this assumption is quite
unwarranted. Others take a different view. McKenneLl, for
example, argues for a pragmatic approach to the issue and,
referring to the convention that statistics appropriate for
interval level measures are inadmissible with ordinal data, he
says "This convention has so entered the folklore of con-
temporary social science that many seem unaware of its
controversial status" (McKennell 1977, p. 218). Tufte says
that "the distinction between interval and ordinal measure-
ment is usually of little importance in data analysis. The wise
assignment of numbers to ordered categories, coupled with
the use of techniques that exploit the properties of numbers
is generally preferable to working with ordered categories"
(Tufte 1969, p. 642). Similarly, Labovitz, having carried out
tests based on assigning interval scores to ordinal categories,
argues for the interval assumption in practice and points out
the advantages as follows:
Consequently, treating ordinal variables as if they are
interval has these advantages: (1) the use of more power-
ful, sensitive, better developed and interpretable statistics
with known sampling error, (2) the retention of more
knowledge about the characteristics of the data, and (3)
greater versatility in statistical manipulation, e.g., partial
and multiple correlation and regression, analysis of
variance and covariance, and most pictorial presentations
(Labovitz, 1970, p. 523).
Assumptions such as these are a legitimate matter of
debate. What is not legitimate, however, is to make an
assumption at one moment and reject it at another. This is
in fact what Baker et aL have done. The fact that they
accept the assumption of equal intervals is evident in their
endorsement of the use of factor analysis, a~ad of the alpha
coefficient as a measure of reliability. McKennell, for
example, says "The alpha approach, stemming from psycho-
logical test theory, entails manipulations of the data which
~sume interval scale properties even at the item level"
(McKenneU, 1977, p. 218). In discussing the neutral point
issue, however, Baker et al. say that the Likert items are
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took full account of the difficulty of identifying an exact
dividing point in the distribution and employed a neutral
area, refraining in all cases from categorising those in that
axea as pro or anti.
The results which we obtained by adding the responses to
the individual items in the above fashion can be compared to
the range of responses on the individual items themselves.
For example, basing our conclusion on summated scores, we
reported that "21 per cent of the population emerge as in
some ctegree supportive in their attitude to IRA activities"
(ESRI Paper No. 97, p. 98). This compares to responses i.n
some degree favourable to the IRA on the three individual
items concerned of 20 per cent, 35 per cent and 43 per cent.
As we have noted, the neutral point on the individual items
is unmistakable. Thus, examination of this and the other
sets of individual responses (see Part I, Appendix A, Table
A1) leads to apportionment of the population into groups
favourable and unfavourable to the particular attitude objects
in question broadly in line with that arrived at as a result of
the summation procedure and assumptions just outlined.
Baker et al. have referred to some methods for establishing
a neutral point. The problem is that none of the methods can
be regarded as satisfactory. One of the methods they mention,
which they themselves acknowledge to be "crude", is to
employ a direct question concerning general attitude to the
stimulus. We have argued above (pp. 114-117) that responses
to direct questions on sensitive topics are likely to be mis-
leading. Use of such responses for the purpose suggested by
the authors of the critique would then be likely to lead one
to actually misplace the neutral point. They also propose the
use of a technique suggested by Guttman and Suchman for
identifying the neutral point of an attitude scale (Guttman
and Suchman, 1947). The technique involves plotting the
average iotensity of an individual’s response ~.gaJnst his
average content score and taking the minimum point of the
plot as the point of indifference or neutrality. There axe
two problems with this proposal. Firstly, its use involves
asking a separate intensity ouestion after each content
question, thereby doubting the number of questions relating
to each attitude. The cost of such doubting in terms of
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"essentially ordinal measures" and that "... equal intervals
between the points of’the score cannot, strictly, be assumed"
(Baker c’t al., p. 87). Either the assumption is made or it
is not.
A further assumption which is required is that the items
which are combined to measure a particular attitude are all
of more or less equal weight and importance. Obviously one
cannot prove that this is so, since, with qualitative items this
must always be a matter of judgement. We have made this
assumption in relation to each of the sets of items as a
reasonable approximation and the reader can judge, its
reasonableness by examining the sets of items themselves.
In showing in detail what is involved in the process of
adding ;.gerber the responses to a number of items, we
begin with the individual responses. Quite evidently, the
neutral point can be unambiguously determined in the case
of the individual items. Respondents were asked to agree or
disagree in varying, but specific, degrees of strength with a
particular statement. The neutral point, therefore, lies
unambiguously between the AGREE side and theD1SAGREE
side of the responses, that is between "agree slightly" and
"disagree slightly" on each individual item (see the response
format Part I, p. 17 above). When the responses to a number
of items are added together, some of the resulting scores will
represent combinations of individual responses which are all
either positive or negative toward the particular attitude
object. In other cases the final score will be based on
individual responses which are both positive and negative and
the tin’a] overall- score will be to some degree positive or
negative, favourable or unfavourable, depending on the
number and intensity of the positive and negative responses.
Scoring such cases simply involves using all the available
information to produce a qualified description of the overall
response as slightly or moderately positive or negative or
whatever the evaluative designation happens to be. It may be
important to riote that to speak of a neutral "point" is to risk
introducing a misplaced notion of precision which would be
entirely unwarranted. We were careful in ESR.I Paper No. 97
not to designate those in the middle as pro or anti as might
be implied in the idea of a unique neutral point. Instead we
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questionnaire space would be very considerable. Secondly,
the technique referred to by Baker et al. is applicable to
only one particular scaling technique, i.e., cumulative scaling.
The point is of some interest, however, because subsequent
discussion in the literature has tentatively suggested that it
may be possible to overcome these limitations (Suchman
1950, Green 1954, Guilford 1954, McKennell 1977). How-
ever, the fact that intensity is a component of the content
score in Likert scaling poses a dilemma for those who would
wish to extend the technique in this direction. On the one
hand, the inclusion of intensity in the content score (as in
the approach suggested by Guilford) creates a dependence
between it and the measure of intensity.14 On the other
hand, if, in an effort to get around this problem, the intensity
component is removed from the content score (i.e., attempt-
ing to adapt the original Guttman-Suchman approach) then
information essential to Likert scaling, essential specifically
to the allocation of respondents with scores in the middle
range, is lost. What remains is not in fact the same scale as
that on which it was originally desired to identify a neutral
point. In the light of all these difficulties we prefer to rely for
allocation of respondents into positive, negative, and neutral
categories on the assumptions employed in ESR.I Paper
No. 97 and described in detail above.
In drawing together their discussion of the issues of relia-
bility and the neutral point, Baker et al. state what they
regard as two necessary conditions for using summated scales
to interpret the distribution of attitudes on any particular
issue, and they conclude that our scales meet neither of these
conditions (Baker et al., p. 91). We have shown that their
14. Green adverts to the problem of dependence but seems to assodat6 it
exclusively with the single question as opposed to the double question approach.
Accordingly he suggests that two separate questions be asked (Green 1954,
p. 357). The problem would seem to be more radical them this however, in that,
when the original question is in Liken format, it is a moot point whether a
follow-up intensity question would in fact elicit a response which would yield
ma intensity score which would be significantly more independent than an
intensity score derived from the single Likert item. On the bLsic issue of the
impact of the dependence in question, it could of course be argued that the lack
of independence is not such that the location of the minimum point is com-
pletely predetermined, i.e., that it must inevitably be at the numerical
mid-point of the scale for all possible data sets.
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conclusion that our scales do not meet" the first condition
(reliability) is based on a misinterpretation of what is an
acceptable Standard of reliability. Their second necessary
condition is that "the ’neutral’ point must be independently
determined". To use the term independent determination in
relation to the methods referred to by Baker et al. is, how-
ever, quite illegitimate. It may be noted in this context that
Guttman and Suchman (1947) were careful to reject the
possibility of dividing the population by use of "an external
criterion" and indeed spoke of their method as ~’an approach
to an intemai definition Of a zero point". The cautious
presentation of Guttman and Suchman is entirely warranted
in that they were outlining a method based on a theory
which they did not specify in any sn~tistical sense, and for
which they did not even try to suggest statistical tests. But
the caution of the progenitors of the method is transposed by
Baker et al. into "independent determination" and the
exaggeration is compounded by erecting this into a "necessary
condition". Baker et aL go on to claim that the authorities
in the field explicitly advise against reliance on the numerical
mid-point of a scale as the attitudinal neutral point. What the
authorities whom they quote (Edwards 1957 and Oppenheim
1966) have said is that the neutral point does not necessarily
correspond to the numerical mid-point. We cntirely a.~wee
andwhat we have done is to specify the conditions m~dcr
which it seems reasonable to interpret the mid-p~fint :*sOlc
neutral point, i.e., as indicating an area of neutrality in the
distribution. We regarded this, and still rcgard it, as an
appropriately cautious approach to a complex problem. Thus
on both counts, Baker et al. conclusiu~l that our procedures
in~,olve "a serious misuse of sumnlatcd scalcs" is unwarranted.
IV INTERPRETATION, LABELLING AND
PRESENTATION
A Interpretation and Labelling
The matter of interpretation and labelling must be evaluated
by reference to. the original items. In criticising the use
of "anti" in regard to attitude towards Northern Ireland
Protestants, Baker. et aL misconstrue the four items con-
cerned, reducing them to "recognition of differences of
outlook, approach to life and political aims together with a
reluctance to accept that these Northern Ireland Protestant
aims should determine the resolution of the Northern Ireland
problem" (Baker et aL, p. 93). Attitude items, being brief
and colloquial, are difficult to paraphrase but we would
suggest the following as a minimal statement. Respondents
whom we labelled strongly anti-Northern Ireland Protestants
would have agreed strongly that Northern Ireland Protestants
have an un-irish outlook and approach to life, that they are
unwilling to reach an agreement with the Catholic com-
munity, that their defence of their privileged position is a
basic cause of the problem and that despite the fact that they
are in the majority, they have no right to determine how
Northern Ireland is to be governed.~s To interpret this as
indicating an attitude of political opposition, is, in our view,
a reasonable summary of the responses and the use of the
label "anti", the literal meaning of which is "opposed to", is
an acceptable designation of the attitude. Of course, if the
label is separated from the text and read out of context, it is
open to misinterpretation but this is true of any summary
word or phrase.
15. The items and pereentnge response a~e presented in Part I, Appendix A,
Table At.
The content of two of the three items representing attitude
to IRA activities is similarly misinterpreted. In Paper No. 97
and in Part I of this document, we have presented the argu-
ment in support of the interpretation that responses to these
items reflect an attitude or evaluative orientation towards
the IRA and that this evaluative orientation can be dis-
dnguished as an orientation towards IRA activities as opposed
to IRA motives. In being asked to judge whether this is so
or not, the reader is entitled to have his attention directed to
the items themselves and not to what we believe axe inaccurate
summaries of them.
Baker et al. then say that the use of the term support to
desc~be this attitude is not in accord with normal usage of
the English language and they refer to the Oxford English
Dictionary definition which we presented in Part I (p. 30) in
support of this view. We leave it to the reader to judge
whether this def’mition necessarily implies activity or what
Baker et al. refer to as "concrete manifestations of agree-
ment". That activity is not implied is quite obvious, given
the explicit disavowal of an inference about activity in
Paper No. 97 and given that the findings relate to an attitude
of support)s One can illustrate the latter point by reference
to one of the central findings of the research carried out by
the Committee on Irish Language Attitudes Research in
1975. This is that there is in Ireland widespread attitudinal
support for the Irish language but that this is combined with
i a low commitment to the use of the language and with a
variety of other negative attitudes. The summary of the
results of that research provide an excellent example of the
16.Baker eta/. claim that our statement about not having any evidence that the
attitude we measured |cads to concrete action is a "denial of any link between
attitude and action" (Baker eta/., p. 94) adding that such a denlaJ runs counter
to most de~tions of attitude Lnd that it undermines the r,,~on d’£t’re of attitude
reseaxch. The literature on attitude research and, indeed, common scrxs¢ indicate
that at~tude [s only one of the dete~ts of behavioux and that other factors
(opportudiW, moral, lega], or financLd incen~ves or disincentives, group pr¢~uxe,
etc.) enter in to reinforoe or negate die influence of attitude. In refen-ing to die
fact that we had no ¢v/deTtce that the attitude leads to concrete action, we were
not denying the possibility of such a [ink: we were simply cautiordng the reader
against making any hasW inferences in the absence of specific evidence of such a
¯ llnk.
use of the term "support" in the context of attitudinal
research which is fully in accord with our usage.
To summarise, for the national sample support for the
language and language policy is very high when "Irish"
is expressed in terms of ethnic identity, cultural value
and in terms of the Gaeltacht. Support is rather negative
on the dimension of "school Irish" and commitment to
its use is low, while beliefs about the eventual fate of the
language, and its position and utility in the modern
world, are generally pessimistic. (Committee on Irish
Language Attitudes Research, 1975, p. 298).
Baker et al. imply that our use of the items concerned to
measure attitude of support for the IRA is absurd on the
grounds that, if the same items were applied to Fianna F~il,
Fine Gael, the Labour Party or the Australian Country Party,
they would show that "most of the adult population of
Ireland simultaneously ’support’all four" (Baker et al., p. 93).
The real absurdity would of course be to attempt to measure
attitudes of support for legitimate political parties by means
of such items. No one has ever suggested that the methods of
any of these groups are totally unacceptable or that their
members are basically criminals and murderers. Even if
common sense did not rule such items out in relation to these
political parties, the normal preliminary research procedures
for constructing attitude items would eliminate them. The
items would contravene one of the most fundamental criteria
of attitude measurement, namely, that items be relevant to
the psychological object concerned. Thus the items would
be totally unsuited to measuring attitudes of support for
legitimate political parties. But that has no bearing on their
suitability for measuring attitude of support for the activities
of paramilitary organisations, avowedly engaged in violence.
Finally, under the heading of interpretation, Baker et al.
take up the point that sympathy for IRA motives may be
no more than an endorsement of the goal of reunification.
in Paper No. 97 we summarised our reasons for believing that
the attitude cannot be explained away as an alternative
expression of the attitude to reunification. We elaborated on
these reasons in Part I of this document where we emphasised
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that the significance of the finding is that a substantial pro-
portion of people are prepared to express their support for
the goal of reunification by endorsing IRA aims and attribut-
ing patriotism and idealism to the IRA. In measuring attitudes
to IRA aims, our concern is with aims as these are perceived
by respondents, not with the aims as seen by someone else.
Hence, any suggestion that we should have told respondents
our own perception of the aims of the IRA would be a mis-
conception of the purpose of such attitude measurement.
B Presentation
In the last section of their critique, Baker et al. present
two phrases and a lengthy excerpt from Paper No. 97 which
they say represent excessive claims and over-confident
presentation. Since they concede that the first two examples,
which relate to matters of technique, may not be very serious,
they need not detain us except to point out that one of them
has already been discussed by us in Part I (pp. 27-28) and the
other would be notable only if Baker et aL had succeeded in
showing that "the evidence for the existence of these two
separate factors (IRA activities and IRA motives) is totally
lacking" (Baker et aL, p. 96). They have failed to show this.
The main concern of the authors of the critique then is
with the tone and style of the presentation of the results.
They reproduce three paragraphs from Paper No. 97, in an
attempt to illustrate a definiteness and a dearth of qualifica-
tion, and they claim that this style of presentation implies
that the scales possess full validity.
In the passage concerned (ESRI Paper No. 97, pp. 97-100)
it is first of all made clear that the particular attitudinal
measure is’a matter of interpretation of a number of items.
The passage begins with a statement of our interpretation of
the items and this is adverted to again in the subsequent
discussion ("If our identification and interpretation of a
two-dimensional attitude to the IRA is valid . . ."). Caution
is enjoined on the reader in the discussion of the distribution
of the attitude and two important qualifications are noted --
that we have no evidence that the attitude in question leads
to concrete actions and that it is held in varying degrees (i.e.,
slightly/moderately/strongly). In regard to the latter point,
it is noted on the page preceding that from which Baker et al.
quote that the labelling of degrees of an attitude and the
presentation of such scales in percentage terms are approxi-
mate procedures. Finally, when the percentage results are
being discussed in the p~ragraphs which Baker et al. quote,
the dependence of the results on a particular mode of
measurement is emphasised by the phrases "as we have
measured this attitude" and "on this evidence".
We do not believe that these paragraphs represent over-
confident presentation..It is quite clear, however, that they
do not imply an assumption on our part that our scales
possess full validity, especially since, in our explicit references
to the issue of validity, we made no such claim and merely
referred to increased or enhanced confidence in the validity
of our measures.
Baker et al. final criticism of our presentation is the use
throughout Paper No. 97, of the present tense. The period
of data collection was clearly indicated in Paper No. 97 in
the chapter describing the method, in the heading of Table 1
and again in the heading of Table 16 (the first table to
introduce the additional Northern ireland data). The use of
the present tense in reporting survey data is so common as
to be a convention. Thus the published reports of three
previous major attitude surveys in Ireland, Governing Without
Consensus (Rose, 1971), Report of the Committee on IHsh
Language Attitudes Research (1975), and Prejudice and
Tolerance in Ireland (Mac Gr~i/, 1977) all use the present
tense when reporting on data collected in 1968 in the case
of Rose’s research and in 1973 in the case of the Language
Attitude study and Mac Grail. Like us, these authors were
following a well established convention and other examples
of the use of this convention could readily be documented.
Paper No. 97 was published within thirteen months of the
completion of data collection, and our use there of the
present tense possesses none of the exaggerated significance
read into it by Baker et al.
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V SUMMARY
For the reader’s convenience we organise our Summary of
this rejoinder to correspond point by point with the Summary
of Baker et aL of their critique. In relation to points (d)-(j),
we indicate pages of the Rejoinder in which the particular
point is dealt with.
(a) That the sample is well drawn and the questionnaire
properly administered can in fact be taken for granted,
although in the present controversy even the sampling
method was challenged by some critics-(see reply by
B. J. Whelan in Appendix I of this document).
(b) Though the stated aim of the critique is to provide "in
itself an independent and balanced assessment of Paper
97" (Baker et aL, p. 57), only two brief paragraphs of the
critique are devoted to Section HI of Paper No. 97 which
deals with choices of solutions and with policy preferences
and which forms the largest part of our presentation of
the results. While we are naturally pleased that the critics
conclude that this section is "a solid and useful contribu-
tion to knowledge", the critique does not elaborate on
the basis for this conclusion and we must refer the
interested reader to Paper No. 97 itself.
(c) We agree in principle with this statement concerning the
methodology of attitude research. However, the authors
of the critique have, in ways which will be summarised in
a moment, misunderstood this methodology in important
respects, and in other respects have been inappropriately
selective in their presentation and application of the
guidelines mentioned.
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(d) In their summary Baker et aL give two instances of an
alleged "considerable conceptual confusion" in Section IV
of Paper No. 97. The argumer~t underlying the first of the
two instances is based on a highly implausible supposition.
The supposition is that respondents could have under-
stood the term IRA used in research specifically and
cleaxly related to the current Northern Ireland problem
as refer~ng to the Old IRA of 1919-21. Their first
instance also relies on a demonstrably erroneous state-
ment about consistent Irish newspaper use of the term
Provisional(s) as opposed to the term IRA. The azgument
underlying their second instance (confusion in relation to
nature of attitude) is incorrect because it is based on an
equation of attitude with emotional response. This is the
real confusion but it is the!rs not ours (pp. 112-115 above).
(e) As will be clear from the comment we have just made, we
diverge from the authors of the critique on the issue of
what is an attitude. For them attitudes axe emotional
rather than rational. We cannot agree and do not believe
that attitudes are commonly defined in this way in social
psychology. The premise is false, and the conclusion --
that our questions (items) are inappropriately designed
- is false (pp. 112-115 above).
(f) In no case did our factor analysis breach mandatory rules.
The well established rules to which Baker et al. refer axe
universally acknowledged to be mere rules-of-thumb. In
regard to the issue of the number of factors, Baker et al.
concentrate on only one of these rules-of-thumb. Other
guidelines give different results and our decision was in
accord with the vitally important guideline or criterion
of interpretability. The sweeping conclusions drawn by
Baker et al. -- that the factor analysis contains at least
four serious errors and that the final grouping of items is
unacceptable - have no basis in either factor analytic
theory or precedent (pp. 116-128 above).
(g) The conclusion that three of our scales lack reliability is
based on the application of a standard of reliability which
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is an upper limit on what might be regarded as desirable,
not a minimum, as Baker et al. imply. There is thus no
basis for concluding that these lack reliability or do not
measure anything consistently (pp. 129-131 above).
(h) We have described in detail the assumptions underlying
the summation procedure, our placement of the neutral
point and our consequent apportionment of the popula-
tion into groups which are favourable and unfavourable
on each of the attitudes in question. Baker et al. reject
our approach to the identification of the neutral point
on summated attitude scales and claim that independent
determination of the neutral point is essential. In their
summary, they make an inferential leap from the fact
that the neutral point was not determined in this way in
ESRI Paper No. 97 to the conclusion that our placement
of this point is misleading, in other words, that the
percentages quoted in relation to each attitude are
misleading. In fact the percentages we quoted axe in
accord with the distributions on the individual items, in
relation to which there can obviously be no dispute
concerning the neutral point. We have discussed above
the various methods referred to by Baker et al. for
determining the neutral point on summated scales and
have concluded that they axe either potentially misleading
or in other ways unsatisfactory. Accordingly, we prefer
to rely for placement of the neutral point on the assump-
tions employed in ESRI Paper No. 97 and described in
detail above (see pp. 131-136).
(i)Baker et al. state that our labelling involves a debatable
use of the English language. In seeking to substantiate
.this view they misconstrue our items and then disregard
the extensive elaboration and qualification of the labels
in question in Paper No. 97 (pp. 136-140 above).
(j)The assessment of tone of presentation in any paper is
necessarily subjective. We do not believe that the presenta-
tion in Section IV of Paper No. 97 is over-confident.
What is quite certain, however, is that at no point in the
research is the assumption of full validation of our
measures either stated or impfied (pp. 140-141 above).
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VI CONCLUSION
There are three reasons why the conclusions drawn in the
critique are unfounded. (i) The critique is confused as to the
meaning of attitude and as to the meaning of the term
IRA (two confusions that are then imputed to us). (ii) The
application of methodological criteria is selective. The
authors of the critique present some methodological criteria
as though they carried more weight than is, in fact, the case,
and they exaggerate the standards implied by other criteria.
An example of the latter re-appears in the conclusion in the
statement "Standard tests show (the scales) to be statistically
unreliable" - a statement that is demonstrably incorrect.
(iii) In discussing our interpretation and presentation, .the
critique misconstrues our attitude items, ignores the qualifi-
cations made in the text, and exaggerates the implications of
our style of presentation. These are the bases of the con-
clusions drawn by Baker et al.,which culminate in the state-
ment that "Taken together they completely invalidate the
findings". On the contrary, we have shown that none of our
findings is in any way undermined and in our view the
criticisms in Part 11, taken individually or cumulatively, are
either irrelevant or without merit.
In their conclusion the authors of the critique proceed
further and rule out alternative ways of analysing the data.
In Part I of this document we argued that an alternative and
valid approach to data of this nature is to focus on the
individual items, and that such an approach would lead to
conclusions largely similar to those drawn in Paper No. 97.
Finally, Baker et al. lament the misfortune that "the
virtues of a large past of Paper No. 97 tend to be obscured by
the deficiencies contained in the first eight pages of Section
IV". Given that any academic work containing over 160
pages is unlikely to be without blemish, some might feel that
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we should rest content in the fact that our critics, after a
searching examination of Paper No. 97, claim themselves to
have identified flaws in only eight pages! But we believe that
the critics have failed to provide evidence for the fatal
deficiencies they claim to have identified in these eight pages,
and, since the issue is important, both methodologically and
practically, we have taken pains to establish the deficiencies
of the crit4que. We hope that as a result, those with either a
practical or a research interest in the Northern Ireland
problem will be helped in evaluating Paper No. 97 for
themselves.
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APPENDIX I
The Sample used in ESRI Paper No. 97
B.J. Whelan
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Some of the comment on Paper No. 97 was critical of the
sampling method used¯ These criticisms were of three main
types: (a) statements that it is impossible to make inferences
about the whole population from a sample of "only" 2,000
people; (b) complaints that the sample design, though possibly
adequate, was incompletely described; (c) alleged biases in
the sample obtained.
(a) The Possibility of Statistical Inference
Some commentators were clearly unfamiliar with the
substantial literature in statistics and the social sciences
which shows that one can draw valid inferences about large
populations on the basis of relatively small random samples.
Of course, such inferences can only be made within a certain
margin of error. Provided the sample size is adequate, as it is
in the present case, the magnitude of this maxgin can be
reduced to an acceptable level. The use of statistical tests can
then. ensure that one’s conclusions are "statistically signifi-
cant", i.e., capable of generalisation to the population from
which .the sample was selected.
(b) The Description of the Sample
It is .always a matter of judgement in reporting substantive
research results as to how much technical detail should be
presented. In the present instance, the authors of Paper No.
97 devote four pages (pp. 25-28) to describing their sampling
procedures and refer also to an even fuller description of the
RANSAM system in the January 1979 issue of The Economic
and Social Review. They also present in Appendix A a com-
parison between the 1971 Census and their sample and
comment briefly on any divergences between the two.
Some critics have demanded even more detail such as the
number of clusters hsed and a listing of their locations. While
¯ it would obviously be a breach of confidentiality to state the
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precise addresses included, we can say that 100 clusters of
25 names were selected on a random basis with geographical
stratification. Each D~.il constituency in the country was
represented in the sample in proportion to its size, so that at
least one duster was selected from each of the 42 constitu-
encies. On average, about 18 interviews were obtained in
each duster.
(c) Differences between the Sample and the Census
The main criticisms advanced ~¢ere of serious bias in (a)
the distribution of respondents by urban/rural residence;
and (b) the distribution by educational level. These criticisms
ase unfounded. Let us consider each in tur~a.
(1) It was claimed that there was evidence of distortion in
urban]rural distribution (assuming that in this latter
regard the census definition of "urban/rural" had been
adhered to). Paper 97 did not in fact, use the census
definition. It is dearly stated on page 44 "For the
purpose of comparing urban/non-urban background,
urban was defined as major cities and towns with popula-
tions of 10,000 and over, non-urban as towns of 3,000-
10,000 inhabitants, villages and open countryside". The
1971 Census shows that 40.2 per cent of the population
rived in cities and towns of 10,000 or over. Some 42.4
per cent of the sample fall into this category. This small
difference is well within the 95 per cent confidence
interval even before taking account of the demographic
changes which have occurred since 1971.
(2) The criticism of the educational distribution also hinges
on a comparison of the 1971 census with the sample. The
comparison is invalid for two reasons: (i) In recent years
there has been a substantial decline in the number of
people leaving full-time education after completing
primary level. Indeed, attention is drawn to this point on
page 159 of Paper No. 97. The attached table shows that
the percentage of those having primary education only
has fallen from 62.7 per cent in 1971 to 51.1 per cent in
1978. Thus, the sample figure of 44.5 per cent must be
compared with 51.1 per cent and not 62.7 per cent.
(ii) The census question is framed in such a way that all
those who omit or refuse to give details of their education
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-- an issue well known to be sensitive -- are assumed to
have primary level only. If allowance is made for this,
the divergence between the sample and the census will be
even smaller.
Furthermore, the minor discrepancies in these variables
would only marginally affect the final results. To demonstrate
this point, a complete re-weighting of the data was carried
out with the educational distribution of the sample con-
strained to correspond exactly with the up-dated census
figures. None of the resulting percentages deviated from
those pubfished by more than 1V2 per cent.
Calculation of percentage of population over 18 having’primary
education only in 1978
Number of persons of different ages in 1971 surviving to 1978 and
number of them with primary only *
Males Females
PHmary Primary
Age in 1971 Total only Total only
11--17 205.5 35.6 197.5 32.1
18--19 51.0 17.5 49.1 14.4
20--29 196.1 86.5 189.6 73.5
30--39 150.l 84.3 146.7 74.4
40--49 149.2 101.9 152.6 95.5
50--59 140.8 106.9 144.6 103.1
60--69 90.7 75.0 102.6 79.8
70--74 35.9 31.9 51.8 44.0
80 4.6 4.2 8.0 7.1
1023.9 543.8 1042.5 523.9
Estimated Net Immigration 1971-1978 = 89.9 thousand
It is estimated on the basis of the 1971 census that about three-quarters
of these immigrants will be over 18 by 1978 and that about one-third
of these will have ceased education at primary level. Thus, the total
population over 18 will have increased by 67.4 thousand and the
number with primary level only by 22.5 thousand.
Hence, estimated population over 18 in 1978 is
1023.8 + 1042.4 + 67.4 = 2133.7
Numbers with "Primary Only" are
543.8 + 523.8 + 22.5 = 1090.2
Thus the estimated percentage with "Primary Only" is 51.1 per cent.
*Source: Irish Life Table No. 6, Irish Statistical Bulletin, March 1976;
Census of Population Vols II and XII.
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APPENDIX II
The Questionnaire used in ESRI Paper No. 97
E.S.R.I. July 1978
I.D.
L~erviewer ,No.
Interview, , NO,
Sarnple Type
[]
Card
[]
THE EC0.~0/~IC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Attitudes Toward Sex:is] and Po~lttc)) issucz): Main Test
This is a survey ~ the atLltudes ~ people in the l~ish Republic
to~v~s ~t V~Lriety ~ so~isJ ~ ;)ollticJd ilsue$, inc|ud~ relations
~th ,’qorthern lrelLnd. Your r,~une hu been chosen at random to
complete this questle~’u~aire, l~ is important that we ol)taL’l your
responses as you~ views) wiU represetlt the vie’~s (~ many Others
who ththk like you, but whom we c~u~ot interview. We are no~
i~erested In ge).ting your n~e on the questionnaire, so your
~mswers ~-iJl be completely ~.
There Ire eight short $¢ctl(~| in ~ questioraa~lre, and it ia lmpor-
tan~ that you complete each section. The que$~iom~Lre shouJd tike
s little les| th;k~ ~ bo~r to comp|ete.
Thank you for your co-opera, iota.
~e~viewer
Date
Col.
1.2,3,4
5, 6,
7,8.
9. 10,
11
12.
13 BI a.".k
Cazd 1
E.S.R.I. J~ly 1978
Address Doo-~ ..........................]
Address demolisbed/derellct ..............- ..’ 2
Named pers¢~ tmkflown at addrels .............3
NaJ~Ed person deceaJJed .......................4
Named person had moved to ~ucCher dLstzlct , .~. ,S
N~uned per~ wins away (IJ~, ill L~ hospitzJ)
all survey period ..............................6
persc~ was too £U (st home) to interview,
or unsuitable because ~deufness, m~taJ suue,
la=lp~e difficulties etc .........~ .............7
Named person re~used to be interviewed ........8
Ctber (Specify} ...............................9
IF RESPOh~EI~T REFUSED
4. !~le~e outllms e-~use given by respoode~t:
PleaSe i~dtct.~e bow ptaz~ible the e~mse outlined above seemed
to ~: -
COL
14
17
s .-..~3 ._~ o__
~j m _,_~__ _
~CT;O~ ~ [NT~OUU~ON
P~ of M~t Ufc ..., ...... 4
IF IN I~UTH, MON£GHAN, L~TCM+ ~O, DONEGAL OR C^VAN, PLT.~SE ESTIM~.TE,
~L~
WI~ ~o mill.., ......... +.. 1
2 - $ mUez .................... 2
6* ]0mU~ ...... , ............ 3
1] - IS m~s ,...** ............ 4
Ov~ 15 m~lel ..,.,**.+ ........ $
COrk, ........................... ,..2
........................... 2
G~W~ ................ . ........... 2
W~ ...+., ........ * ........... 2
IF ~dT~ D~ THt F~IJSIJC
................. ¯ ...........
30
Loc~t ’~r: M£,~ City ............. . * ............ I
T~a .............................. 3
N~¢ of Co~r~
~¢~ .H... ........ . ............ 2
Gldwa? ............................ 2
"#~J fold ,H.,* .................... 2
OcbeJ ~o ~lCb Fop~ at~ou ¢m¢: 10, 000. 3
T~va m~J 3.0~ ~p ~ 10+ 0~ ........ 4
T~+00’~’e~ M~ wp ~+ 3,000 ........... S
vcJ~F ~, cp~ ~q, ..............
IF ~1~ DIE l[~E !~J M,J C
5¢~11~d .......................... 21
[mope ....... , ........ . ............ 30
Amcdca ................... ¯.. 31
2.
CoL
22
23
..?~. ...........
._??:P. ......
29
._P:.~? ........
~t2
cad 1
L~¢ IJJr~ MS~ Ctr/ .......................... 1
Mcdiv.m ~ d~ ................... 2
TO~ ..............................
VmAp ov ~ co~ .............. 4
N~m¢ of C,~a ~7
C,~k ...............................
LLmcr~ck ........................... 2
G~d~ay ............................ 2
w 81~r ~N .......................... 2
O~ ~B vi~ ~p~ ~r 10. 000. 3
Tm~n ~r ~,0¢0 up U~ 10.000 ........ 4
VUllg¢ o~ opca mu.~rry .............. 6
IF OIJT~D~ THE RE’F~NJC
£m’o~ ............................ 30
~¢tb Am*cd¢~ ...................... 31
~zv~e..’¢ .......................... 32
VW a~’e or ~ o~m~r7 .............. 4
C~rk ............................... 2
G~v~y ............................ 2
(F OUT~ ~IE TH[ R£~f IIJC
N~m I reJmd ..................... ¢T
Fa:~d~ ........................... 2~i
£m~ ............................. 30
Notch Amecdca ...................... 31
L~¢ ¢Lt tT~Ma~,m Clr/ ......................... 1
Tm~l .............................. 3
3.
30
39.40
4]
42, 43
4"~
21. Hzve you evel ~d br ~ d~ ¯ you om~d~ ~he ~publl¢ ?
Yes        ~
N~ Am¢l~©a .................. S
3° Sycm ............ 3
6- 10~ ........... 4
]$ * ),c~r~ .............. 6 $o
re1? lm~m’:lmt ................. I
F~dy lra?m:~t ...............
~mJy b’apmuu~l .............. S
[qo~]ly Im ~ 1mira L:~’t Jm ,.. 4
~.~ght[ y un~n pot uu~i ............ $
FaLr]y ~m~r[~ml .............. 6
Vc;y ~m~t .............. 7
27. Wb~ ~ dlil~ o( ~urlcl[ a= Irish. do ~)u I~ £1~ msJ~ ~ P~l:lbIlc o f [~ ~
P.cp ublic o[ t .~l~d .............. I
~epublt¢ p~u~ Nm~cm [rtland .,. 2
2& Agzi~. Iookl~q~ ~ ~ C~’d. ~m~ you V.U mc bo~ tm~r~z it i~ ~o ~ U~I lr;sb
very ir~mt ................. 1
F~rly lr~ ~r t ~t ................ 2
5~i~bdy importer .............. 3
F~hly ~m~t~mc .............. 6
Vc~ ~t mp~nmt ............... 7
64
65
SECTION U
X h~TR UCTIO~
On the Eol}owu~ !~ges yo~ will find some s~eme~s wh~h pec@le have
used ~ dlffere~ Limes Lo expreas ~beir feel~s Lbout a vLriety CL social
Isles, Some l~C~le bare RliTeed wiLb ~hese sl~Itements while o~er$ hive
dlsLgreed. As f~r as we are concerned there are no ri~b£ Or wrc~ ~Laswer$
¯ to ~se stat@rnen~l. The s£1t~emenis bkve been gathered from ¯ wide
"varle~y d sources lind do nol n~e$sari]y express ~Jr opLqions. We would
like yo~ to tell us bow you feel aben these statements by pI~ci~ ~ ’~X"
Ic~ the box ~Lch r~ost cLoseLy ~ee~mbLes your opLnlon.
AS it is likely th~tL yo~ ~’i|~ h~ve stronger views ~tbout some ~f ~ele $~a£e-
me~ts th~u~ ~ ~ters, wet h=v~ pr~Ided three de, tees ~ ~l~e.me~ m~i
.~hr4e degrees ~ dls~reemer~ for &ch s~eme~t. Ple~e p~e lm "X"
in the box which best ~escrlb~s your opinion.
^GRE~Tbc:¢ should b~ h~¢ m~/¢~J
...... ~iz~l, i Itr°nE~m°O¢II~l dfehtI i sli~hIlrn°de~J~I ~’~n~I
I~ y~a ~ you wo~ld place your ’~" like this:
DISA GR~E                       AGI~£
,--I~ZI =o~,,,,i a~z~t    i {---J.......-J-.~~i~’ ~,,~ ,==,
If yo~ ~, yo~ might pI=tce your ’~" |Ike this;
i 1 I×I           i
If y~u ~,’ you would pul y~r "X’* llke ~,hll:
~Lnions fraokly. Your ~nswers will be tre~ed in th~ strlctest c~de~ce.
Remember ~ the followl~ ~re a colle~gion of ~g~eme~s from different
sources ~d GO no~ n~:eslarlly express the opNm~ g t/~ rese~hers.
Ple~tse tnswer ~S quickl) U possible Mth~/t be~ c~trel~SS, US|~ yottr
fir~ impression without thinkin~ very long Itboul ~.ay one Item.

’-T’- ’--;- ’--~- ’-;- ’-~- ’--~- ’---:
"mrld
pIna~ :u"~:ur, o9~r ,1-,Ir ~ lucu; L,~dy
I I L_L_LI--+
~Y~V~Q
C~rd 2 9.
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SECTION IV
Now I have a couple cl forms which deal wRh broad outlooks
rela~iNl to some of the problems which we are dlscussing¯ At the top
of the following pages there is a he~i~, and below that there are paJ rs
of I/Jjectives sdth spaces betwlten. The melnir~ of each spice Is writ~n
acrc~s the top. I.et~ take a hypotbetield example of bow tlds scaJe Is
used:
¯ COMMUNISM
very qu~e slightly equlJly slightly quite very
Worthy :_ : : : : V*" : Unworthy
Bad : : V~ : : : :Good
In this example you would ask yoarself to what extent is Cornmunlsm worthy
or unworthy ; ba~ or ~ocd, For instances:
{1~ [~ youlelt that Cornmtlni~m wu ve_e~ unworthy, then you would put the
tick it, the spice righ~ beside the word unworthy.
(21 On the next Line, if y~J thaughi that Commuatsm wassuo~uRe bed ~0u~
net vel’y bad), you would place abe tick just away from~ad. Y~
wattl~ ooJ:tnue oct dow~ t!~ P~,l~e in thiL my. Judging on each li~e
how cl~ely the edJectlves ~ere related to C0mmtmtsm.
R may be dtfflcult to see how the td~ec~Ives are ~uited (relatad)
to some of the issues. If you are not sure of the meanLng of the adjective
at one lllde d the Hne, look at Rs 0pposlte.Remember tha~ adjectives
can have dLfferent meanLngs; lot: examp|e:
HARD can mean difficult, e.g, hard decision; HARD can mean solid,e.g.
hard watt.
So If you have trouble w/th some of the tdjective$, try to think of their
various meanings.
It wctdd he very unusuaJ if you felt chat every IsJtue was closely
related to every adjective. This is why we give you ¯ choice of seven
spaces ~o tlck o~ each |ins. If you feel that the [ssue at the top of the
page i$ ~ {0r tmrelated) to both ~ abe ed)ecifves ~ a li~e,
th4tn y¢~ f*hettld t~ck the m~ddl~ s_~ of fleet lL’~e* ¥ot.t should worR as,
¯ qulckl~’ as po~slble wRhout being cltrelsss, uslng your flrst Impres~io¢,
. wRho~, thinking very l~4g ab~Jt any one il~m.
Never p~t more tJ~m one tick on a~y one line and do ~ot forget
any line. Treat each li~e separately, with0~t locking back or th/nkldg
about your prevt~a twlwe~s. Remembec ~he tnformation you give here
is eoaflden|lt/, SO please express y~rsetf freely¯
II.
BEPUBLIC,4J~ISM
(,4.
V..
~L
6L
71. WiSe ~.. : : : :
YL
TJ.
74.
¯ Wort37 : : --" -- : : : : Ummrtby
Fa.-nJli~r :
¯ ~ m
_: : Uv~Usr
EUy ~ : : : : : : : DIf[icuh
B~ : . --- ~ --- -- _: m.: Good
Irrelevant : .... : Rel~ts~
_4_0~ ........
51 .........
: I~e-L*cm~ro~rlda2 ............
: F c<,ILs~ .........
COst]y : . -- : : : : : C~eap
s? ..........

SECTION V
In thil Section we would like to have your opinlmss on memo Rs~ts d the
Northern Lrelsmd Co~lict Situation. AS in Section If, please place an "X"
in the box which best describe# the way you feel stbout each st~temenl.
AgAin there m~e no’right" or "w~’~’t a~swers; we are interested simply in
wh~ you yoerself think. Please answer a~ qulcldy ~ possible without being
ezreless. PleaSe remember th~ your ~wers wW be treated in the
strictest co~der*ce,
l~wlB©aakm Is emeazial ~     ~n~ mo~kr,le sl~f~I szl~1 m~ckla~ m~8
my mludoa of ~e ~’c~ km la
~,~-o-    I I I II I I
94. Th4 b4~ic psob~m to
~re~ ~ modcz|I e slit~ht
DIS^~
g~ Tb~ F~s~ce ~ I ~rHId~
amo~m~ m (o~lp oee~pzdo~
Cot
L~
~3 8)~k
I"[ I ! .........
I I I I .........
I I I i-
~lgi~t m~k~ale ~g
I I I ,.~: .........
~ ~’.~.~ .........
A~
Card 3             14.
3O
3~

C=rd 4 16.
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SECTION V]
119. ’l’be.re hss been ¯ lot ~ talk ~bout solutions to the present pr01~em
hi Northern Ireland. Now l want you to leave aside what you wo~d
like to see In a~ /de" world and tell me which of the fotlowir~ is
the moat workJtbl¢ ~ acceptable toyou as a s~ull0e. (Card 1 )
Northern Ireland ~o remain port ~,the U.K.. wUh ¯
devolved governmen~ ~ its own ...................]gotoQ. 12(
Norther~ h’eland to remain part ~ the U.K,. with
no parlLtment d RS own, bet gover~.l dlrecOy
[T~n lJ~don ....................................2 go t~) Q.121
North~r~ I~e[~cl ~d the Republic to unite, with
government .....................................3 go toQ.122
Northerl~ ireland and the Republic to unite in ¯
federal ttystem, that is with strong regi~lal govern-
mental for Northern Ireland and the ~e.~Jbl~c M
wed ~ut Sn ore rai } ¢~mt r;li gover nr~o.t .............4 go to Q.123
NortherD Ireland to be independent, not lh~ked to
J3rRaln or the Republic ...........................$ go to Q.124
Northern Irelond to be jointly c~tr~lled by the
~ritl~h government and the government ~[ ~he 14
Republic, with a devceved governm~t c~ its ~’n ....6 to go Q. 12~ .......
120. Should this de~’olve~ go~ernment be based 0,3 majority rule. or
sbculd there be power-sharLqg, that is, =houJd the Cathulie
minority have the ~arantee¢~ right to be part ~/ the Government ?
Control bY the majority ......I
P~,er-~harieg ............. ,2 Go to Q. 126 .15 ......
121. Should Northern Ireland be governed by Direct ~1 with a
~.~reUt~y ~ State, or ~hmfld it be iuhy iv~egr¯ted ~d treated
as ~u~y ~.b~r part ~ Eagia~2
Direct Rule .................1 Got~.Q* 126 16
Full l~egr=tio~ .............2 .........
L22. ~mtd ~b~s governm~:~ be ¢c~tr~led by ~ mtjorRy, or s’~,~Sd
there be power-sharing, the~ Is, should the Prctesltnl minority
h~ve th~ &~sr~teed right to be part el" the gOVernment-?
CooZro} by the majority .......i
Povae¢-sh~t~{~ll ..............2 Go to Q. 126 .17 .....
123. In regard ~o the federal system, should there he two regioa~
goverrtme~s, one for Northern Ireland ted ~ for the Republic,
or shct~d there be f~:ur regional gover~mm~l, one tot each
the e~d prc~f~,ees?
Two regional governments... 1Go to Q. 126 IFo~x relgiO~d gover~tments ...2 ..........
17.Card 4
124. ShC~kbtha government d an lndepeadenl Northern Ireland be
cooLroll~ by the majorRy, or should there be power-sh;Lr~,
that is, should the Catholic m~nority b~ve the guaranteed right
to be p~r~ or ~ ¢overn~nsni ?
CoQtrol by the majority ...... 1 GO xo Q 128.
Powe r- sharing .............. 2
125. ~ld tb~s dev¢|v~ g~’ern~f~ ha c~r~ by th# maJorl[y.
or shaukl there be p~ver°sharthg, thaL is. should the CaLholic
mhtority have the guar~te0d righL to be part c( the gover~mev~ ?
CogroL by the majority ...... 1 Go to ~. 126
Po~er-s~g .............. 2
126. Vltxio¢~ steps have haen suggested which the ]3rltisb and Irish
gwerwm~ts might t~Lke tn order to assist in brLnglng abotlt
a Iolutica. First of all. please indicate ~ether y¢~ agree
or disggr~e w/Lh g2~se ~eps thmt ~he ~ goverame~ Bight
take ?

19.
pUc~zUy r~tivsw4, as O~r~
144. ~ I~t~ll~ ip~=l’r~nlr~t Wc~ld
I~nlli larJ g,o~pL
14& ~r/d~h wt~raw~ h~ .~m~m
i~.l ~ wlthoul ~ c~aK~ I of d~
] i i II i :: .......
D~I~~- AI~II~
rn~cr~u: ~lSbz I~bl m~le~a~ s~g
I    tl ’1    i ......
146.~0w i~ you look 3t this {/St ~ SOlutions P.~aJn, wo~l~I you ~e.~ me wh~t~
your ~cnd choice for a s~utlon wo~ld be .~ (Cusd ! )
Northern [rela~ to remaL~ p~rt O[ the U. K., with
¯ devolved ~over~fl~ent ~ /~s ~’n .................I go ~o ~. 14 ?
Northern L~elzu~ ~0 remain p~rt ~ the U..~. wlth
~o pzrlL-.r,.ent ~ it~ own. but gover~i directly
from Londo~ ...................................2 go to Q,I~8
¯ Northern [rel:~d and the P~ep~bllc to x:~tte. ~t~
One g ~’e r n.’~ent ......................., .....3 go to Q.149
Northern Iral~n~ ~d ~ I1cp~b[~c to ur~te in ¯
feder~ system, tQ~t is with sCror~ regi~l
governments .~or Northern Lrela~ xnd the
l~rtm~ent ......................: .............4 go ~oQ.i$0
Northern ~r~u~J to be U~eper~e~t. tz~ llr.ke~ ~o
~rtta~ or ~ P.ep~blic .......................~.. 5 go to Q,1~I
Norther~ Ireta~zi ~o be Jointly co~r~ll~l ~y the
[~r|tish govercme~t ~ ~e government oz" the
~epublic. with ¯ devcJv~J govercm~nt ~ its own ... 6 go ~o Q:I$2
147.
~ould t~s devolved ~ov~rnm~t be bLsed oo majority r~e, or should
there ~e pow~r-~h~:Ing, th~ is. shcu~i ~l-.e C~t.~olic minority h~w
the £~r~ee.J r~h~ to ~e part ~ the Govern~en~ ?
C~r~ by ~ maJor~y ......1 Go to ~. 1S3
Po~r-s~.r~ .............2
148.~hOULd Norther~ [reLlU~ be goveroe~ by Direct ~k ~,-ith a Secret~ry
cg State, or shOUld U be fuUy Ln~.egrntcd and treated a~ any other
part d England ?
D/r~t Ru/e .................l Go to Q, 153
Full ~e~r atlon .............Z
149.~o~Id this ~overumen~ be coatroUed by the majority, or should there
be ~r-sh~rin~. that is, should th~ Prote~.~r~ minority hnve the
~’~aran~ed rigl~ to be p~rt ~ the got,cramenl ?
Conf, r~ by the m:~Jori~y ......1 Go to q. 153
power-sharlzlg ..............2 .....
46
47
Cird 4 21.
154.With regcrd to the Northern IreLand i~r~blem some people chink we
should insist on a United Ireland to be Impleme~ed In~mediztaly
while other pe~le thLnk that we should 2b4mdon Lbe alto c/ s
United Ireland altogether. (~ ccdJrse other peopJe have opinions
son~ewbere between these extreme
~ 
(Card J).
Suppose the people who believe ~bat we sh~dd I~sls~ on ¯ Un~ed
h’etsnd immedi~ely are it one eDd ~ this scale, lU poL~ rim=bet omm,
s~d Lbe people who th~k we shoed abandon ~ ~m ~ a Uai~ed
Iraleald altogether are ~ the ~.her end, ~ point ~mber 7.
Insist oo | Aba~d~ Lhe aim
Ual~d Uatt~ Ix e L~d
Ireland now. altogether
1 2 3 4 S 6 7
:. : *__ : :     :
(Interviewer Instr~ctlo¢,: please write ccde number into box)
Where would you place yOUrseLf On this scLle ?[]154
I55.Where would you place Ftmma FaLl? []
156.Wh~re would you place Fine Gae| i’ []
157 Where would you place the Labour P~r~y? ~’]
L----J
4g .....
50
.51_ .....
22. ¯
v¢~, r~t~ dlgh~y e,~y tl[ghdy q~: very
1 2 3 ¯ $ /~ 7
~_
[a pouu¢~ do )~ emal~y c2d~k of ~r~lf ~ Flanaa F~, F~ G~¢I, LabOr, m
whau
¯ F~ J==s FaLL .......................................... 01
FL~ G~J ........................................... .02
L,tbo~ .............................................. O3
S~m ~=in d~ ’*’orkcr’ t par:?/O facial ~ Fcb] ........... 04
~cialE~ Lebo~ p~rt)" ................................. 07
l~epeed¢~l Fla~ F~ ............................... 08
O:~nmmJ~ p~n? a ~ [ ;~.la~d ............................ 09
;;oapa~ll~m ..................... , ............ ¯ ....... 11
IF F,~p~VO[NT D~.5 NOT )~AM][A pARTy..~( ¢~ 163
~3
~6
_.s~:_~ .......
164.
~ ~m:ra~ly ~ak of ~ncl f u ¯ IIrJ~ elmer K* ok of me pA~tCB ~hm W
O;bt:r~l
Flea FXU ................................ 01
~ GI, el ................................. 02
LX~Om .................................... O3
~n tht WO~e.I’S ~/Ofllclxl ~ ~lL.04
Sod~l~l La~ pxrv; ....................... 07
VAt p~de.n t FI~A FXU .....................
C,~m m unt~ plV~ of rrelmd .................. @g
15L In ’~rms of poUa©xl px~¢~ ~ ~ld your fa~l c~nk of h~m~Af In po~B w~ ~
Flua F~ ................................ G]
.................................... 03
C~m~ml~ p~y ol Er~l~ .................. 04
~.~o T.eAD p~ ]~7 .......................... 06
amn ~l T ~m hxtn ......................... 09
C~mt~ par~ ............................... 10
~on p~m.~n ............................... 12
vc~ ~win8 ~p
I~?. FIWA Fxfl ................................ 0]
Fi~e G~el ................................. 02
Cm~m~mt~ p~’ty o~ i~m~ .................. ~4
~m ~:la We ]72"~ .......................... 06
Cl~m~ n8 ~hl~ ......................... 08
~’3m a~ TtL"0bx£~ ......................... 09
Cu~e p~e/ ............................... ~D
t~m p.~ ~4m ............................... I~
St
.*0~!! ....... ~
^rid (n ~as of ~HEic~U ~ boy did ~ r~m~ m~ of b~lf ~ ~ v~
RaJ~ J FI~I ......... , .......... , .......... Ol
Fluc G~Z ................................ , 02
[.Lbom .................................... 03
Corn mmist p~), of I~lZnd ................. 04
St~ .~ ( 1927- 2970) ....................... 05
F~Ja p,: 1927 ... ...................... 05
Cm’n a~ aJ Gaedbe4Z * ...................... 07
C~ma no ~bl ,*¢bt= ......................... ¢~S
~ ua Ta~n~l~ .. * ...................... 09
Other ( spe~ ~’) ............................. IZ
DOO’[ ~ ......... * ...................... ,,~3
IF RE~NDF.~T ~ NOT NAME ^ p/LRT¥. ^~J~ O. 16g
ZT0. Fizz Fail....: .......................... 0]
Ft~c G,,ml ............................... .02
FC~ p~ 1~’~’7 ......................... O6
~-n m am~ z~A Ga~lh~ .................... 07
C~m U Ttlmha~ ....................... 09
~ p~rds~m ..............................
$9
.*~*0A.7.2 ........
73
.-7~. ...........

Ca~4 S 26 .
178. ~1t~ Name ........................ 01
~.w :psych Dal]7 M~J ...................
Dldly ~ ................. 04
D~ily T~l~Et~pb .............. 05
G~a:41au .................... 07
Io~dae T~¢+ ................ 08
S~ ......................... O9
17E [eb~ ~ .*~.***.+ .............. I
N~W lpl~n EV~g HCllld ............... 3
~g P, mml ........ : ........ ¯
O~ ................ ’ ........ $
180. [II~I . NCOe+ ........................ 1
S~mdsy ~c~s7 ~¢pc~de~I ........... 2
New :p~l~es 5,~d ~y P’m~ ............ :.... 3
Suoda7 world ................ 4
S=]d~7 N.~w: of ~ Wo~d.. ........... 2
OOb~n’e~r ..................... .~
S~ly ExpIeU * ¯.. *. .........
S~da7 ~IL’mt ................ $
~ndz~ T~eS ................
oLgkm~yl Htb~m/s ..................... 2
Mot~hly =ewl- MI~tU ...~ ..................
~Ipe~s c¢ l~cll/pmv~t~ l~ ............. 4
183. WiLh~=Sa~:oT.Y.
, 
wb~chC~a~l~Idy~ne~[~l,~w~:h~
L~.C. L ................... 3
~ ~Cl9 .................... 4
U.T.V./I.T.V */~.T. V ....... $
Co],
Du~. 1-11
19
14
- ~.%.~Z ........
+}.+. ...........
~o
21
22
Card S 27.
~mo~ vmy ofmn
S
riJ~
187. Wttb ~c8~ m I~dio. wblc~b ~m$ vaIL~ ~ ~ ,w4l~y U~ ~1
~ Ei~eaau .................. !
Itad~ R~ G atl,~.~ta ........... 2
a, S. C* .......................
IWdlo ~ ................... 4
O~r (s~c~l) ................. S
^ppuc~Le .................
IM. H~ o~ ~ you ~ u~ ~7 o f ~ foU~vLu8 ~ of Radio ~u~ga~mm~)
2 2 3
¯ $
11~. Nevs
~g. ~ A~f~tz amd
190. ~b~ ~a,~mq~e
V.’be~ y~ U~ W yore &lm)4~ boy o ft~n do ym~ ~ i~m FoUnts)
A)mog ~ ............... 1
P.a~.~7 ............... . ....... 2
Occmlo~ ................. 3
t~ovwm~dy~ew.~racvb~c~Zi~msdoy~beloo$~n~ ¯
CatbnU¢ ........................... )
C~M~Cb of I~a~l ................... 2
Pmsbym~ ....................... 3
Mecbod£g ......................... ¯
Otbe~ ~e~gaat .................... $
Jew~b ............. ~. ............. S
F~o’~cacl~u~ .................... 9
110. I~ me~ic~J~$ O) ~ mtl~ F~U~: na~ formcx mU~:
Cstbn]lc .......................... ]
Ct~m~ of Zm,la~d °.., .............. 2
)d~l~od£~ ......................... 4
)ewi~b ........................... 6
24
26
~s
30
3]
32
How o~. I f e~. 4o you p m M~Z of ~rl~l
On]}’ i ai~l y ....................... 2
A I~ zl~s~ ¯ yt~ ................. 3
OOC¢ 8 ~ont~ ...................... 4
TviCt CI ~zee E~nes a £nog~1 ........ $
Ooc~ i re, ok ...................... 6
DaLly ............................. $
196. ^~z (w~) hoch ~*om ~’r~r and ~z fa~x o f I~c z~mc r~u~oa ~ 7~u 1
Whal ~U~oa Lt ~0m [z~hel ~ )4o~ if dc~a~d. F4c,~z azk vhal 1~#~on ~ w~)
Prubyz~rt~ .................. 3
Memo~is~ .................... 4
/cv4s~ ...................... G
Z~o~-~acztdng ............... 9
¢~dzoU~ .....................
Mecbod[cz .................... 4
Ox~cr PzO~I .............. $
~wL~h ...................... 6
No ~lls~on ...............
.... ?
o~f ~tlSi~ (,~¢d ~y) ........ s
Aad wkaz re.kl~l¢~ ~ yow mo~e~ (~ ffd~:c:~,a~d, paea~ a~kvhlt ~.l/~
ClOUt. ..................... I
Fc~y~rlan .................. ;S
Mc~odl~ .................... 4
0~: P~¢ ............... $
Non pla~$ ................ g
~o ~ kncv wh~ ~U/~OO [h¢ va~ bccc~b~ ~p L~
Ca~l/c ...................... 1
Church o f [rciau0d ............ 2
~d~u~ .................. 3
Me’bodt 1~ .................... 4
Ot~ P~o~c~l .............. S
p:vish .................
~.... 6
~ r~LLi~o .................. |
35
3~
200, N~. ~ y~u ,~.U me vb~ leve.J b~ y~oo ~sdled vbe.u ~u ~,b~.d ~a~ fl~-~me
educs~ ~
P~,mar! - ~a~en~c~e ............................... ~ .........
P’~rn m’y + ~np~ ........................................... 2
T©¢~ caJ/Voci~#J - b~om F~
~ 
............................. 3
Inern~edl a~ C~rd~¢l~e/G~c~p Ce~ ~cl~ ................ ~ ...... $
Urd vrJd (7 m o~bez ~:d level Im~ mtJ~ . Incom pjl~: ~e ........... ... ?
Gra4u~r of Uni’,.~z~ty ¢~ ot~ ~u~rd level ~ti~c~. ............. 9
201.
~ ra~ t~ pflm~ scb0~ ~ ~ne~ded ;or mo~ o~ y~r curie in prlm~ ~qoo] ~ (C~d M)
Lay ~ ............................................
C~tinlam l~a~ .................................... 2
O~et ~scb~ ~ o~ Bmtben ....................... 3
Dlc~e~ p~i~u~ or Tr.acM~g Ol~k:z o ( prles~ ............. 4
Te.,~b~n8 orde.r o ~ S~s’~r~./NUnS ....... ;....’......" ......
O~be: (specie) ......................................
DOO’ i ~ ......................
. ...................
?
~F L~y RUN. A~ O. 2~2
P’zo~mmc ............... ]
CS~OU¢ ................. 2
O~r (~.~i~’) ............ 4 ~"
21~. ^~d ~bo ram zhe ~:cooda.~ schOOl you i(~e.sd~d ~or mo~ of 7~m tithe In ~
Lay i~lm ........................................... )
C’m~stilm ~z~m:be
n 
.................................. 2
DIoce.~ ~ or T~,:b~ ~r of pr~e~.~c ........... ¯
Tc~l~ng o~er of :~ ~,~n/N ~ ....................... $
Ochr t ( ~cl~ ....................................
~o’ i Imov ....................................... q
LF lay 7;UN, ASC~ Q. 204
204. ’,,~ Is il a I:*zo¢~cJu~ o: a C|~WL[¢ ,~*choo] ?
C~(bolie ................. 2
Ma)e ............... 1
Fem~ec ............. 2
Nov. j~m co flm~ up. I wau~t u:* So ~ ¯ ~ ¢~.~ans ~ c~.m~ng yc~ ~pa~a~ rac.
20~ /m: you: S~Lf’Emp)~ ........ ~ ..................... 1
Employed fu11*t~n~ ......................... 2
Employed psz~-~m~ ........................ 3
Ful;- flm~ msdem .......................... 6
H~Vl|~ md p~’r t~n~ Cmple~,~,~ ........... T
4o
41
42
45
212. Oo pl: m ~ b~ad o f ~ t:~lr.b~ld ~ ~t ~a ~dl~., ~nd/~ ~l~n
~
- ~ ............
..1
1 " ~ em~s....~
3-4 ............. 3
?’]0 ............ $
~]-20 ............ 5
2]-~ ............ 7
G~e r ~g ........... I
¯ :~S_ ...........
49
~2
Cans 5
31
214.
21S.
pieam ~ ~ dz¢ of fa,~m in s~
Uadcr 5 a~c~ ....... I
5-14 ............ 2
I$-2~ ............ 3
¯ 0-49 ............ 4
S0 - I00 ........... 6
Ovcl ]CO ........... G
FARM, ple~¢ ~k 0:¢ ~ n~’nbcr ol ¢m~¢$ on ~¢ fz:’m,
},~m¢ .............. 1
! -2 ............. .2
~-4 .............
219. If ~ ~aLte ¢~                   (C~N)
.................... 01 .................... 2~
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................... ~0S .................... J$
.................... 06 ................... I$
................... 09 .................... I~
.................... 08 .............. ~..... 18
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234.
~J~:E$$ ~c~ stak ~ ~d run,be: Of cn~.tu Of ~
bu~a~
" 2 empires ....... 2
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FAP~. F~¢z~ sts~¢ tbt ~z¢ of fa~ bn *~lmte ac~s
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SECTION IX
CaLrd 5 33.
Note~
This section is applicable only to respondents who have
indicted that t/mix c~’n reltgioo or former religion is(ve#.s) C~rch
o/ Irldand, Presbyteri~m or Methodist - NOT to be administered to
"Other ProtesLv~t" or "C~r 1~eligio~’.
READ OUT:
As you have seen from the queginnnaire, this study is primarily con-
cerned with the con/’lict in Northern Ixeinnd. grid tht~, invo]~s reistlons
bet~n Ca~holics and Protestants. We grB thereA’ore in.rested Ln
getting the views v/ Proteat~mts in the Republic. AS you undoubtedly
know the percentage d ~he pvpulaLton in the Republic who are Prc~e~mt
is very low. The probabURy ~ picking up a signiflca~ ~umber
Pro~stant respondent8 in our sample is therefore’very sm~tl].
For this rsa~oa we are departing slightly from ottr tLsual procedure Of
raadom sampling, fred would like to interview some Prc~est~mts in
add ition to th~4te in the origi~ saxapin. Rather inLn looking for some-
One with paxlicuinr vim on the toPic, we ~lnt to m~Xe OUr choice Of
e~ri Pro~st~t resp~,Qde.~s u o|os~ ~ p~s~in ~o ¯ trl~e ¢ro4M~-~tinf:
of opinion. To achieve this we would like you ~o give us the ngmes Of
the fot~" Pro~estgats known p~rsonally ~o you who live the shortest dista~ce
from here. This is tto~ our customary procedure, b~l v*~ bop~ yr~
uederstaad the reasons ~or R in the particular study. Just as is the
case ~Ath your own answer~ to ~lds questionnaire. ~he re~p~es of the
people whom yo~ a~me ~’UI be kelP4 s~rictly coofkien~Lsl, and t~ Iofor-
m¯~io~ used ~or statintinsd p~rposes only.
Card $        34,
We wOUld very much appreciate your cooper~tioo in this ma~ter.
FILL I~" NAMES AND ADDRESSES BELOW:
i, Name
Address
2. NLme
Address
3. Name
Address
4. Name
Address
IF RESPONDENT IS A/~ EXTRA PROTESTANT RESPONDEN’TI FILL
IN THE FOLLOWING
227. interviewer No.
225. ~tervlew NO. ~ person
frolm whom na~e and
address obt gibed
71,72
~ .....
C. ha y~ Op~LOB, ~ eb~rt Any ~a~a why U~C rLq~l did Jm ~i~. v6Ud In~¢ms~udm (~a~.
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¯
]
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2
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j                                75
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